...Christy Mag Uidhir Cornell University 2009 Alexander Nehamas, Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. xi + 186 pp. BOOK REVIEWS Lynne Rudder Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life...

... to the conventionalist's core instincts, including embracing: the view that binding promises must involve the promisee's belief that performance will occur; the view that through the promise, the promisee and promisor create a shared end; and the tendency to take promises between strangers, rather than intimates...

... promisees have an interest in not being wrong about how promisors are going to behave, but why can’t this interest be served by a prediction as well as by a promise? And if this interest is as much at stake in the one case as in the other, why isn’t the moral situ- ation the same? The information...

.... Promising is a relation of at least three terms: promisor, promisee, and what is promised. The idea of a promise that is a promise to no one, not even to oneself, seems incoherent. Since this is so, we need to account for the value in what we can call “phantom promises”: attempts...

... for present actions are grounded in present or future desires. Futurist subjectivism promises to answer Parfit's Agony Argument , and it is motivated by natural extensions of some of the considerations that support subjectivism in general. However, it faces a problem: because which desires one will have...

...Sophia Dandelet Veritism is the idea that what makes a belief epistemically rational is that it is a fitting response to the value of truth. This idea promises to serve as the foundation for an elegant and systematic treatment of epistemic rationality, one that illuminates the importance...

...Patrick Todd The most promising way of responding to arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom (in one way or another) invokes a claim about the order of explanation: God knew (or believed) that you would perform a given action because you would, in fact, perform...

....” 34. See, for example, Gilbert 2004, 90 : “If you fail to give me what I have a right to through your promise, I have the standing, as your promisee, to rebuke you on that account. Similarly, should you threaten to break your promise, I have the standing, as your promisee, to command or insist...

.... https://gen.medium.com/the-lifespan-of-a-lie-d869212b1f62 . Cohon Rachel , and D’Cruz Jason . 2016 . “ Promises and Consistency .” In Questions of Character , 215 . D’Cruz Jason . 2015 . “ Trust , Trustworthiness, and the Moral Consequence of Consistency.” Journal...

... strength of a motivating reason: a thesis that is essential to the very coherence of the Coincident Reasons Thesis. Now suppose that one has incurred some obligation—say, by pledging to give a certain amount to a charity, or by promising to volunteer for a certain 615...

... not always be the same reason, depending on the surrounding circum- stances. It may fail to constitute a reason (a promise to ϕ that is given under coercion or fraud arguably gives no reason to ϕ) or even constitute a reason for acting otherwise (a pleasure that is sadistic arguably gives a reason...

.... if the promiser has a clear belief as to the sense in which it was understood by the promisee, and if the latter is still in a position to grant release from it, but unwilling to do so, if it was not obtained by force or fraud, if it does not conflict with definite prior obligations, if we do not believe that its...

... of reasons, however. He claims that reasons of moral integrity (for declining to comply with managerial directives) are more likely to outweigh reasons based on promises than reasons deriving from the public good (for complying with managerial directives). Perhaps so. But I do not share McMahon's confidence...

..., moral arguments cannot explain (1) how it can be that every promise obligates the promisor irrespective of any considerations other than that they made the promise (135), and relatedly (2) why promisees retain a demand-right against the promisor even when the promisor ought not discharge a promise all...

... promise, despite being a promise between acquaintances, is inspired by Seana Shiffrin's account of promises between intimates: “Promising to φ conveys [to A, the promisee] B's willingness to forswear the moral right to alter course. B's participation is no longer dependent on how B perceives the merits...

... to the “practices” objection: promising that it will rain is not a matter of standing in a relation to the proposition that it will rain; and betting that it will rain is not betting on the truth of that proposition either. (Presumably, however, present- and past-directed promises and bets are still propositional...

... he’ll do. Perhaps the promiser is not very reliable, or the matter is of particular importance for the promisee. The invoca- tion of a promise is meant to assure that the promiser can be relied on in this situation, and that he’ll accord it the importance that the prom- isee sees in the matter...

... know or justifiably believe. Thus, tellings have the mark of the illocutionary. For instance, in normal circumstances, it is enough for a speaker to promise something for her to have done that very thing. This is marked by the legitimacy of including ‘hereby’ before the performative verb, as in ‘I...

...: “ought” implies “can” but does not imply “must” . 2 To see the apparent tension related to this slogan, consider first the following way of explaining the pro tanto/all-things-considered distinction: You have a job at a military base. You have the evening off today, and you have promised to meet your...

... further things. In utter- ing ‘I promise to come to your party’, I promise to come to your party. In uttering ‘It starts at eight’, you assert that it starts at eight. In uttering ‘I apologize for forgetting about your party’, I apologize for forgetting about your party. A speech act is that which you...