Search Results for propositional attitude reports
1-20 of 159 Search Results for
propositional attitude reports
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
... cases, however, intersubstitution of that -clauses and proposition descriptions fails to preserve truth value or even grammaticality. These substitution failures lead some philosophers to reject the standard view of propositional attitude reports. Others conclude that propositional attitude verbs are...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 132–136.
Published: 01 January 2017
... and 4 set out Hanks's view in more depth. The second part is made up of three chapters that put the view to work to solve Frege's Puzzle as well as problems posed by empty names, and to provide accounts of attitude reports and the de se . The stand-alone final chapter hints at how the approach to...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 281–338.
Published: 01 July 2014
... to assert a proposition that is “close enough” to it in certain respects. But a theory of loose content certainly need not take this form for our introduction of ‘quasi-assert’ to be successful.) 42 As we have seen, the conclusion that everyday speech reports express zero-measure...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... University Press. ———. 2004 . “Tensed Quantifiers.” In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics , Vol. 1 , ed. D. Zimmermann, 3 –14. Oxford: Clarendon Press. McKay, Thomas, and Michael Nelson. 2008. “Propositional Attitude Reports.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), ed. E. N...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 341–371.
Published: 01 July 2002
...- sitional attitude contribute to propositions two-place relations between individuals and propositions. The broad outline of a framework that includes these assumptions is one that I think many, though again not all, philosophers of language find congenial. I am concerned here to investigate and explain...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
..., neither the puzzle itself nor Russell's solution to it have been well understood. The principle Russell seeks to defend concerns not the substitution of expressions in a sentence but rather the substitution of propositional constituents in a Russellian proposition. This article further argues that...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
Published: 01 July 2019
... out the relationship between these notions. To take one familiar question: does believing a proposition require having credence 1 in it? On the one hand, fully believing a proposition seems incompatible with doubting it. On the other hand, it seems that any interesting attitude of belief could not...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... view that 'ought' always expresses this relation—adherents of the naive view are happy to allow that 'ought' also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, that were things ideal, some proposition would be the case. What is important to the naive view is that there is also a deliberative...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 207–253.
Published: 01 April 2015
... attitude relations construed as three-place relations between agents, propositions, and modes of presentation. These mark two important differences with so-called “hidden indexical” theories of attitude reports (for example, Schiffer 1992 ), which are otherwise similar in requiring tacit existential...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
... all probability measures that give higher credence to the proposition that the specimens under discussion are G. hackmani than to the proposition that they are G. balachowskyi. The attitude report ascribes a relation to that semantic value. But that spells trouble, for it is traditionally taken as...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... a conditional is independent of any proposition inconsistent with its antecedent. But they also point to something important, namely, that our uncertainty about conditionals is not confined to uncertainty about the facts (what the actual world is like) but also expresses uncertainty about the...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
... proposition” views are paradigm examples of linguistic theories, although practically all accounts of the paradoxes subscribe to some kind of linguistic theory. This essay shows that linguistic accounts of the paradoxes endorsing classical logic are subject to a particularly acute form of the revenge paradox...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 577–617.
Published: 01 October 2013
... possible worlds in the object language. This, in turn, requires that the truth of a semantic value of a sentence (or whatever structure is embedded in a modal) be relativized to a sequence of worlds rather than to an individual world, and thus be distinguished from a proposition in the traditional sense...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
... . “E-type Pronouns and Donkey Anaphora.” Linguistics and Philosophy 13 : 137 -77. Higgins, F. 1979 . The Pseudo-Cleft Construction in English . New York and London: Garland. Hintikka, J. 1969 . “Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.” In Philosophical Logic , ed. J. Davis, D. Hockney, and...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 359–406.
Published: 01 July 2012
... . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Quine Willard V. O. 1956 . “ Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes .” Journal of Philosophy 53 : 177 – 87 . Recanati François . 2005 . “ Deixis and Anaphora .” In Semantics vs. Pragmatics , ed. Szabó Z. Gendler , 286 – 316 . Oxford...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2004) 113 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2004
..., how to analyze singular negative exis- tentials, and why co-referring names can’t always be interchanged salva veritate in propositional attitude reports (the Frege-Russell problems, for short).3 Almost without saying: for what led these neo-descriptivists to their version of descriptivism was not...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2016) 125 (1): 35–82.
Published: 01 January 2016
... who cooked the risotto he ate. have semantic values of the same kind. Yet there is still room for denying that they both state a relationship between a subject and a set of propositions. As the analogy with (11) and (12) shows, the type of the semantic values in play in attitude reports need not be...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 323–369.
Published: 01 July 2018
... ‘myself’ in dream reports: ( Kiss Me ) I dreamed I was Brigitte Bardot and I kissed me. ( Kiss Myself) #I dreamed I was Brigitte Bardot and I kissed myself. Nothing is special about believing and dreaming: similar data arises for most nonfactive propositional attitude reports. 7 Thus, it would be...
Includes: Supplementary data
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... reasonable. (This is the function C A such that C A ( B ) = C ( B | A ) for each proposition B .) We'll say that propositions A and B are compatible (for credences C ) iff C ( A ) > 0 and C ( B | A )>0; otherwise, they are incompatible . Here are two important standard...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 432–434.
Published: 01 July 2004
...-inspired examples of true identity state- ments. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are dedicated to semantic issues typically deemed to be intractable from the New Theory’s viewpoint. Berger confronts problems related to attitude reports, such as Kripke’s disquotational principle and the de dicto/de re distinction...