Search Results for reason-based representation
1-20 of 293 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
...Franz Dietrich; Christian List This essay presents a new “reason-based” approach to the formal representation of moral theories, drawing on recent decision-theoretic work. It shows that any moral theory within a very large class can be represented in terms of two parameters: (i) a specification of...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
... the agent's object-involving de se representation of that very exercise as justifying . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 basing relation inference operative reason motivating reason epistemic agency deviant causal chain transparency So-Hyun watches Al-Jazeera and also watches...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 193–243.
Published: 01 April 2008
... something that can be intellectually cognized.19 Unlike sensory cognition, Aquinas thinks that intellectual cognition essentially involves immaterial processes and that its species or representations are received in an immaterial subject (the intellect or rational soul).20 For the same reason, Aquinas...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2007) 116 (3): 468–470.
Published: 01 July 2007
... and idealism (chapter 1), and the problem of how to make sense of Kant’s intricate argumentation in the “Transcendental Deduction of the Cat- egories” (chapters 2–4). It entails a very thorough interpretation of sections 16–20 and section 26 of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... reason to insist that the psychological conditions necessary for objective representation require that the individual do the objectifying himself or herself. Some of the work can be done by psychological subsys- tems. Some of it can be done by needs and activities of the individual and causal...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
... equivalent to the assignment of a stably high rational degree of belief. Although the logical closure of belief and the Lockean thesis are attractive postulates in themselves, initially this may seem like a formal “curiosity”; however, as will be argued in the rest of the essay, a very reasonable theory of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2009) 118 (4): 465–500.
Published: 01 October 2009
... Darwall's example of motivationally potent reasoning that is not based on preexisting desires, Thomas Scanlon's criticism that the Humean theory fails to account for the structure and phenomenology of deliberation, and the phenomenon of akrasia as discussed by John Searle. In each case a Humean account...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... may thereby give us reason to revise our judgments regarding the fea- tures that distinguish depictive from nondepictive representations. My aim, in what follows, is to provide a resemblance account of depiction that both answers the metaphysical question and goes a considerable way toward...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... . It is clear given my previous discussion that I will reject premise 2 as an instance of the numerical fallacy. If P ( p ) were the complete mathematical representation of how likely p is for an agent, then this would be reasonable. But it isn't. What we need is some mathematical relation that...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 215–287.
Published: 01 April 2013
... hypothesized to acquire their meaning in an essentially similar way, save that the arbitrary associations are determined by biology rather than social convention. But this linguis- tic model is inappropriate for pictorial representation for many reasons. The most fundamental is that successful pictorial...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
... often also excluded for similar reasons. For brevity, in what follows I shall say that P and R correlate when the above bicondi- tional holds, and I shall speak of correlation across a given range of worlds or subjects when the experiences in those worlds or subjects are included in the domain of...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 371–398.
Published: 01 July 2018
... contracting yellow fever. The reason that most people don't seek yellow fever vaccination is that, for them, the relevant context is No Exposure. Causal sufficiency, which is the concept explicated by the Pearl-Halpern measure η ph , is different from causal strength. Crucially, it does not take into...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 431–435.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jenann Ismael Frisch Mathias , Causal Reasoning in Physics . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2014 . viii + 256 pp . © 2016 by Cornell University 2016 In 1913 Bertrand Russell argued that contrary to what most of us presume, the causal structure of the world is not...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 235–266.
Published: 01 April 2000
... concepts and intuitions remains a vexed matter. The locus classicus for these controversies is the Critique of Pure Reason’s famous taxonomy of representations (called the Stufenleiter; or “step-ladder The genus is representation in general (representatio). Under it stands...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 533–562.
Published: 01 October 2007
... completely inadequate for those who wish to think of rational status as a function of reasons. 17. See Gert, Brute Rationality, especially chaps. 2–4. Principle P is based on a defini- tion of rational action that plays a central role in Bernard Gert’s moral theory. It was discussions of this...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2019
...: affect and intersubjectivity. The last two chapters of the book put forward the idea that even higher-level mental phenomena such as reflection, thought, and mathematical reasoning are to be treated in an enactivist paradigm. Here Gallagher introduces the notion of an affordance space , derived from...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 209–239.
Published: 01 April 2012
... claim for our article is that what is true of turning on the television is also true of deliberation. It could be reasonable for Katie to call to mind the advertising campaign based on the phrase ‘I’m loving it’ when deliberating about whether the phrase is grammatical. But she could call it to mind...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 147–190.
Published: 01 April 2017
... justification, and the tremendous developments in logic that facilitated that drive, ran counter to Kant. For a variety of reasons, however, there has been continued interest in the idea that intuition plays a role in justifying our arithmetical knowledge, and most investigations into Kant's philosophy of...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2000
.... Lehmann, and M. Magidor. 1990 . “Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Preferential Models and Cumulative Logics.” Artificial Intelligence 44 : 167 -207. Lehmann, D., and M. Magidor. 1992 . “What Does a Conditional Knowledge Base Entail?” Artificial Intelligence 55 : l -60. McCarthy, J. 1980...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 425–427.
Published: 01 July 2001
... the more limited capabilities of real human agents (30). The idea, I take it, is that these objective standards are modes of correct reasoning that could be followed by a sufficiently intelligent and knowledgeable being. However, Weirich does not ask what these standards might be, or what...