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Journal Article
Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox
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The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 227–262.
Published: 01 April 2021
...David James Barnett Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p , but I don't believe that p...
Journal Article
Belief and Indeterminacy
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The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Michael Caie An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent...
Journal Article
On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement
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The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
...-invariance in light of peer disagreement is sometimes rationally permissible and that, even when it is not, being required to revise your opinions in light of peer disagreement does not lead to any kind of problematic skepticism. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 Acknowledgments to Tom Kelly...
Journal Article
Nonclassical Minds and Indeterminate Survival
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The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
...J. Robert G. Williams Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories...
Journal Article
Accuracy, Deference, and Chance
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The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 43–87.
Published: 01 January 2023
... here that is entailed by Lewis’s version: There is thus a burden on the metaphysician (reductionist or not) who wishes to vindicate a principle like Principal Principle. She must explain why her account of what chance is will require rational agents to expect chance to be at least as accurate...
Journal Article
Rational Probabilistic Incoherence? A Reply to Michael Caie
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The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 393–406.
Published: 01 July 2015
... that probabilism isn't to blame for the failure of rational introspection and that Caie's modified accuracy criterion conflicts with Dutch book considerations, is scoring rule dependent, and leads to the failure of rational introspection. © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 probabilism rational requirements...
Journal Article
Love and the Value of a Life
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The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 251–280.
Published: 01 July 2014
... of these implications seems right. It is therefore tempting to reject the picture of love as a rational response to reasons, which are distinctive virtues of the person you love. Jollimore is not convinced. He responds to the difficulties by insisting that reasons for love need not require it: reasons can make...
Journal Article
Full Belief and Loose Speech
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The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
Published: 01 July 2019
...Sarah Moss This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed...
Journal Article
The Normativity of Rationality
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The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 313–317.
Published: 01 April 2020
... this akratic combination of attitude-states involves irrationality. One plausible explanation of why you're irrational is that you violate a requirement of “structural” rationality that prohibits you from having this combination. In other words, the rational code requires, roughly, that you not both believe...
Journal Article
Brute Rationality
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The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 306–310.
Published: 01 April 2008
... of practical reason, if you are rationally justified
in acting a certain way, then you are also rationally required to act in that
way. On this view, whether an action is rationally both justified and required
is determined by the reasons for the action, all-things-considered. If the all-
things-considered...
Journal Article
Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons
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The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 533–562.
Published: 01 October 2007
... of irrationality. But
this will not entail anything about their capacity to render actions ratio-
nally required. And yet some reasons surely serve to require actions and
can be compared along that dimension, yielding a notion of strength in
generating rational requirements.
To repeat: if reasons...
Journal Article
The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs
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The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 555–606.
Published: 01 October 2008
... that the Relevance-Limiting Thesis is false. My
strategy is to provide a counterexample: a story in which the agent
clearly learns nothing non-self-locating between two times and yet in
which she is rationally required to respond to the self-locating informa-
tion she...
Journal Article
Fitting Things Together
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The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (2): 206–211.
Published: 01 April 2024
... is to say that global consistency and fit with appearances are constitutive ideals of reasoning, associated with imperfect duties of rationality. There is no conflict of requirements, just two ideals. A wider constitutivist approach, which includes not just compliance-constitutive requirements...
Journal Article
Evaluative Uncertainty and Permissible Preference
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The Philosophical Review (2025) 134 (1): 35–64.
Published: 01 January 2025
... on T1 or T2, respectively. So it seems that you are rationally required to prefer A to B conditional on T1, and that you are rationally required to strongly prefer A to B conditional on T2. These observations support the following general principle. The Rational Conditional Preference...
Journal Article
Rational Probabilistic Incoherence
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The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
..., to be probabilistically coherent. If PROBABILISM is true, it follows that in certain cases rationality requires that an agent either be ignorant of her own credences or be ignorant of an obvious truth. We might simply accept this consequence of PROBABILISM, despite its prima facie implausibility. In this essay, I'll...
FIGURES
Journal Article
Beyond Consequentialism
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The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 657–661.
Published: 01 October 2013
... effective means to her dominant end of the moment (obtaining immediate pleasure). But there is a broader (although still prudential) sense of ‘rational’ in which she acts irrationally—she acts against her long-term self-interest. She is rationally required, in this broader sense, to care about her future...
Journal Article
The Importance of Being Rational
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The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 523–527.
Published: 01 October 2019
.... After setting out the basic plan in chapter 1, the first agenda item, tackled in chapter 2, is to show how a reasons-based account of rationality can explain coherence requirements on beliefs and intentions. Take, for example, the rational requirement not to have inconsistent intentions. Lord shows...
Journal Article
Psychiatry in the Scientific Image
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The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 304–306.
Published: 01 April 2008
...
Joshua Gert, Brute Rationality.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xiii + 230 pp.
According to many theories of practical reason, if you are rationally justified
in acting a certain way, then you are also rationally required to act in that
way. On this view, whether an action...
Journal Article
Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas
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The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
... of countably many propositions, any
two of which are incompatible, rationality requires that one’s credences
in the propositions in this set sum to one’s credence in their disjunction.
The Generalized Halfer Principle does not generate any violations of CA.
For according to the former principle...
Journal Article
Moral Worth, Supererogation, and the Justifying/Requiring Distinction
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The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 611–618.
Published: 01 October 2012
..., it is plausible that I
would be rationally justified in risking serious harm by rushing into a
burning building by the following reason: that by doing so I might well
save a child. But no reasonable person thinks that this reason rationally
requires me to do so. So this particular altruistic reason can...
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