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regret

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 487–514.
Published: 01 October 2018
... premise that becoming overridden can result in “moral residue” (e.g., in the appropriateness of feeling regret). But then, I note, one could similarly infer not-OIC—via not-(1)—from the premise that becoming infeasible can result in moral residue. So there is an argument against OIC which parallels the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 495–499.
Published: 01 July 2020
... that predictably frustrate the ends they have or ought to have. This is the upshot of the “life-saving argument” (an allusion to Plato) against near bias in chapter 2 and the “no regrets argument” (based on previous work with Preston Greene) against future bias in chapter 6. More on these two arguments...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 507–535.
Published: 01 October 2004
... : 241 -62. ____. 2003 . How is Strength of Will Possible? In Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality , ed.S. Stroud and C. Tappolet, 39 -67. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Humberstone, I. L. 1980 . You'll Regret It. Analysis 40 : 175 -76. Jones, K. 2003 . Emotion, Weakness of Will, and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 118–121.
Published: 01 January 2000
... believe there are no black people present, and to distribute this card when they do. I regret any discomfort my presence is causing you, just as I am sure you regret the discomfort your racism is causing me. Sincerely yours, Adrian Margaret Smith Piper (1996, 220) Handing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 575–578.
Published: 01 October 2015
...” ( akousion ) unless they are painful or regretted ( EN 1110b18–22). Echeñique addresses this apparent counterevidence by insisting that it is only the unrepentant agents, not the unrepented actions, that Aristotle is refusing to classify as involuntary (173–78). This is a highly strained reading of the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 241–286.
Published: 01 April 2016
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 592–595.
Published: 01 October 2000
... guilt ade- quately from other kinds of pained reaction to past events (such as shame, remorse, regret, and so on). Moreover, it may be doubted whether the interest we take in past failures to abide by the standards that regulate deliberation really justifies the claim that we hold ourselves...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 374–377.
Published: 01 July 2014
... targets of so many of the critical essays, I regretted Korsgaard's absence and found Street's excellent chapter a nevertheless disappointing choice for this volume. I would have preferred to see her address the most common and pressing skeptical questions about her interesting and ambitious metaethical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 120–122.
Published: 01 January 2001
... that his bestowal of freedom won’t turn out to be a gift he’ll quite properly regret. THOMASP. FLINT University of Notre Dam 122 ...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 647–650.
Published: 01 October 2007
... Hans Herzberger, Amartya Sen, and Peter Walley. The next essays, by Joseph Raz (“Personal Practical Conflicts”) and Monika Betzler (“Sources of Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret both attempt to explain the sense in which even choosing the best of conflicting options may be...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 650–653.
Published: 01 October 2007
... Peter Walley. The next essays, by Joseph Raz (“Personal Practical Conflicts”) and Monika Betzler (“Sources of Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret both attempt to explain the sense in which even choosing the best of conflicting options may be unsatisfactory, or leave reasons for...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 654–656.
Published: 01 October 2007
... Herzberger, Amartya Sen, and Peter Walley. The next essays, by Joseph Raz (“Personal Practical Conflicts”) and Monika Betzler (“Sources of Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret both attempt to explain the sense in which even choosing the best of conflicting options may be unsatisfactory...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 657–663.
Published: 01 October 2007
... (“Sources of Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret both attempt to explain the sense in which even choosing the best of conflicting options may be unsatisfactory, or leave reasons for regret. Raz argues that, in conflict situations, it is impossible to completely conform to reason; even if the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 663–666.
Published: 01 October 2007
... next essays, by Joseph Raz (“Personal Practical Conflicts”) and Monika Betzler (“Sources of Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret both attempt to explain the sense in which even choosing the best of conflicting options may be unsatisfactory, or leave reasons for regret. Raz argues that, in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 589–592.
Published: 01 October 2000
.... Constraints, as constraints, are essential to the goal they superfi- cially seem to constrain. Of course, if this response is correct, then the one he takes may be precisely the wrong one. Though I regret doing so, I must add that this book will win no laurels 59...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 632–635.
Published: 01 October 2000
... book, On Action, I neglected to mention McCann’s much earlier work-an oversight that I very much regret. 633 BOOK REVIEWS contains a reference to a willing and so on, the implicit specification of the content would indeed never...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 667–670.
Published: 01 October 2013
... antecedent wish and our antecedent efforts.” Stoic theory requires that I should accept this event as occurring for the best, but it does not follow from this that I must accept it gladly . On the contrary, I might (and given my previous commitments inevitably would) accept it with the bitterest regret...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 567–570.
Published: 01 October 2003
... students of Aristotle will most care about), and two brief indexes (of names and of subjects). Broadie tackles Aristotle’s argument on its own terms, unburdened by explicit engagement with other commentators. Specialists may regret this choice, but anyone who has struggled with the demands of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 409–414.
Published: 01 July 2006
... pp. Saurette, Paul. 2005. The Kantian Imperative: Humiliation, Common Sense, Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. xiv + 305 pp. Scruton, Roger. 2005. Gentle Regrets: Thoughts from a Life. London: Continuum. vii + 248 pp. Sedley, David, ed. 2005. Oxford Studies in Ancient...