Search Results for questions
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The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 647–650.
Published: 01 October 2013
...Laurence Thomas Boonin David , Should Race Matter? Unusual Answers to the Usual Questions . New York : Cambridge University Press , 2011 . © 2013 by Cornell University 2013 This is a most engaging, informed, and honest work. The third characterization perhaps reflects the...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 297–299.
Published: 01 April 2002
...Chris Bobonich Diskin Clay, Platonic Questions: Dialogues with the Silent Philosopher. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. Pp. xxiii, 309. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 2...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 657–663.
Published: 01 October 2007
...Ram Neta Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, eds., Naturalism in Question . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. viii + 340 pp. Cornell University 2007 Davidson, Donald. 1980 . “Mental Events.” in Essays on Actions and Events , 207 -25. Oxford: Oxford University Press...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Rachael Briggs Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
... rationalism” endorsed by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, who insist on a deep link between the two forms of modality. This article argues that the defense of modal rationalism presented in Chalmers and Jackson (2001) begs the question against the type-B materialist/modal autonomist. The argument proceeds as...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
... reconciles divine foreknowledge and human freedom and the Ockhamist's way. In particular, this essay further demonstrates that when it comes to divine foreknowledge's compatibility with human freedom, the fundamental question is not the Ockhamist's question of whether God's beliefs about what an agent will...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
...Daniel Greco Epistemologists and philosophers of mind both ask questions about belief. Epistemologists ask normative questions about belief—which beliefs ought we to have? Philosophers of mind ask metaphysical questions about belief—what are beliefs, and what does it take to have them? While these...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
...Chiwook Won The overdetermination problem has long been raised as a challenge to nonreductive physicalism. Nonreductive physicalists have, in various ways, tried to resolve the problem through appeal to counterfactuals. This essay does two things. First, it takes up the question whether...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 83–134.
Published: 01 January 2016
...Andreas Stokke This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 97–115.
Published: 01 January 2011
...John Martin Fischer; Patrick Todd In his recent essay in the Philosophical Review , “Truth and Freedom,” Trenton Merricks contends (among other things) that the basic argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom is question-begging. He relies on a “truism” to the effect...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Han van Wietmarschen The central question of the peer disagreement debate is: what should you believe about the disputed proposition if you have good reason to believe that an epistemic peer disagrees with you? This article shows that this question is ambiguous between evidential support (or...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
...? Dispositionalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's manifesting a disposition to respond to those bases by having the belief, intention, resentment, and so on, in question. Representationalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's representing the bases as justifying the...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
Published: 01 July 2019
...Sarah Moss This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 35–82.
Published: 01 January 2016
... expressivism semantics infinitival questions nonpropositional attitudes This paper is about three topics: know-how, metaethical expressivism, and foundational questions in the theory of meaning. Know-how and expressivism are usually regarded as disjoint subjects, belonging to distant provinces of...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 349–383.
Published: 01 July 2008
... David Widerker. It shows that neither is sufficient to reject the Direct Argument. The article then proceeds to challenge the argument in a novel fashion. Van Inwagen has not given us good reason to think that the principle in question has an adequate anchor in our inferential practices, especially in...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 385–443.
Published: 01 July 2008
... essay proceeds by questioning traditional assumptions about the connection between the objects that are used to specify the truth-conditions of a sentence, on the one hand, and the objects whose existence is required in order for the truth-conditions thereby specified to be satisfied, on the other. This...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 555–606.
Published: 01 October 2008
...Michael G. Titelbaum Can self-locating beliefs be relevant to non-self-locating claims? Traditional Bayesian modeling techniques have trouble answering this question because their updating rule fails when applied to situations involving contextsensitivity. This essay develops a fully general...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 225–240.
Published: 01 April 2009
...Mark Eli Kalderon In Fear of Knowledge , Paul Boghossian argues against the very coherence of epistemic relativism. This essay does two things. First, without questioning the truth of his conclusion, it argues that Boghossian's argument for that conclusion fails. Second, it argues that the avowed...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
... transmission and transmission failure really are, thereby exposing two questionable but quotidian assumptions. It attacks existing views of transmission failure, especially those of Crispin Wright. It defends a permissive view of transmission failure, one holding that deductions of a certain kind fail to...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 565–591.
Published: 01 October 2010
... theory of causation is the notion of a real ground or causal power that is non-Humean (since it doesn't reduce to regularities or counterfactual dependencies among events or states) and non-Leibnizean because it doesn't reduce to logical or conceptual relations. However, we raise questions about...