Search Results for qualia

... Press. ____. 1980b . “Are Absent Qualia Impossible?” Philosophical Review 89 : 257 -74. ____. 1997 . “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness.” In The Nature of Consciousness , ed. N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere, 375 -415. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ____. 2001...

...Robert Van Gulick In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can...

... and yet have different qualia, or none at all. The fact that we cannot derive that a creature has qualia, or some particular quale, from the claim that it satisfies the realizing physical states is a manifestation of our not having an explanation of how these states realize qualia...

... Press, Clarendon Press. Leibniz, Gottfried. 1714 . The Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason. In Philosophical Papers and Letters , edited by L. Loemker, 636 -42. 1969. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969. Levine, Joseph. 1983 . Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific...

..., Gareth. 1982 . The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fales, Evan. 1996 . A Defense of the Given. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Farrell, B. A. 1950 . “Experience.” Mind 59 : 170 -98. Graham, George, and G. Lynn Stephens. 1985 . “Are Qualia a Pain...

... of qualia,” our understanding of which is fixed by sensory examples such as the way something looks or feels, which we “find it natural to think of as subjective” (23). Similarly, we may say that there is, in some loose sense, “something it is like” for thoughts or wishes or doubts to occur to us (232–33...

... of qualia,” our understanding of which is fixed by sensory examples such as the way something looks or feels, which we “find it natural to think of as subjective” (23). Similarly, we may say that there is, in some loose sense, “something it is like” for thoughts or wishes or doubts to occur to us (232–33...

... of qualia,” our understanding of which is fixed by sensory examples such as the way something looks or feels, which we “find it natural to think of as subjective” (23). Similarly, we may say that there is, in some loose sense, “something it is like” for thoughts or wishes or doubts to occur to us (232–33...

... of qualia,” our understanding of which is fixed by sensory examples such as the way something looks or feels, which we “find it natural to think of as subjective” (23). Similarly, we may say that there is, in some loose sense, “something it is like” for thoughts or wishes or doubts to occur to us (232–33...

... what he calls the “awareness of qualia,” our understanding of which is fixed by sensory examples such as the way something looks or feels, which we “find it natural to think of as subjective” (23). Similarly, we may say that there is, in some loose sense, “something it is like” for thoughts or wishes...

...). But in another—the genuinely phenomenal one—it con- cerns what he calls the “awareness of qualia,” our understanding of which is fixed by sensory examples such as the way something looks or feels, which we “find it natural to think of as subjective” (23). Similarly, we may say that there is, in some loose...

.... Qualitative property] Qr = the property of sensations in virtue of which they are sensations of [phenomenal property] Pr” (257 A quibble: the definition of “qualitative property” is supposed to be suitable for stating the debate about whether there are qualia, where these are taken to be intrinsic, non...

... color metaphysics. Gert is an adverbialist about appearances in the sense that they are ways of perceiving colors. But one might demand much more than this, even though this is “the thesis to which [Gert is] least strongly committed” (119). Are color appearances mental properties like qualia, perceiver...

... appearances. Appearances are not qualities of ordinary, physical objects: worldly objects can instantiate all the same qualities and nonetheless manifest different appearances. Crucially, nor are appearances “qualia”: unlike qualia, appearances are not private, and they are not instantiated by minds...

... Press . ———. 1999 . Context and Content . Oxford : Oxford University Press . ———. 2008 . Our Knowledge of the Internal World . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Strawson Galen . 1994 . Mental Reality . Cambridge, MA : MIT Press . Tye Michael . 2010 . “ Qualia...

... ones that affirm the identity of mental state types with abstract structural properties of neural events, are challenged by transparency considerations. Qualia seem to be out there in the body, or to be properties of external objects, albeit properties that can be experienced only by viewers...

... Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates—A Reply to Tye 277 BOOK REVIEWS Bartha, Paul, By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction and Evaluation of Analogical Arguments reviewed by Joseph E. Earley 451 Beiser, Frederick C., Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from...

... . Byrne A. Tye M. . 2006 . “ Qualia Ain’t in the Head .” Noûs 40 : 241 – 55 . Campbell J. 1993 . “ The Role of Physical Objects in Spatial Thinking .” In Spatial Representation , ed. Eilan N. McCarthy R. Brewer B. , 65 – 95 . Oxford : Blackwell . ———. 1994...

... domain—in fact if it is to have any causal efficacy at all—it must be physically reducible” (161). The trouble, Kim argues, is that not all mental properties are func- tionally reducible. In particular, qualities of conscious experience—qualia— are not reducible. Qualia exhibit a distinctive...

... if it is to have any causal efficacy at all—it must be physically reducible” (161). The trouble, Kim argues, is that not all mental properties are func- tionally reducible. In particular, qualities of conscious experience—qualia— are not reducible. Qualia exhibit a distinctive qualitative character...