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proposition

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Published: 01 April 2018
Figure 1.   A proposition (wholly) about S and a proposition with no bearing on S More
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 382–386.
Published: 01 July 2022
...Stephan Krämer Trueman Robert , Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2021 . xi + 227 pp. © 2022 by Cornell University 2022 A singular term like ‘Socrates’, if all goes well, refers to an object...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 173–238.
Published: 01 April 2023
...Andrew Bacon This paper argues that the theory of structured propositions is not undermined by the Russell-Myhill paradox. I develop a theory of structured propositions in which the Russell-Myhill paradox doesn’t arise: the theory does not involve ramification or compromises to the underlying logic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 132–136.
Published: 01 January 2017
...Indrek Reiland Hanks Peter , Propositional Content . New York: Oxford University Press . 227 pp. © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 In the twentieth century, philosophers were either skeptical of propositions altogether, tried to replace them by sets of worlds, or seemed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
..., neither the puzzle itself nor Russell's solution to it have been well understood. The principle Russell seeks to defend concerns not the substitution of expressions in a sentence but rather the substitution of propositional constituents in a Russellian proposition. This article further argues...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
... to believe?” “What is it rational for me to believe?” “What am I justified in believing?”). And the question can take broader or narrower scope, depending on whether it is applied to a specific proposition (“Should I believe that there is a God?”) or to one's cognitive life as a whole (“How should I go about...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 341–371.
Published: 01 July 2002
... : 29 -46. ____. 2002 . Intensional Transitive Verbs and Abstract Clausal Complementation. Linguistics Inquiry (forthcoming). King, Jeffrey C. 1994 . Can Propositions Be Naturalistically Acceptable? In Midwest Studies in Philosophy , vol. 11 , edited by French, Uehling, and Wettstein, 53...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Jacob M. Nebel The standard view of believes and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “ S believes that p ” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p ; this proposition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 97–143.
Published: 01 January 2021
...Peter van Elswyk A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This article is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
Published: 01 July 2019
...Sarah Moss This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... view that 'ought' always expresses this relation—adherents of the naive view are happy to allow that 'ought' also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, that were things ideal, some proposition would be the case. What is important to the naive view is that there is also a deliberative...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Michael Caie An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 537–589.
Published: 01 October 2020
... need in order to write the “book of the world.” This paper attempts to make good on this metaphor. To that end, a modality is introduced that, put informally, stands to propositions as logical truth stands to sentences. The resulting theory, formulated in higher-order logic, also vindicates the Humean...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 591–642.
Published: 01 October 2020
... Trenton 2009 . “ Propositional Attitudes? ” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 : 207 – 32 . Moltmann Friederike 2003 . “ Propositional Attitudes without Propositions .” Synthese 135 , no. 1 : 77 – 118 . Montague Michelle 2007 . “ Against Propositionalism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 345–383.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Carlotta Pavese Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... in natural languages and in standard artificial languages. For those of us who think sentences with different logical forms express different propositions, it would mean that no proposition expressed in a typical formal language is expressible in any natural language. The article begins by clarifying...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... mathematical structure of a probability function does. The second mistake is that the hyperreals make too many distinctions. They have a much more complex structure than credences in ordinary propositions can have, so they make distinctions that don't exist among credences. While they might be useful...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 395–425.
Published: 01 July 2013
... that they are is not. Others also draw a distinction between propositional and doxastic justification but apply both to beliefs: the belief that your shares are $27.60 is propositionally but not doxastically justified (see Foley 1987 , 175–86). For my purposes, these terminological differences do not matter. What matters...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Trenton Merricks Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 227–262.
Published: 01 April 2021
...David James Barnett Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p , but I don't believe that p...