... determines the case in favour of form” (265), without, however, providing an explanation of the relation between form and nature. Unfortunately, in this case there is no cross- reference, and neither the glossary nor the index is of much help. Apart from such occasional infelicities, the...

...Paolo Santorio According to the orthodox account developed by Kaplan, indexicals like I, you , and now invariably refer to elements of the context of speech. This essay argues that the orthodoxy is wrong. I, you , and the like are shifted by certain modal operators and hence can fail to refer to...

... skis off' are complex demonstratives. There are also plural complex demonstratives such as `these skis' and `those snowboarders smoking by the gondola'. My book Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account argues against what I call the direct reference account of complex demonstratives...

... interpretation, and first-order normative assumptions. This story is distinguished from extant “reference magnetic” explanations of the phenomenon, and objections and replies are considered. © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 naturalness metaethics metasemantics radical interpretation Some say...

...Susanna Siegel John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. vii, 267. Cornell University 2004 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 113, No. 3 (July 2004) John Campbell, Reference and...

...Stefano Predelli Alan Berger, Terms and Truth, Reference Direct and Anaphoric. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002. Pp. xvii, 234. Cornell University 2004 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 113, No. 3 (July 2004) Alan Berger, Terms and Truth...

...Samuel Cumming Variabilism is the view that proper names (like pronouns) are semantically represented as variables. Referential names, like referential pronouns, are assigned their referents by a contextual variable assignment (Kaplan 1989). The reference parameter (like the world of evaluation...

... Russell's solution requires him to adopt certain substantive views about the nature of the referents of what are usually called “logically proper names.” In particular, Russell's solution will work only if the referents of such names are given to one who understands them in a manner that is entirely “aspect...

... nonparadoxical self-reference to prove conclusively that even immediate full grounding isn't an internal relation in this sense. The positive, second part of this essay uses the notion of a “completely satisfactory explanation” to shed light on the logic of ground in the presence of self-reference. This allows...

... friendly versions of (i) and (ii) by replacing the appeal to possible worlds with reference to the newly introduced entities. This maneuver invites an obvious reply, however. If the new entities are the things that play the role we typically associate with worlds, as partially described by (i) and (ii...

... the referent of the complement clause that p . On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—for example, the proposition that p —as they are in the case of believes . In many...

... uniformly occur as predicates. Predicativism flies in the face of the widely accepted view that names in argument position are referential, whether that be Millian Referentialism, direct-reference theories, or even Fregean Descriptivism. But names are predicates in all of their occurrences; they are...

...Catrin Campbell-Moore In Michael Caie's article “Rational Probabilistic Incoherence,” Caie argues that in light of certain situations involving self-reference, it is sometimes rational to have probabilistically incoherent credences. This essay further considers his arguments. It shows that...

...David E. Taylor This essay argues that deflationism (about truth and reference) is incompatible with the phenomenon of referential indeterminacy (RI). This puts the deflationist in the difficult position of having to deny the possibility of what otherwise seems like a manifest and theoretically...

... the Syntactic Rationale and presents serious auxiliary problems for predicativism. © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 predicativism referentialism reference proper names count nouns Predicativism is the thesis that names are count nouns having a predicate-type semantic value in all of...

... Cornell University 2007 Erratum for Andrew Chignell 2007. “Belief in Kant.” Philosophical Review 116: 323–360. In the section titled “E.2. Theoretical Belief,” p. 345, the sentence beginning “I’ll refer to it here as Theological Belief should instead read: “I’ll refer to it here as...

... languages, the identifi cation of sense and meaning cannot be sustained since it is in confl ict with another charac- teristically Fregean thesis, that sense uniquely determines reference. The argument is quite simple and can be outlined as follows. Assume the two theses we have just stated:2 I...

... and time, and not to the concept of the understanding (§24). (translation amended) 3 In the list of references, page 55, the reference to Hanna, R. (2011) should be: ———. 2011. “Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and The Gap in the B Deduction.” International Journal of Philosophical...

...Jason Stanley Jeffrey C. King, Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account. Cambridge: MIT Press, Bradford Books, 2001. Pp. xiii, 207. Cornell University 2002 Evans, G. 1979 . Reference and Contingency. Monist 62 : 161 -89. Neale, S. Term Limits. In Philosophical...

... as we can tell, no one but us believes.” This is the provocative first sentence of Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn's most recent book. The central star in this galaxy is that “reference is the only semantic property of mental or linguistic representations” (1). Fodor and Pylyshyn allow that there is...