Search Results for quality
1-20 of 340 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2005) 114 (4): 551–553.
Published: 01 October 2005
...Ian Carter Matthew H. Kramer, The Quality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. ix, 482. Cornell University 2005 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 4 (October 2005) Matthew H. Kramer, The Quality of Freedom...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 633–645.
Published: 01 October 2007
... Primary Qualities.” In Locke and Berkeley: A Collection of Critical Essays , ed. C. B. Martin and D. M. Armstrong, 86 -124. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. Du Trieu, Phillippe. 1678 . Manuductio ad Logicam Sive Dialectica Studiosæ Juventuti ad Logicam Præparandæ . Oxford: L. Lichfield at T. Bowman's...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 128–132.
Published: 01 January 2000
...David Cummiskey DIGNITY AND VULNERABILITY: STRENGTH AND QUALITY OF CHARACTER. By George W. Harris. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997. Pp. 148. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REVlEWS then only when taxonomized as self- and other...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 43–95.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Pär Sundström Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 93–117.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Nicolas Bommarito The contemporary discussion of modesty has focused on whether or not modest people are accurate about their own good qualities. This essay argues that this way of framing the debate is unhelpful and offers examples to show that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 432–434.
Published: 01 July 2003
... certain aspects of the activity are experienced as rewarding. Several explicative comments are in order. (1) To say that an experience is rewarding is not to say that it has some general quality of “rewardingness.” Rather, this is merely a way of summarizing differ- ent ways in which an intrinsic...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 273–277.
Published: 01 April 2018
... are arranged like points in a quasi-geometric logical space. In the second stage, the author carries out the task of showing how ordinary truths about things and qualities can be reduced to fundamental truths about facts. Turner argues that, subject to caveats, the resulting theory appears to have a...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2018
... between perceivers, objects, and the like, and take that to be the bearer of chromatic properties” (143). She therefore rejects both standard realist views that hold external items have colors as well as brain-based irrealist views that relocate color qualities or qualia “in the brain” (Averill, Block...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2003) 112 (1): 57–96.
Published: 01 January 2003
...Matthew Stuart Cornell University 2003 Aaron, Richard. 1971 . John Locke . 3d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Alexander, Peter. 1985 . Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aristotle. 1984 . The Complete Works of Aristotle . Ed. Jonathan...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 205–239.
Published: 01 April 2016
... about the existence of material objects and their qualities for the most part, it seems plausible that, for any given sensory experience we have, there is some chance that it misinforms us about the objects in our environment. But how can I know by sensation, for example, that there is a white coffee...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 287–289.
Published: 01 April 2016
..., on Brogaard's view, it is an experience (possibly nonveridical) of the body or mind responding to qualities of some object. As the emotion of romantic love specifically, it is an experience of the body or mind responding to the lovable qualities of the beloved (69). These experiences might include...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 563–601.
Published: 01 October 2007
.... India-napolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. ____. 2003 . “A Spectral Reflectance Doth Not a Color Make.” Journal of Philosophy 100 : 191 -202. ____. 2004 . “A Green Thought in a Green Shade.” Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 : 29 -39. Harman, Gilbert. 1990 . “The Intrinsic Quality of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2014) 123 (4): 541–544.
Published: 01 October 2014
... “foundational premise” that he takes for granted in the opening sections of the Treatise : “that sensible qualities—the qualities that we see, feel, hear, taste, and smell—are merely ideas or sensations in our minds” (4). One of the dialogue's arguments for this premise is what Dicker calls the “argument from...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 261–263.
Published: 01 April 2015
... says that ‘person’ should be understood to refer not to a thing, but to a feature: to “some such quality or modification in man as denominates him a moral agent” ( Law 1823, 179 ), to “an especial property of that thing or being, separated from all the rest that do or may attend it in real existence...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2003) 112 (2): 135–189.
Published: 01 April 2003
... would be nonrelational features of the person one loves, something about her in her own right. According to the “quality theory,” for example, reasons for love are the beloved’s personal attributes, such as her wit and beauty. In J. David Velleman’s provoca- tive and ingeniously argued proposal, the...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2017
... spatio-temporal properties: they represent “essentially manifest qualities” (chapter 5)—qualities that (like color qualities under Allais's interpretation of them) essentially pertain to the way things appear to us (for example, in the case of color, to how things look). Despite essentially pertaining...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 135–138.
Published: 01 January 2002
....: Ridgeview, 1996 ), 19 -49. Boghossian, P., and D. Velleman. 1989 . “Color as a Secondary Quality.” Mind 98 : 81 -103. Clark, A. Sensory Qualities . 1993 . Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press. Strawson, Galen. 1989 . “Red and `red'.” Synthese 78 : 193 -232. Strawson, P...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 89–92.
Published: 01 January 2000
... claim is the most significant part of the book, and it will be my focus here. Those who take Aristotle to be committed to material changes in sense- perception often suppose that the sense-organ changes by acquiring a sen- sible quality. For example, as the perceiver comes to see something red...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2019) 128 (3): 293–336.
Published: 01 July 2019
... principle of [modern] philosophy is the opinion concerning colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold; which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in the mind, derived from the operation of external objects, and without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects. —David Hume, A Treatise of...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 107–112.
Published: 01 January 2014
... great deal of material that has been almost entirely neglected by scholars so far. Parts 4 and 5 are devoted to the “two principal kinds…of such properties”: namely, quantity and quality. The topics covered in the part on qualities are reasonably standard ones that one might expect to see—real qualities...