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The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 647–650.
Published: 01 October 2013
...Laurence Thomas Boonin David , Should Race Matter? Unusual Answers to the Usual Questions . New York : Cambridge University Press , 2011 . © 2013 by Cornell University 2013 This is a most engaging, informed, and honest work. The third characterization perhaps reflects the...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 297–299.
Published: 01 April 2002
...Chris Bobonich Diskin Clay, Platonic Questions: Dialogues with the Silent Philosopher. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. Pp. xxiii, 309. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 2...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 657–663.
Published: 01 October 2007
...Ram Neta Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, eds., Naturalism in Question . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. viii + 340 pp. Cornell University 2007 Davidson, Donald. 1980 . “Mental Events.” in Essays on Actions and Events , 207 -25. Oxford: Oxford University Press...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Rachael Briggs Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
... reconciles divine foreknowledge and human freedom and the Ockhamist's way. In particular, this essay further demonstrates that when it comes to divine foreknowledge's compatibility with human freedom, the fundamental question is not the Ockhamist's question of whether God's beliefs about what an agent will...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
...Daniel Greco Epistemologists and philosophers of mind both ask questions about belief. Epistemologists ask normative questions about belief—which beliefs ought we to have? Philosophers of mind ask metaphysical questions about belief—what are beliefs, and what does it take to have them? While these...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
...Chiwook Won The overdetermination problem has long been raised as a challenge to nonreductive physicalism. Nonreductive physicalists have, in various ways, tried to resolve the problem through appeal to counterfactuals. This essay does two things. First, it takes up the question whether...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 83–134.
Published: 01 January 2016
...Andreas Stokke This essay argues that the distinction between lying and misleading while not lying is sensitive to discourse structure. It shows that whether an utterance is a lie or is merely misleading sometimes depends on the topic of conversation, represented by so-called questions under...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
... rationalism” endorsed by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, who insist on a deep link between the two forms of modality. This article argues that the defense of modal rationalism presented in Chalmers and Jackson (2001) begs the question against the type-B materialist/modal autonomist. The argument proceeds as...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 591–642.
Published: 01 October 2020
... some important differences between doxastic and non-doxastic “choices,” one can explain these puzzling phenomena. © 2020 by Cornell University 2020 belief attitudes choice questions rationality In this article, I'm going to explain why there are many propositions that we have good...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 97–115.
Published: 01 January 2011
...John Martin Fischer; Patrick Todd In his recent essay in the Philosophical Review , “Truth and Freedom,” Trenton Merricks contends (among other things) that the basic argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom is question-begging. He relies on a “truism” to the effect...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Han van Wietmarschen The central question of the peer disagreement debate is: what should you believe about the disputed proposition if you have good reason to believe that an epistemic peer disagrees with you? This article shows that this question is ambiguous between evidential support (or...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
...? Dispositionalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's manifesting a disposition to respond to those bases by having the belief, intention, resentment, and so on, in question. Representationalists claim that the basing relation consists in the agent's representing the bases as justifying the...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
Published: 01 July 2019
...Sarah Moss This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 35–82.
Published: 01 January 2016
... Williamson 2001 in that it dispenses with the need for modes of presentation. But it still leaves the most pressing questions unsolved: what generates the action-guiding properties of these special propositions? And why can't we express these propositions in speech, so that we can impart know-how simply by...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 285–320.
Published: 01 April 2011
... several challenges to Garber's interpretation, questioning, among other things, Garber's claims about development and Garber's account of Leibniz's primary arguments for the theory of monads. The article concludes that while crucial elements of the standard interpretation of Leibniz as an idealist can be...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
... disbelieve such a proposition. I argue that a rational agent should be such that it is indeterminate whether it believes the proposition in question. For rational agents, indeterminacy in the objects of their attitudes will filter up to the attitudes themselves. © 2011 by Cornell University 2012...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 55–93.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Matthew Kotzen This essay addresses the question of when evidence for a stronger claim H1 also constitutes evidence for a weaker claim H2. Although the answer “Always” is tempting, it is false on a natural Bayesian conception of evidence. This essay first describes some prima facie counterexamples...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs. The essay notes that a similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided by...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 155–187.
Published: 01 April 2013
... intellect of God. Although other early moderns agreed that modal truths are in some way dependent on God, there were sharp disagreements surrounding two distinct questions: (1) On what in God do modal truths and modal truth-makers depend? (2) What is the manner(s) of dependence by which modal truths and...