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The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 107–109.
Published: 01 January 2000
...James Van Cleve UNIVERSALS AND PROPERTY INSTANCES: THE ALPHABET OF BEING. By John Bacon. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. Pp. iv, 159. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REvlEWS serious student of the field and I enthusiastically recommend it to nonspe- cialists...
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 451–506.
Published: 01 October 2004
.... The Philosophical Review, Vol. 113, No. 4 (October 2004) Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto Jonathan Cohen Upon examination, I find only one of the reasons commonly produc’d for this opinion to be satisfactory...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 266–269.
Published: 01 April 2009
...Sonia Roca-Royes Penelope Mackie, How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon, 2006. xii + 212 pp. Cornell University 2009 Chalmers, David. 2002 . “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” In Conceivability and Possibility , ed...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 97–99.
Published: 01 January 2010
...Marc Lange Alexander Bird, Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 256 pp. Cornell University 2010 BOOK REVIEWS Alexander Bird, Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 256...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 462–465.
Published: 01 July 2002
...John MacFarlane Colin McGinn, Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. vi, 114. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS If the complement clause ascribes a first-person content, it expresses...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 155–204.
Published: 01 April 2016
...Anat Schechtman Descartes notoriously characterizes substance in two ways: first, as an ultimate subject of properties (that is, a subject in which properties inhere without itself inhering in anything); second, as an independent entity. The characterizations have appeared to many to diverge...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 293–336.
Published: 01 July 2019
...Colin Chamberlain Consider the distinctive qualitative property grass visually appears to have when it visually appears to be green. This property is an example of what I call sensuous color . Whereas early modern mechanists typically argue that bodies are not sensuously colored, Margaret Cavendish...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 537–589.
Published: 01 October 2020
...Andrew Bacon In explaining the notion of a fundamental property or relation, metaphysicians will often draw an analogy with languages. The fundamental properties and relations stand to reality as the primitive predicates and relations stand to a language: the smallest set of vocabulary God would...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
... as follows. Modal rationalists claim that for all nonphenomenal macro properties, the appropriate supervenience conditional is both necessary and a priori. Hence, type-B materialists must engage in special pleading when they claim that the relevant supervenience conditional for phenomenal properties...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... of which properties of the objects of moral choice matter in any given context, and (ii) a specification of how these properties matter. Reason-based representations provide a very general taxonomy of moral theories, as differences among theories can be attributed to differences in their two key parameters...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 143–178.
Published: 01 April 2019
...Maegan Fairchild According to material plenitude , every material object coincides with an abundance of other material objects that differ in the properties they have essentially and accidentally . Although this kind of plenitude is becoming increasingly popular, it isn't clear how to make sense...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
... identifying normative with natural statements and facts do not transfer seamlessly to identifying normative with natural properties. Already we see important differences from RP . First, what Parfit evidently means by a principle's “being universal law” in clauses (1) and (2) of the Triple Theory is its...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 1–58.
Published: 01 January 2015
... as such is first generated by the understanding through an act of synthesis of the imagination. Against this reading, this article argues that a key characteristic of space as a form of intuition is its nonconceptual unity, which defines the properties of space and is as such necessarily independent...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Andrew Bacon Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centered around what this essay calls “linguistic” accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or nonparadoxical status...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 441–480.
Published: 01 October 2015
...Shamik Dasgupta Sometimes, ignorance is inexpressible. Lewis recognized this when he argued, in “Ramseyan Humility,” that we cannot know which property occupies which causal role. This peculiar state of ignorance arises in a number of other domains too, including ignorance about our position...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 147–190.
Published: 01 April 2017
... aside the role of intuition for the nonce to investigate Kant's conception of natural number. Although Kant himself doesn't distinguish between a cardinal and an ordinal conception of number, some of the properties Kant attributes to number can be characterized as cardinal or ordinal. This essay argues...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
... vindications of David Lewis’s original Principal Principle as well as recent reformulations due to Ned Hall and Jenann Ismael. Joyce enumerates properties that a function must have if it is to measure the distance from a set of credences to a set of truth values; he shows that, on any such measure, and for any...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Sarah Moss This paper argues that just as full beliefs can constitute knowledge, so can properties of your credence distribution. The resulting notion of probabilistic knowledge helps us give a natural account of knowledge ascriptions embedding language of subjective uncertainty, and a simple...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
... intimate connection to the question of whether all fundamental facts are qualitative or whether they include facts about which specific individuals there are and how qualitative properties and relations are distributed over them. Those who think that all fundamental facts are qualitative are arguably...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
... level can coexist with its absence at a lower level. Unlike previous arguments for the level-specificity of chance, the present argument shows, in a precise sense, that higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-level properties supervening on lower-level ones...