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Search Results for reason-based representation
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The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
...Franz Dietrich; Christian List This essay presents a new “reason-based” approach to the formal representation of moral theories, drawing on recent decision-theoretic work. It shows that any moral theory within a very large class can be represented in terms of two parameters: (i) a specification of...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
... the agent's object-involving de se representation of that very exercise as justifying . basing relation inference operative reason motivating reason epistemic agency deviant causal chain transparency So-Hyun watches Al-Jazeera and also watches CNN. She watches Al-Jazeera because she...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 193–243.
Published: 01 April 2008
... something that can be intellectually cognized.19 Unlike sensory cognition, Aquinas thinks that intellectual cognition essentially involves immaterial processes and that its species or representations are received in an immaterial subject (the intellect or rational soul).20 For the same reason, Aquinas...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 468–470.
Published: 01 July 2007
... and idealism (chapter 1), and the problem of how to make sense of Kant’s intricate argumentation in the “Transcendental Deduction of the Cat- egories” (chapters 2–4). It entails a very thorough interpretation of sections 16–20 and section 26 of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
... is based on reasons. Then the author argues that core object representations are based on reasons, through an examination of both experimental results and key markers of the basing relation. The scope of mental states that are subject to epistemic evaluation as justified or unjustified is not...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... reason to insist that the psychological conditions necessary for objective representation require that the individual do the objectifying himself or herself. Some of the work can be done by psychological subsys- tems. Some of it can be done by needs and activities of the individual and causal...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
... equivalent to the assignment of a stably high rational degree of belief. Although the logical closure of belief and the Lockean thesis are attractive postulates in themselves, initially this may seem like a formal “curiosity”; however, as will be argued in the rest of the essay, a very reasonable theory of...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 465–500.
Published: 01 October 2009
... Darwall's example of motivationally potent reasoning that is not based on preexisting desires, Thomas Scanlon's criticism that the Humean theory fails to account for the structure and phenomenology of deliberation, and the phenomenon of akrasia as discussed by John Searle. In each case a Humean account...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... may thereby give us reason to revise our judgments regarding the fea- tures that distinguish depictive from nondepictive representations. My aim, in what follows, is to provide a resemblance account of depiction that both answers the metaphysical question and goes a considerable way toward...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... this essay argues that Robinson-style hyperreals can't be the values of credences, there are several other frameworks that have been proposed that can reasonably be called “infinitesimal probabilities.” It may be that some of these systems do a better job of representing the epistemic structure of...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 215–287.
Published: 01 April 2013
... hypothesized to acquire their meaning in an essentially similar way, save that the arbitrary associations are determined by biology rather than social convention. But this linguis- tic model is inappropriate for pictorial representation for many reasons. The most fundamental is that successful pictorial...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
... often also excluded for similar reasons. For brevity, in what follows I shall say that P and R correlate when the above bicondi- tional holds, and I shall speak of correlation across a given range of worlds or subjects when the experiences in those worlds or subjects are included in the domain of...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 371–398.
Published: 01 July 2018
... Separability of Effects and Multiplicativity, it may be a reasonable measure in contexts where we would like to quantify the average strength of a cause for a variety of independent effects. See figure 5 for an illustration. For that causal structure, it is always the case that min ( η c c...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 97–143.
Published: 01 January 2021
..., Max. 1952. “Saying and Disbelieving.” Analysis 13, no. 2: 25–33 . Boër, Steven E., and William G. Lycan. 1980. “A Performadox in Truth-Conditional Semantics.” Linguistics and Philosophy 4, no. 1: 71–100 . Brandom, Robert. 1994. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 431–435.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jenann Ismael Frisch Mathias , Causal Reasoning in Physics . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2014 . viii + 256 pp . © 2016 by Cornell University 2016 In 1913 Bertrand Russell argued that contrary to what most of us presume, the causal structure of the world is not...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 235–266.
Published: 01 April 2000
... concepts and intuitions remains a vexed matter. The locus classicus for these controversies is the Critique of Pure Reason’s famous taxonomy of representations (called the Stufenleiter; or “step-ladder The genus is representation in general (representatio). Under it stands...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2019
... idea that even higher-level mental phenomena such as reflection, thought, and mathematical reasoning are to be treated in an enactivist paradigm. Here Gallagher introduces the notion of an affordance space , derived from Gibson's notion of an affordance. “An affordance space is the (abstract) range of...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 533–562.
Published: 01 October 2007
... completely inadequate for those who wish to think of rational status as a function of reasons. 17. See Gert, Brute Rationality, especially chaps. 2–4. Principle P is based on a defini- tion of rational action that plays a central role in Bernard Gert’s moral theory. It was discussions of this...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 147–190.
Published: 01 April 2017
... there would be no reason the account could not or should not appeal to both. In fact, so much the better if it more accurately reflects the way humans represent the properties of numbers. I refer to this feature of foundations of arithmetical cognition as “resource and representation multiplicity.” 6...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 209–239.
Published: 01 April 2012
... claim for our article is that what is true of turning on the television is also true of deliberation. It could be reasonable for Katie to call to mind the advertising campaign based on the phrase ‘I’m loving it’ when deliberating about whether the phrase is grammatical. But she could call it to mind...