Search Results for qualitative
1-20 of 111 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Boris Kment Antihaecceitists believe that all facts about specific individuals—such as the fact that Fred exists, or that Katie is tall—globally supervene on purely qualitative facts. Haecceitists deny that. The issue is not only of interest in itself, but receives additional importance from its...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2019) 128 (3): 293–336.
Published: 01 July 2019
...Colin Chamberlain Consider the distinctive qualitative property grass visually appears to have when it visually appears to be green. This property is an example of what I call sensuous color . Whereas early modern mechanists typically argue that bodies are not sensuously colored, Margaret Cavendish...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 135–138.
Published: 01 January 2002
... BOOK REVIEWS There is much of interest in these chapters. I will focus on Clark’s character- ization of the explanandum--sensory phenomenology. It goes with Clark’s first thesis above that the phenomenology of sense varies along two dimensions: one qualitative, the other spatiotemporal. The two...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 511–518.
Published: 01 July 2013
... qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis . According to this proposition, “our introspective representations fail to represent mental states as they are in themselves. More specifically, introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, and…these properties actually...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 345–383.
Published: 01 July 2017
...: quantitative gradability and qualitative gradability . Section 3 discusses the methodology that I shall adopt in showing the compatibility of these two sorts of gradability with intellectualism about know-how. Section 4 is devoted to a discussion of quantitative gradability and section 5 to a discussion of...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2003) 112 (2): 270–273.
Published: 01 April 2003
... additional was necessary to supply a satisfactory account of that motion and the qualitative variety that was to arise from it. Since Leibniz held that motion had to originate ultimately in mind, he further held that gen- uine substances required extended passive matter put in motion by mind. In the...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 563–601.
Published: 01 October 2007
....” Philosophical Studies 68 : 221 -63. ____. 1996 . “A Mind-Body Problem at the Surfaces of Objects.” In Philosophical Issues. Vol. 7, Perception , ed. Enrique Villanueva, 219 -29. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Kalderon, Mark Eli. 2007 . “The Multiply Qualitative.” markelikalderon.com/research/the...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 241–286.
Published: 01 April 2016
... deserves consideration: one might claim that it is metaphysically impossible for determinism (as I have defined it) to be true, so that Triviality is vacuously true. One could try to make this independently plausible by deriving it from the following premises: Qualitative Laws Only qualitative...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2004) 113 (1): 130–132.
Published: 01 January 2004
... referred to as the “distinct- ness of persons.” He discerns a cluster of distinct points here. The two main ones are “the separateness of individual persons from one another” and “the qualitative distinctness of persons, as a type, from other types of entity” (36). In whatever way we elaborate them...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 134–138.
Published: 01 January 2019
... doesn't mean that it isn't physical. In fact he's adamant that it is. Our structural conception of the physical is impoverished; the physical involves conscious qualitative experience no less than quarks. (Though there is some wiggle room, Strawson could be considered a sort of Russellian Monist.) Another...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
.... 27. Fusion isn't just for liquid metal puddle people. Take two qualitatively identical human persons, Shlefty and Shrighty. Owing to sufficient redundancies in their brains, if each had just one cerebral hemisphere, each would continue on exactly as each would if each retained both hemispheres...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 289–290.
Published: 01 April 2001
... chaos theory offers only qualitative and not quantitative explanations and that the theory is fundamen- tally “antireductionist.” There is a nice discussion in the fifth chapter of what it might mean for a theory to be “approximately true.” This discussion is valuable for the insights...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 191–217.
Published: 01 April 2017
... respect to propositional knowledge, although they are omniscient with respect to purely qualitative features of the world. The possible worlds that the gods leave open are qualitatively indiscernible worlds. But those indiscernible worlds may still be distinct. One is where Castor (not something that...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 215–287.
Published: 01 April 2013
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 163–167.
Published: 01 January 2015
... way. One thing that makes this especially puzzling is that he rejects representationalism, holding that qualitative character is determined by intrinsic features of the representational vehicle (a “vectorwave”), not its content (11–21, 126–33). But if informational content is irrelevant to qualitative...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 419–422.
Published: 01 July 2003
... account will work, of course, only if there are tropes, and many phi- losophers view trope-theory with skepticism. Ehring’s main argument for tropes appeals to what he calls “nonsalient qualitative change” (94). In the most common cases of qualitative change, an object exemplifies a universal up to t...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2004) 113 (1): 139–143.
Published: 01 January 2004
... falls under another attribute. For example, an extended substance cannot be explained by or conceived through a thinking substance. The Identity of Indis- cernibles says that if x and y aren’t identical then there is some qualitative dif- ference between x and y that allows us to conceive of them as...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2005) 114 (1): 125–128.
Published: 01 January 2005
... particularly troubling. Note that in Melnyk’s definition of retentive realization physicalism, the tokens that are physically realized are tokens of some functional type. But what if not all psychological tokens are tokens of functional types? For example, consider qualitative or phenomenal psychological...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 519–523.
Published: 01 October 2018
... notion of freedom of spontaneity: “In order to be free, there is no need for me to be inclined both ways; on the contrary, the more I incline in one direction [toward truth and goodness] the freer is my choice” (AT VIII.57–58). Freedom allows (qualitative) degrees. The passage provides no support for...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 107–109.
Published: 01 January 2000
... were qualitatively alike and arranged in a suitably symmetric pat- tern, what differences in relational characteristics could individuate them? Bacon appears to have one additional motive for including relational tropes in the bundles that make up individuals. “What are the relata of...