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referential indeterminacy

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 43–79.
Published: 01 January 2017
...David E. Taylor This essay argues that deflationism (about truth and reference) is incompatible with the phenomenon of referential indeterminacy (RI). This puts the deflationist in the difficult position of having to deny the possibility of what otherwise seems like a manifest and theoretically...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 602–604.
Published: 01 October 2002
... BOOK REVIEWS puzzle is to take Newton’s reference to have been indeterminate as between the two kinds of mass, and similarly in other cases of theory change. But then induction suggests that the language of our own current scientific theories must be full of referential indeterminacy as well...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
.... For simplicity, I am here assuming that ‘P’ determinately refers to a certain com- pound. Below I shall open the door for referential indeterminacy of ordinary proper names. 33. Designators of the form ‘the fact that a exists at t’ and ‘the fact that a is F at t’are to be read as ‘the fact that a exists...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
... disquote clear truths’. If it is clear that ‘ p ’ is true, then RT licenses the enquotational inference to ‘ ‘ p ’ is true’ is true, but not the disquotational inference to p . 26 © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 revenge paradox semantic paradox higher-order indeterminacy determinacy...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... are veridical of the particulars that the singular elements referentially apply to. They attribute kinds, properties, or relations to the perceived particulars. The perception veridically represents a particular as being the way the perceptual attributives indicate. So much for terminological preliminaries...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 142–147.
Published: 01 January 2002
... more referential and ontological continuity between successful theories than what is implied by Laudan s antirealist argument. Such continuity of reference defeats incom- mensurability and vindicates the truth of parts of past theories which on the surface seem to exhibit referential failure. Fourth...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 1–31.
Published: 01 January 2005
... not then their status with respect to (and ‘not would not be indeterminate (indefinite, unclear, uncertain). There would be a “fact of the matter”: borderline cases are not Such a result runs counter to the very nature of borderline cases. Call this the ‘argument from indeterminacy’. (3) Even if we could say...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 381–384.
Published: 01 July 2010
... contents rather than referential ones—the kind of contents that are typically associated with internalism about content. More strikingly, in chapter 6, Stalnaker argues that it is a fundamental constraint on thought that agents always know what they are thinking in the sense that their thoughts have...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 384–391.
Published: 01 July 2010
... contents rather than referential ones—the kind of contents that are typically associated with internalism about content. More strikingly, in chapter 6, Stalnaker argues that it is a fundamental constraint on thought that agents always know what they are thinking in the sense that their thoughts have...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 391–394.
Published: 01 July 2010
... descriptive contents rather than referential ones—the kind of contents that are typically associated with internalism about content. More strikingly, in chapter 6, Stalnaker argues that it is a fundamental constraint on thought that agents always know what they are thinking in the sense that their thoughts...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 394–398.
Published: 01 July 2010
... contents rather than referential ones—the kind of contents that are typically associated with internalism about content. More strikingly, in chapter 6, Stalnaker argues that it is a fundamental constraint on thought that agents always know what they are thinking in the sense that their thoughts have...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 398–401.
Published: 01 July 2010
... contents rather than referential ones—the kind of contents that are typically associated with internalism about content. More strikingly, in chapter 6, Stalnaker argues that it is a fundamental constraint on thought that agents always know what they are thinking in the sense that their thoughts have...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 327–358.
Published: 01 July 2005
.... 334 CONTRASTIVE CAUSATION Contrastivity thus reconciles the vagaries of transworld event compari- sons with objective causation. Of course, there may be linguistic indeterminacy as to which con- trasts are in play in a given causal claim. But this is where indeterminacy...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 151–197.
Published: 01 April 2001
... of which have already been highlighted by my discussion. There’s a referential connection between the subject’s men- tal and linguistic tokens and objects in her surroundings. That referential connection is exhibited in the coordinated role the tokens and the objects...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 51–91.
Published: 01 January 2007
..., neither is parthood. (The evident vagueness in cer- tain sentences of the form ␣ is part of ␤ must therefore be attributed to referential indeterminacy in the singular terms ␣ and What about unrestricted composition? Could one claim that the whole is nothing over and above the parts when...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 355–388.
Published: 01 July 2006
... the fact that in some cases that are phenomenally similar to the Odd experience, such as some afterimages or cases of “see- ing stars,” the experiences seem indeterminate with respect to how far away from the subject the “stars” are, or the afterimage is. If such indeterminacy with respect...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 375–377.
Published: 01 July 2009
... other names as referential devices. Proper names are not rigid designators. Different contexts of use allow different criteria for successful reference. The breezy style and no-nonsense thesis give the book a refreshing feel, especially in contrast to the labyrinthine philosophical analyses...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 378–381.
Published: 01 July 2009
... other names as referential devices. Proper names are not rigid designators. Different contexts of use allow different criteria for successful reference. The breezy style and no-nonsense thesis give the book a refreshing feel, especially in contrast to the labyrinthine philosophical analyses...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 381–384.
Published: 01 July 2009
... other names as referential devices. Proper names are not rigid designators. Different contexts of use allow different criteria for successful reference. The breezy style and no-nonsense thesis give the book a refreshing feel, especially in contrast to the labyrinthine philosophical analyses...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 384–389.
Published: 01 July 2009
... other names as referential devices. Proper names are not rigid designators. Different contexts of use allow different criteria for successful reference. The breezy style and no-nonsense thesis give the book a refreshing feel, especially in contrast to the labyrinthine philosophical analyses...