...Alan Millar THE BODY IN MIND: UNDERSTANDING COGNITIVE PROCESSES. By Mark Rowlands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Pp. x, 270. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, No. 4 (October 2001) THE BODY...

... acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless allow us to think and act for reasons, and these processes must be the ones that generate the voluntary activities making...

...Thomas Crowther There has been relatively little discussion, in contemporary philosophy of mind, of the active aspects of perceptual processes. This essay presents and offers some preliminary development of a view about what it is for an agent to watch a particular material object throughout a...

...Daniel Hoek Conversational exculpature is a pragmatic process whereby information is subtracted from, rather than added to, what the speaker literally says. This pragmatic content subtraction explains why we can say “Rob is six feet tall” without implying that Rob is between 5 ′11.99″ and 6 ′0.01...

... , world-involving process/interaction that starts with the tomato and ends with the neural events? Why not instead say that in the normal case, as in the hallucination case, it only belongs to the neural events in the head? This would be a standard across-the-board brain-based theory of sensible...

... perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. In a nutshell, what is distinctive about (AF) is the idea that vision is partly future-tensed . For (AF) posits visual contents that involve anticipation —that is, visual contents that are not just about how the objects of vision are right...

... is that conscious attention to a substantial object (person, tree, etc.) causes sub- sequent information processing about that object. Call this role “targeting,” and distinguish it from the (putative) role of experience in understanding what a use of a demonstrative refers to. Targeting is...

... metacognitive belief-producing system consisting of an information producer and an endorsement mechanism. The endorsement mechanism either endorses or rejects the content generated by the information producer, and endorsed content results in a belief. The reliability of this two-step process depends on the...

... Rowlands is chasing after something like this. (In this connection it is significant that he expresses the environmen- talist ontological claim both as a claim about cognitive processes (31) and as a claim about mental processes (8 So far as perception is concerned, what really matters to him is that a...

... evidence E about p. You are justified to believe that S also has evidence E about p (you and S learn that the total is forty-six dollars, you also both know that you split the bill equally and that you tip 20 percent). t 2 : You form the belief that p after a process of reasoning on the basis of E...

... that define a program (210–11); insofar as a (typical) neural network instantiates a computational process, it does so serially, as it directly transforms a single input into a single output (211, 216). Consequently, the issue of parallelism is a red herring; rather, the key question at stake is...

... are somewhat phony world-bound properties that depend on what the laws of nature happen to be. Ellis calls his alternative metaphysic scientific essentialism, and he summarizes it in five contrasting theses (7): 1. Causal relations are relations between events in causal processes...

... this principle to develop what he takes as a key to Descartes’s philosophy—the process of “analytical reflexion” (dis- cussed more fully below) by which knowledge that was previously only implicit is explicitly intuited. This interpretive key is then employed to unlock many of the other major...

... with problems of temporal becoming. The creative process is close to being a mystery rather than a prob- lem; there is some plausibility in the Fodor-inspired claim that we don’t even know what a theory of this process would be like. No one here tackles the mys- tery; many deal instead in...

... particular, he endorses a criterion whereby the consequences that matter are one's believing truths and not believing falsehoods ( Goldman 1986 , 98). In a more recent article, Goldman (2001, 32) writes that “true belief is the ultimate value in the epistemic sphere, and various belief-forming processes...

.... J. McDowell. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ____. 1985 . “Molyneux's Question.” In The Collected Papers of Gareth Evans. Ed. G. Evans. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Felleman, D., and D. Van Essen. 1991 . “Distributed Hierarchical Processing in the Primate Cerebral Cortex.” Cerebral...

.... 267 BOOK REVlEWS responsibility-constituting deliberative processes must be “the agent’s own.” They argue in chapter 7 that there is an essentially historical di- mension to moral responsibility that cannot be captured by purely struc- tural “mesh theories...

... comfortable resting on the hypothetical. However, Siegel also says results from experimental psychology do not settle the central philosophical issue (xviii–xix). The former concern processes and mechanisms, and the latter concerns experience. Whether “top-down” effects ever alter relatively early perceptual...

... causally overdetermine e if and only if (O1) both c1 and c2 are causes of e ; (O2) if c1 had occurred without c2 , e would still have occurred; (O3) if c2 had occurred without c1 , e would still have occurred. Here the processes initiated by c1 and d1 represent the...

... Collins, Hall, and Paul 2004, 403 -17. ____. 2004b . “Routes, Processes, and Chance-Lowering Causes.” In Dowe and Noordhof 2004, 138 -51. ____. 2007 . “What's Wrong with Neuron Diagrams? ” In Campbell, O'Rourke, and Shier 2007, 69 -92. ____. n.d. “Token Causation.” Unpublished...