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rational requirements
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 227–262.
Published: 01 April 2021
...David James Barnett Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p , but I don't believe that p...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Michael Caie An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
...-invariance in light of peer disagreement is sometimes rationally permissible and that, even when it is not, being required to revise your opinions in light of peer disagreement does not lead to any kind of problematic skepticism. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 Acknowledgments to Tom Kelly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
...J. Robert G. Williams Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 43–87.
Published: 01 January 2023
... to an accuracy criterion, which underwrites any rational requirements for conforming credences to chance and noted that for any account of chance that accepts the Principal Principle, rational agents must be required to expect chance to be at least as accurate as they are. However, the accuracy requirement...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 251–280.
Published: 01 July 2014
... 2011 , 93–94). 7 In a different idiom, we can distinguish “insistent” from “noninsistent” reasons. 8 The latter make it appropriate or rational to respond in a certain way, without requiring that response. By contrast, insistent reasons to φ are either decisive, implying that one ought to φ...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
Published: 01 July 2019
...Sarah Moss This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 393–406.
Published: 01 July 2015
... is that an agent does not have the resources to know whether she satisfies the rational requirement or not. 17. This was already shown in Caie's essay. 18. The introspection and Dutch book criteria that we focused on were written with a rationally permissible operator, so Weak Rational...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 313–317.
Published: 01 April 2020
... this akratic combination of attitude-states involves irrationality. One plausible explanation of why you're irrational is that you violate a requirement of “structural” rationality that prohibits you from having this combination. In other words, the rational code requires, roughly, that you not both believe...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 306–310.
Published: 01 April 2008
... of practical reason, if you are rationally justified
in acting a certain way, then you are also rationally required to act in that
way. On this view, whether an action is rationally both justified and required
is determined by the reasons for the action, all-things-considered. If the all-
things-considered...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 533–562.
Published: 01 October 2007
... of irrationality. But
this will not entail anything about their capacity to render actions ratio-
nally required. And yet some reasons surely serve to require actions and
can be compared along that dimension, yielding a notion of strength in
generating rational requirements.
To repeat: if reasons...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 555–606.
Published: 01 October 2008
... that the Relevance-Limiting Thesis is false. My
strategy is to provide a counterexample: a story in which the agent
clearly learns nothing non-self-locating between two times and yet in
which she is rationally required to respond to the self-locating informa-
tion she...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
... steps in the argument that are invalid. We can grant, as the argument assumes, that a credal state is defective insofar as it is guaranteed to be less accurate than some other credal state. It doesn't follow, however, that probabilistic coherence is rationally required. For there are cases in which...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 657–661.
Published: 01 October 2013
... effective means to her dominant end of the moment (obtaining immediate pleasure). But there is a broader (although still prudential) sense of ‘rational’ in which she acts irrationally—she acts against her long-term self-interest. She is rationally required, in this broader sense, to care about her future...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 523–527.
Published: 01 October 2019
.... After setting out the basic plan in chapter 1, the first agenda item, tackled in chapter 2, is to show how a reasons-based account of rationality can explain coherence requirements on beliefs and intentions. Take, for example, the rational requirement not to have inconsistent intentions. Lord shows...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 304–306.
Published: 01 April 2008
...
Joshua Gert, Brute Rationality.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xiii + 230 pp.
According to many theories of practical reason, if you are rationally justified
in acting a certain way, then you are also rationally required to act in that
way. On this view, whether an action...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
... of countably many propositions, any
two of which are incompatible, rationality requires that one’s credences
in the propositions in this set sum to one’s credence in their disjunction.
The Generalized Halfer Principle does not generate any violations of CA.
For according to the former principle...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 611–618.
Published: 01 October 2012
... this reason require me to do?
These questions are not simply two ways of asking the same thing since
they can receive different answers.3 For example, it is plausible that I
would be rationally justified in risking serious harm by rushing into a
burning building by the following reason: that by doing so I...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 27–56.
Published: 01 January 2003
... is a standard decision-
theoretic assumption about rational action.1
Pascal’s Wager
1. Rationality requires you to give positive probability to God’s
existence.
27
ALAN HÁJEK
2. The decision matrix is as follows...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 187–217.
Published: 01 April 2007
... should change her opinion. But am I rationally required
to do so as well, when I fi nd out that she disagrees with me? Kelly (2005,
180–81) writes:
205
DAVID CHRISTENSEN
On the present view, the rationality of one’s believing as one...
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