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projectiv
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 309–313.
Published: 01 April 2020
...Andrew Cortens Azzouni Jody , Ontology without Borders . New York: Oxford University Press , 2017 . xxxv + 279 pp. © 2020 by Cornell University 2020 Jody Azzouni's aim in this book is to articulate and defend what he calls “object projectivism”—roughly, the view that reality...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 313–347.
Published: 01 July 2000
...
and what I am not. I am not saying that Hobbes himself had any
clear notion of the metaethical differences between projectivism
and subjectivism, nor that he ever explicitly rejects subjectivism.
These are our distinctions, and it would be anachronistic to read
them back into Hobbes...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 348–352.
Published: 01 July 2019
.... This is difficult to deny, though Gert offers an interesting critique of the transparency of experience (chap. 8). If we experience color appearances to be on objects in our environment and those appearances are qualia-like, then some form of projectivism about color perception appears to follow (even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 294–296.
Published: 01 April 2002
... projectivism, ceteris paribus laws are explanatory
only if they relate events as cause and effect. Hence, relying on ceteris paribus
laws to launch a defense of event dualism (3.2) presumably has little force
against a physicalist, while it is dispensable for one committed at the outset to
Strawsonian...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (1): 115–119.
Published: 01 January 2022
... on projectivism in ethics); “We have nothing to say about what makes a F , it just is F ; that is a basic and inexplicable fact about the universe” (190; in a discussion on Michael Devitt against David Armstrong). Second, he insists throughout the book that truthmaker theory is part of metaphysics and denies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 291–294.
Published: 01 April 2002
...
for event causation in terms of explanation (basically ceteris paribus laws, nota-
bly involving those couched in intentional terms) must remain circular, as he
himself admits (219). Barring projectivism, ceteris paribus laws are explanatory
only if they relate events as cause and effect. Hence, relying...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 125–131.
Published: 01 January 2012
... as perhaps
131
BOOK REVIEWS
the most famous of all moral noncognitivists, prefiguring in his work twentieth-
century emotivism, with its assertion that moral judgments are expressions of
feeling masquerading as judgments, and projectivism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 131–137.
Published: 01 January 2012
...
the most famous of all moral noncognitivists, prefiguring in his work twentieth-
century emotivism, with its assertion that moral judgments are expressions of
feeling masquerading as judgments, and projectivism, with its dismissal of moral
judgments as all false: mere erroneous projections of our...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 137–139.
Published: 01 January 2012
... of
feeling masquerading as judgments, and projectivism, with its dismissal of moral
judgments as all false: mere erroneous projections of our subjective feelings on
to the world. The second half concerns Hume’s distinction between the natural
and artificial virtues. Here too the author advances...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 157–185.
Published: 01 April 2007
... by the gods, as Wright says. If we give
priority to the left-hand side of the biconditional, we have “detectivism” about piety; if
we give priority to the right-hand side we have “projectivism.” Wright, “The Euthyphro
Contrast,” 108, drawing on Johnston. But what does the difference in “priority” amount...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 159–191.
Published: 01 April 2008
... cohere with various metaethical theories, see Justin D’Arms and
Daniel Jacobson, “Sensibility Theory and Projectivism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical
Theory, ed. David Copp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 186–218.
184
Utilitarianism without...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 43–87.
Published: 01 January 2023
... and Schmidt-Petri Christoph , 263 – 97 . Berlin : Springer . Lange Marc . 2017 . “ Is Kantian Projectivism the Only Hope for Grounding the Principal Principle? (No) .” The Monist 100 : 422 – 36 . Levinstein B. A. 2019 . “ Imprecise Epistemic Values and Imprecise Credences...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 481–527.
Published: 01 October 2017
... and Projectivism .” In The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory , ed. Copp David , 186 – 218 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . D'Arms Justin Jacobson Daniel 2010 . “ Demystifying Sensibilities: Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect .” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy...