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regret
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 487–514.
Published: 01 October 2018
... the premise that becoming overridden can result in “moral residue” (e.g., in the appropriateness of feeling regret). But then, I note, one could similarly infer not-OIC—via not-(1)—from the premise that becoming infeasible can result in moral residue. So there is an argument against OIC which parallels...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 495–499.
Published: 01 July 2020
... that predictably frustrate the ends they have or ought to have. This is the upshot of the “life-saving argument” (an allusion to Plato) against near bias in chapter 2 and the “no regrets argument” (based on previous work with Preston Greene) against future bias in chapter 6. More on these two arguments below...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 507–535.
Published: 01 October 2004
... : 241 -62. ____. 2003 . How is Strength of Will Possible? In Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality , ed.S. Stroud and C. Tappolet, 39 -67. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Humberstone, I. L. 1980 . You'll Regret It. Analysis 40 : 175 -76. Jones, K. 2003 . Emotion, Weakness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 118–121.
Published: 01 January 2000
... they believe
there are no black people present, and to distribute this card when they do.
I regret any discomfort my presence is causing you, just as I am sure you regret
the discomfort your racism is causing me.
Sincerely yours,
Adrian Margaret Smith Piper (1996, 220)
Handing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 241–286.
Published: 01 April 2016
... of the mistakes he made before meeting Mary will be things he can appropriately regret. More generally, people whose lives have gone well should have few regrets about their early choices. Of course, we often do have such regrets, and judge them to be appropriate. Nevertheless, I do not think that the claim...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
...). Our assessment of those Savage acts may focus on a variety of properties, such as their worst or best possible outcomes, or the amount of “regret” we would experience if our choice led to a bad outcome. Here are two illustrative theories: Maximax: Choose a Savage act with the greatest best-case...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 575–578.
Published: 01 October 2015
... they are painful or regretted ( EN 1110b18–22). Echeñique addresses this apparent counterevidence by insisting that it is only the unrepentant agents, not the unrepented actions, that Aristotle is refusing to classify as involuntary (173–78). This is a highly strained reading of the relevant texts. To that same...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
... of Philosophy 59 : 5 -30. List, Christian. 2003 . “A Possibility Theorem on Decisions over Multiple Propositions.” Mathematical Social Sciences 45 : 1 -13. Loomes, Graham, and Robert Sugden. 1982 . “Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice under Uncertainty.” Economic Theory 92...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 1–50.
Published: 01 January 2007
... a highly accessible discussion of the same topic.
44
The Persecutor’s Wager
the maximin principle would direct us to choose the option with the
least bad this-worldly worst-case scenario, namely, liberty.
(iii) The minimax regret...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 647–650.
Published: 01 October 2007
... for Regret both
attempt to explain the sense in which even choosing the best of conflicting
options may be unsatisfactory, or leave reasons for regret. Raz argues that, in
conflict situations, it is impossible to completely conform to reason; even if the
agent does his or her best, he or she cannot...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 650–653.
Published: 01 October 2007
... for Regret both
attempt to explain the sense in which even choosing the best of conflicting
options may be unsatisfactory, or leave reasons for regret. Raz argues that, in
conflict situations, it is impossible to completely conform to reason; even if the
agent does his or her best, he or she cannot...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 654–656.
Published: 01 October 2007
... for Regret both
attempt to explain the sense in which even choosing the best of conflicting
options may be unsatisfactory, or leave reasons for regret. Raz argues that, in
conflict situations, it is impossible to completely conform to reason; even if the
agent does his or her best, he or she cannot...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 663–666.
Published: 01 October 2007
...-maximization, the criterion favored by Hans Herzberger,
Amartya Sen, and Peter Walley.
The next essays, by Joseph Raz (“Personal Practical Conflicts”) and
Monika Betzler (“Sources of Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret both
attempt to explain the sense in which even choosing the best...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 657–663.
Published: 01 October 2007
...-maximization, the criterion favored by Hans Herzberger,
Amartya Sen, and Peter Walley.
The next essays, by Joseph Raz (“Personal Practical Conflicts”) and
Monika Betzler (“Sources of Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret both
attempt to explain the sense in which even choosing the best...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 95–124.
Published: 01 January 2012
..., forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings. (P. F. Strawson
1993, 48)
I shall call this larger set of sentiments (of which the reactive attitudes are
a proper subset) ‘personally engaged attitudes.’ Strawson contrasts this
larger set with such sentiments as fear, pity, regret, repulsion, and some
forms...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 374–377.
Published: 01 July 2014
... and Korsgaard's views are the targets of so many of the critical essays, I regretted Korsgaard's absence and found Street's excellent chapter a nevertheless disappointing choice for this volume. I would have preferred to see her address the most common and pressing skeptical questions about her interesting...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 120–122.
Published: 01 January 2001
... quite properly regret.
THOMASP. FLINT
University of Notre Dam
122 ...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 667–670.
Published: 01 October 2013
..., I might (and given my previous commitments inevitably would) accept it with the bitterest regret. That conflict of attitudes does indeed presuppose a bifurcation between the personal standpoint and the standpoint of one who identifies with the rational direction of the universe as a whole...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 592–595.
Published: 01 October 2000
... to past events (such as shame,
remorse, regret, and so on). Moreover, it may be doubted whether the
interest we take in past failures to abide by the standards that regulate
deliberation really justifies the claim that we hold ourselves morally re-
sponsible for such failures. Our ongoing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 589–592.
Published: 01 October 2000
..., are essential to the goal they superfi-
cially seem to constrain. Of course, if this response is correct, then the one
he takes may be precisely the wrong one.
Though I regret doing so, I must add that this book will win no laurels
59 1...
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