Search Results for propositions
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The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
..., neither the puzzle itself nor Russell's solution to it have been well understood. The principle Russell seeks to defend concerns not the substitution of expressions in a sentence but rather the substitution of propositional constituents in a Russellian proposition. This article further argues that...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
... believe?” “What is it rational for me to believe?” “What am I justified in believing?”). And the question can take broader or narrower scope, depending on whether it is applied to a specific proposition (“Should I believe that there is a God?”) or to one's cognitive life as a whole (“How should I go about...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 341–371.
Published: 01 July 2002
... : 29 -46. ____. 2002 . Intensional Transitive Verbs and Abstract Clausal Complementation. Linguistics Inquiry (forthcoming). King, Jeffrey C. 1994 . Can Propositions Be Naturalistically Acceptable? In Midwest Studies in Philosophy , vol. 11 , edited by French, Uehling, and Wettstein, 53...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition is...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 132–136.
Published: 01 January 2017
...Indrek Reiland Hanks Peter , Propositional Content . New York: Oxford University Press . 227 pp. © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 In the twentieth century, philosophers were either skeptical of propositions altogether, tried to replace them by sets of worlds, or seemed...
Published: 01 April 2018
Figure 1. A proposition (wholly) about S and a proposition with no bearing on S Figure 1. . A proposition (wholly) about S and a proposition with no bearing on S More
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... view that 'ought' always expresses this relation—adherents of the naive view are happy to allow that 'ought' also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, that were things ideal, some proposition would be the case. What is important to the naive view is that there is also a deliberative...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Michael Caie An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
Published: 01 July 2019
...Sarah Moss This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Trenton Merricks Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... natural languages and in standard artificial languages. For those of us who think sentences with different logical forms express different propositions, it would mean that no proposition expressed in a typical formal language is expressible in any natural language. The article begins by clarifying the...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... mathematical structure of a probability function does. The second mistake is that the hyperreals make too many distinctions. They have a much more complex structure than credences in ordinary propositions can have, so they make distinctions that don't exist among credences. While they might be useful for...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Han van Wietmarschen The central question of the peer disagreement debate is: what should you believe about the disputed proposition if you have good reason to believe that an epistemic peer disagrees with you? This article shows that this question is ambiguous between evidential support (or...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 345–383.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Carlotta Pavese Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows in...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... essay argues that unaided perception yields objective representation of the macrophysical environment. It does so in prelinguistic animals, even in animals that almost surely lack propositional attitudes. The essay concludes with explications of nondeflationary conceptions of representation and...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
...Trenton Merricks The bulk of the essay “Truth and Freedom” ( Philosophical Review 118 : 29–57) opposes fatalism, which is the claim that if there is a true proposition to the effect that an action A will occur, then A will not be free. But that essay also offers a new way to reconcile divine...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
... diagnosis of probabilistic analogues of Gettier cases. Just like propositional knowledge, probabilistic knowledge is factive, safe, and sensitive. And it helps us build knowledge-based norms of action without accepting implausible semantic assumptions or endorsing the claim that knowledge is interest...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... a conditional is independent of any proposition inconsistent with its antecedent. But they also point to something important, namely, that our uncertainty about conditionals is not confined to uncertainty about the facts (what the actual world is like) but also expresses uncertainty about the...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 577–617.
Published: 01 October 2013
... possible worlds in the object language. This, in turn, requires that the truth of a semantic value of a sentence (or whatever structure is embedded in a modal) be relativized to a sequence of worlds rather than to an individual world, and thus be distinguished from a proposition in the traditional sense...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
... proposition” views are paradigm examples of linguistic theories, although practically all accounts of the paradoxes subscribe to some kind of linguistic theory. This essay shows that linguistic accounts of the paradoxes endorsing classical logic are subject to a particularly acute form of the revenge paradox...