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The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
...Samuel Cumming Variabilism is the view that proper names (like pronouns) are semantically represented as variables. Referential names, like referential pronouns, are assigned their referents by a contextual variable assignment (Kaplan 1989). The reference parameter (like the world of evaluation...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 53–94.
Published: 01 January 2020
...Anders J. Schoubye M ILLIANISM and DESCRIPTIVISM are without question the two most prominent views with respect to the semantics of proper names. However, debates between MILLIANS and DESCRIPTIVISTS have tended to focus on a fairly narrow set of linguistic data and an equally narrow set of problems...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
... that Russell's solution requires him to adopt certain substantive views about the nature of the referents of what are usually called “logically proper names.” In particular, Russell's solution will work only if the referents of such names are given to one who understands them in a manner that is entirely “aspect...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 219–240.
Published: 01 April 2017
... the Syntactic Rationale and presents serious auxiliary problems for predicativism. © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 predicativism referentialism reference proper names count nouns Predicativism is the thesis that names are count nouns having a predicate-type semantic value in all...
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 487–516.
Published: 01 October 2006
... for a very particular reason; it does so because a sense presents a reference, by incorporating a mode of presentation. This is how Frege invariably speaks of the matter when- ever he is discussing the senses expressed by proper names, the most renowned passage being found in the opening paragraphs...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 314–316.
Published: 01 April 2008
... descriptions, proper names, and pronouns are the same—they have the same syntactic as well as semantic structure. They are definite descriptions, with the definite article THE taking two arguments, an index andaNoun Phrase. Elbourne’s proposal targets two dominant views, one in linguistics, the other...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
... is called N } . On the flip side, if a ‘called’ predication could be true only if ‘called’ were followed by a quote-name, as in “Socrates was called ‘Socrates’,” then no instance of the being-called condition proper would be true. From the perspective of a proponent of the bastardized...
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 432–434.
Published: 01 July 2004
.... He also discusses questions having to do with apparently vacuous proper names, and the problem of so-called “intentional identity.” The final two chapters deal with the semantics of anaphoric pronouns, including the classic problem of “donkey” sentences, and questions of plural quantification...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 260–264.
Published: 01 April 2018
... syntactically just like proper names. In this case they would be in the business of referring. And it is natural to think that we would still find the inferences to be quantified, apparently compelling loaded statements. (Few would want to say that we find these inferences compelling only because of some tacit...
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (1): 119–123.
Published: 01 January 2022
... of these statements seems to express a semantic rule. Regarding de re modal claims, Thomasson starts by arguing that proper names come with some conceptual content: for instance, “Kamala Harris” comes with the category “human.” The de re necessity “Kamala Harris is necessarily human” can be derived from the rule...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
... is comfortable’ be read as a material predication? Second, predications with a proper name or a variable in subject position 289 THOMAS SATTIG Let me give a brief outline of the syntax and semantics of these modes of predication. Consider...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 371–374.
Published: 01 July 2014
... then include the condition that a Loch Ness monster exists. This is meant to account for reference failure and results in the falsity of the utterance. Finally, there are also network-bound truth-conditions (86). The networks in question are networks of uses of proper names. The networks are formed...
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 281–286.
Published: 01 April 2000
... exist in any sense-and his belief that there is no singular infor- mation about nonexistents; had Quine failed to exist, there would have been no information about him, not even that he fails to exist. (Crucial to this view is that Prior took names like ‘Quine’ to be logically proper...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 473–478.
Published: 01 July 2002
... at all) instead. This differentiates them from ordinary definite descriptions and makes them akin to proper names. Romeo could sin- cerely insist: (2) Juliet is and always will be the sun—even at times in the future when lik- ening a girl to the sun would be a way of saying her company...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 251–266.
Published: 01 April 2007
.... Possible worlds enter Kripke’s story as a device for giving a clear and precise characterization of the semantic hypothesis about names that he was defending. One says what the truth conditions are for a par- ticular kind of statement (for example, statements with proper names as constituents...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 497–537.
Published: 01 October 2002
...-dependent) words. Though Naming and Necessity is concerned with proper names, not demonstratives, it opened wide a window that had remained mostly shut in Meaning and Necessity but that, thanks largely to Kripke, shall forevermore remain unbarred. Understanding of demonstrative semantics grew by a quan...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 219–250.
Published: 01 April 2007
... to discuss whether we ought to endorse the schema. The box and the quantifi ers have already been explained. Predicate let- ters are schematic letters for predicates, and individual constants are schematic letters for proper names. Finally, when a formula in which one or more variables have free...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 667–670.
Published: 01 October 2013
... for each chapter and a general bibliography, consisting mostly of modern editions of ancient texts, together with a few articles and monographs. The work is completed by an index of topics and proper names; there is no index locorum . To do justice to the wealth of challenging material in each...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 63–105.
Published: 01 January 2019
...” as a kind of “functional concept.” 28. Another objection to my appeal to concealed questions is that it cannot explain why substitutions of proper names (e.g., logicism ) or indefinite descriptions (e.g., a proposition ) for that -clauses do not preserve truth value. But both names and indefinites...
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 295–325.
Published: 01 July 2022
...’ is not a proper name but an abbreviation of a description, namely, ‘an/the infant into whom b 1 – b 6 might have developed, had the world been as described.’ So are ‘Shae’ and ‘Mae’ introduced below (see note 18 ). 13. In a review of many studies on this issue, Rossant and Tam...
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