Search Results for proper names
1-20 of 347 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
...Samuel Cumming Variabilism is the view that proper names (like pronouns) are semantically represented as variables. Referential names, like referential pronouns, are assigned their referents by a contextual variable assignment (Kaplan 1989). The reference parameter (like the world of evaluation...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
... Russell's solution requires him to adopt certain substantive views about the nature of the referents of what are usually called “logically proper names.” In particular, Russell's solution will work only if the referents of such names are given to one who understands them in a manner that is entirely “aspect...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 219–240.
Published: 01 April 2017
... the Syntactic Rationale and presents serious auxiliary problems for predicativism. © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 predicativism referentialism reference proper names count nouns Predicativism is the thesis that names are count nouns having a predicate-type semantic value in all of...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
...’, ‘some’, and ‘a’), although ‘the’ would in some cases go unpronounced. Tyler Burge thought that “proper names,” as he called them, were predicates in the sense that they were true or false of things and should be treated as general terms in a semantic theory of English. 2 While I agree with all...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 407–442.
Published: 01 July 2012
...Dale Dorsey Subjectivism about well-being holds that ϕ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, ϕ is valued , under the proper conditions, by x . Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists. One important source of dispute is...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 473–507.
Published: 01 October 2016
...Daniel Koltonski On the shared-ends account of close friendship, proper care for a friend as an agent requires seeing yourself as having important reasons to accommodate and promote the friend's valuable ends for the friend's own sake. However, that friends share ends doesn't inoculate them against...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... an extension of a proposal due to Ned Hall and others from the case of chance to that of causation. The remedy suggests a new view of the relation between causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, namely, that they stand to each other much as chance stands to credence, being objective...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... action. According to this view, if Jim ought to jam, that is not because there is a special distinctive deliberative ought relation between Jim and jamming; rather, it is because a certain proposition ought to be the case: namely, that Jim jams. This essay defends the naive view, by first arguing that...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
...Peter A. Graham A principle that many have found attractive is one that goes by the name “'Ought' Implies 'Can'.” According to this principle, one morally ought to do something only if one can do it. This essay has two goals: to show that the principle is false and to undermine the motivations that...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 314–316.
Published: 01 April 2008
... descriptions, proper names, and pronouns are the same—they have the same syntactic as well as semantic structure. They are definite descriptions, with the definite article THE taking two arguments, an index andaNoun Phrase. Elbourne’s proposal targets two dominant views, one in linguistics, the other in...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2006) 115 (4): 487–516.
Published: 01 October 2006
... reference for a very particular reason; it does so because a sense presents a reference, by incorporating a mode of presentation. This is how Frege invariably speaks of the matter when- ever he is discussing the senses expressed by proper names, the most renowned passage being found in the opening...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 432–434.
Published: 01 July 2004
.... He also discusses questions having to do with apparently vacuous proper names, and the problem of so-called “intentional identity.” The final two chapters deal with the semantics of anaphoric pronouns, including the classic problem of “donkey” sentences, and questions of plural quantification...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 260–264.
Published: 01 April 2018
... the nonreferential character of number-terms has to do with the force of the arguments from innocent to loaded statements. Presumably we could have spoken a language where number-terms behave syntactically just like proper names. In this case they would be in the business of referring. And it is...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 371–374.
Published: 01 July 2014
... also network-bound truth-conditions (86). The networks in question are networks of uses of proper names. The networks are formed by anaphoric links and reference borrowing, as in Kripke's causal account. Reflexive contents are discussed in relation to the use of singular terms, as will be exemplified...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2007) 116 (2): 251–266.
Published: 01 April 2007
... unmediated. Possible worlds enter Kripke’s story as a device for giving a clear and precise characterization of the semantic hypothesis about names that he was defending. One says what the truth conditions are for a par- ticular kind of statement (for example, statements with proper names as...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2000) 109 (2): 281–286.
Published: 01 April 2000
... names like ‘Quine’ to be logically proper names whose meaning is their reference. In his contribution, Lambert ar- gues that Prior fails to make clear sense of the notion of a logically proper name.) Translated into talk about intensions, Prior’s view about singular information is an instance...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
... atom at t—an object without any proper parts at t—or composed of atoms at t.14 (b) Universalism: for 13. My aim is to show that the outcome of cases (AE) may be plausibly accepted in the presence of (AC) not that they should be accepted. Therefore I shall rest content with the way in which the...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 473–478.
Published: 01 July 2002
... else (or nothing at all) instead. This differentiates them from ordinary definite descriptions and makes them akin to proper names. Romeo could sin- cerely insist: (2) Juliet is and always will be the sun—even at times in the future when lik- ening a girl to the sun would be a way of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 497–537.
Published: 01 October 2002
...-dependent) words. Though Naming and Necessity is concerned with proper names, not demonstratives, it opened wide a window that had remained mostly shut in Meaning and Necessity but that, thanks largely to Kripke, shall forevermore remain unbarred. Understanding of demonstrative semantics grew by a quan...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2007) 116 (2): 219–250.
Published: 01 April 2007
... to discuss whether we ought to endorse the schema. The box and the quantifi ers have already been explained. Predicate let- ters are schematic letters for predicates, and individual constants are schematic letters for proper names. Finally, when a formula in which one or more variables have...