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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 128–132.
Published: 01 January 2000
...David Cummiskey DIGNITY AND VULNERABILITY: STRENGTH AND QUALITY OF CHARACTER. By George W. Harris. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997. Pp. 148. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REVlEWS then only when taxonomized as self- and other...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 551–553.
Published: 01 October 2005
...Ian Carter Matthew H. Kramer, The Quality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. ix, 482. Cornell University 2005 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 4 (October 2005) Matthew H. Kramer, The Quality of Freedom...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 633–645.
Published: 01 October 2007
...Michael Jacovides Cornell University 2007 Locke on the Semantics of Secondary Quality Words: A Reply to Matthew Stuart Michael Jacovides Purdue University Let me first acknowledge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
...Andrew Y. Lee Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in multidimensional spaces, where distances between points inversely...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 93–117.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Nicolas Bommarito The contemporary discussion of modesty has focused on whether or not modest people are accurate about their own good qualities. This essay argues that this way of framing the debate is unhelpful and offers examples to show that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 43–95.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Pär Sundström Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 57–96.
Published: 01 January 2003
...Matthew Stuart Cornell University 2003 Aaron, Richard. 1971 . John Locke . 3d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Alexander, Peter. 1985 . Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aristotle. 1984 . The Complete Works of Aristotle . Ed. Jonathan...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 205–239.
Published: 01 April 2016
... of Simple Ideas of Sensation .” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 : 301 – 21 . Curley E. M. 1972 . “ Locke, Boyle, and the Distinctions between Primary and Secondary Qualities .” Philosophical Review 81 : 438 – 64 . Feldman Richard , and Conee Earl 2001...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 273–277.
Published: 01 April 2018
... sentences; and, crucially, ordinary talk of things and qualities can be paraphrased away by supposing that the atomic sentences define a Tractarian geometry. In the nihilistic factalist language, the geometric constants (tetradic parallelism, similarity) and identity will have to be sentential operators...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 563–601.
Published: 01 October 2007
.... India-napolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. ____. 2003 . “A Spectral Reflectance Doth Not a Color Make.” Journal of Philosophy 100 : 191 -202. ____. 2004 . “A Green Thought in a Green Shade.” Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 : 29 -39. Harman, Gilbert. 1990 . “The Intrinsic Quality...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2018
... perceivers, objects, and the like, and take that to be the bearer of chromatic properties” (143). She therefore rejects both standard realist views that hold external items have colors as well as brain-based irrealist views that relocate color qualities or qualia “in the brain” (Averill, Block, Lormand...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 432–434.
Published: 01 July 2003
... of the activity are experienced as rewarding. Several explicative comments are in order. (1) To say that an experience is rewarding is not to say that it has some general quality of “rewardingness.” Rather, this is merely a way of summarizing differ- ent ways in which an intrinsic desire is rendered rational...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 135–189.
Published: 01 April 2003
... that they would be nonrelational features of the person one loves, something about her in her own right. According to the “quality theory,” for example, reasons for love are the beloved’s personal attributes, such as her wit and beauty. In J. David Velleman’s provoca- tive and ingeniously argued proposal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 287–289.
Published: 01 April 2016
..., on Brogaard's view, it is an experience (possibly nonveridical) of the body or mind responding to qualities of some object. As the emotion of romantic love specifically, it is an experience of the body or mind responding to the lovable qualities of the beloved (69). These experiences might include experiences...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 541–544.
Published: 01 October 2014
... sections of the Treatise : “that sensible qualities—the qualities that we see, feel, hear, taste, and smell—are merely ideas or sensations in our minds” (4). One of the dialogue's arguments for this premise is what Dicker calls the “argument from perceptual relativity,” or APR (100). He reconstructs...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 135–138.
Published: 01 January 2002
....: Ridgeview, 1996 ), 19 -49. Boghossian, P., and D. Velleman. 1989 . “Color as a Secondary Quality.” Mind 98 : 81 -103. Clark, A. Sensory Qualities . 1993 . Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press. Strawson, Galen. 1989 . “Red and `red'.” Synthese 78 : 193 -232. Strawson, P...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2017
... properties: they represent “essentially manifest qualities” (chapter 5)—qualities that (like color qualities under Allais's interpretation of them) essentially pertain to the way things appear to us (for example, in the case of color, to how things look). Despite essentially pertaining to how things appear...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 89–92.
Published: 01 January 2000
... claim is the most significant part of the book, and it will be my focus here. Those who take Aristotle to be committed to material changes in sense- perception often suppose that the sense-organ changes by acquiring a sen- sible quality. For example, as the perceiver comes to see something red...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 293–336.
Published: 01 July 2019
... ) The fundamental principle of [modern] philosophy is the opinion concerning colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold; which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in the mind, derived from the operation of external objects, and without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects. —David Hume...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 251–280.
Published: 01 July 2014
... because there are no reasons that do not depend on love; Frankfurt's critique of objective value is not our present concern. We should also distinguish the claim that there are reasons for love from the more specific contention that they consist in valuable qualities of the beloved, qualities she has...