...Stephen Law Bede Rundle, Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. xii + 204 pp. Cornell University 2007 Van Inwagen, Peter. 1996 . “Why Is There Anything at All?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70 : 95 -110...

... for an action. According to this view, if Jim ought to jam, that is not because there is a special distinctive deliberative ought relation between Jim and jamming; rather, it is because a certain proposition ought to be the case: namely, that Jim jams. This essay defends the naive view, by first arguing...

... of the book and then proceeds to highlight some difficulties and challenges. It argues that these challenges show that Schroeder's improvements on traditional Humeanism—while they do succeed in making the view more immune to some argumentative moves and somewhat more plausible—push rather strongly in non...

... be taller than I would be’ or ‘if I am seven feet tall, I am taller than I am’. These examples exemplify the fact that whether a sentence's evaluation remains at the actual world in the scope of a modal or conditional depends on the combination of mood in the embedded and matrix clauses rather than...

... or after. For biological conception is most plausibly seen as a momentous event in the continuing life of a preexisting organism—the egg—rather than a cataclysmic event ending one life and creating another. This article considers and rebuts the most likely challenges to this claim. This metaphysical point...

... of the dialectical context with the compatibilist . Hence, it is not the compatibilists' burden to produce counterexamples to it. Rather, it is van Inwagen's burden to produce relevant confirming instances of it. Cornell University 2008 Ayer, A. J. 1954 . “Freedom and Necessity.” In Philosophical Essays...

... to the conventionalist's core instincts, including embracing: the view that binding promises must involve the promisee's belief that performance will occur; the view that through the promise, the promisee and promisor create a shared end; and the tendency to take promises between strangers, rather than intimates...

... against subjectivist theories of practical reason, it is argued that a form of subjectivist theory exists that is not only consistent with Parfit's claim that all reasons for acting are object rather than state given, but that can support that claim. Second, it is argued that Parfit's arguments against...

... important about what the pursuit of probabilistic knowledge demands from us. It does not demand that we give hypotheses equal treatment , by affording them equal credence. Rather, it demands that we give them equal consideration , by affording them an equal chance of being discovered. © 2016 by Cornell...

... knowledge. This essay defends intellectualism from the argument of gradability. It is argued that the gradability of ascriptions of know-how should be discounted as a rather superficial linguistic phenomenon, one that can be explained in a way compatible with the absoluteness of the state reported...

... the resources to formulate a nonfactualist account of know-how. On this account, know-how has a kind of nonpropositional content and plays the role of guiding performance of action, rather than recording information from the environment. © 2016 by Cornell University 2016 know-how expressivism...

... like. Is such knowledge to be understood as knowledge of a fact, or rather as a kind of ability? From the claim that the knowledge in the target cases is not immediate, and the fact that these cases are paradigm cases of immediate knowledge of objects' kinds, the essay concludes that perception does...

... by, systems of social oppression. In such cases, the article suggests, the externalistic view that justification is in part a matter of worldly relations, rather than the internalistic view that justification is solely a matter of how things stand from the agent’s individual perspective, becomes the more...

..., with the complications. This essay tries to reconstruct psychological principles that would explain the thesis and that are at least consistent with what Rousseau otherwise says on the subject. Much of the value of this exercise, however, lies not in the particulars of the resulting psychology but rather in the depth...

... the power of any idea derives from the power of its causes and because many ideas have external causes, there are no grounds for taking the intensity of conscious experience to track a mind's power closely. Rather, as the second group of remarks suggests, power in a human mind tracks the degree to which...

..., neither the puzzle itself nor Russell's solution to it have been well understood. The principle Russell seeks to defend concerns not the substitution of expressions in a sentence but rather the substitution of propositional constituents in a Russellian proposition. This article further argues...

... that have been offered for it. Toward the end, a proposal about moral obligation according to which something like a restricted version of 'Ought' Implies 'Can' is true is floated. Though no full-fledged argument for this proposal is offered, that it fits with a rather natural and intuitive picture...

... are “hard facts.” Rather, the fundamental question is whether God's beliefs about what an agent will do in the future depend on what that agent will do in the future. References Anselm . 2007 . Basic Writings , trans. and ed. Williams Thomas . Indianapolis : Hackett . Aquinas...

... to causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs. The essay notes that a similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided...

..., but rather rejects common assumptions, encoded in the notation of the λ -calculus, about what properties and relations can be built. I argue that the structuralist had independent reasons to reject these underlying assumptions. The theory is given both a diagrammatic representation and a logical...