Search Results for process

...Alan Millar THE BODY IN MIND: UNDERSTANDING COGNITIVE PROCESSES. By Mark Rowlands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Pp. x, 270. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, No. 4 (October 2001) THE BODY...

... acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless allow us to think and act for reasons, and these processes must be the ones that generate the voluntary activities making...

...Jack C. Lyons The paper offers a solution to the generality problem for a reliabilist epistemology, by developing an “algorithm and parameters” scheme for type-individuating cognitive processes. Algorithms are detailed procedures for mapping inputs to outputs. Parameters are psychological variables...

...). According to DRH, perceptual processes are constrained to compute over a bounded range of dimensions, while cognitive processes are not. This view allows that perception is cognitively penetrable, but places strict limits on the varieties of penetration that can occur. The article argues that DRH enjoys...

...Thomas Crowther There has been relatively little discussion, in contemporary philosophy of mind, of the active aspects of perceptual processes. This essay presents and offers some preliminary development of a view about what it is for an agent to watch a particular material object throughout...

...Daniel Hoek Conversational exculpature is a pragmatic process whereby information is subtracted from, rather than added to, what the speaker literally says. This pragmatic content subtraction explains why we can say “Rob is six feet tall” without implying that Rob is between 5 ′11.99″ and 6 ′0.01...

...: Colors are properties of perceptual interactions [or processes] involving a perceiver (P) endowed with a spectrally discriminating visual system (V) and a stimulus (S) with spectral contrast of the sort that can be exploited by V. (140) She says, “we must focus on the interaction occurring between...

... on this guiding picture by questioning the unity of the mind. So-called dual process theories, and later refinements of such theories (e.g., Evans 2010 ), postulate different processes going on in our heads, where these processes may run their course fairly independently of one another, without the need for any...

... in some proposition p is doxastically rational iff c was produced by a reliable credence-forming process, where a credence-forming process is reliable provided it usually generates credences with a sufficiently high degree of accuracy (as measured by your favorite scoring rule...

... to believe that S also has evidence E about p (you and S learn that the total is forty-six dollars, you also both know that you split the bill equally and that you tip 20 percent). t 2 : You form the belief that p after a process of reasoning on the basis of E. You are justified to believe that S also...

... object (person, tree, etc.) causes sub- sequent information processing about that object. Call this role “targeting,” and distinguish it from the (putative) role of experience in understanding what a use of a demonstrative refers to. Targeting is supposed to happen in both normal cases and cases...

... that Rowlands is chasing after something like this. (In this connection it is significant that he expresses the environmen- talist ontological claim both as a claim about cognitive processes (31) and as a claim about mental processes (8 So far as perception is concerned, what really matters to him...

...—but are somewhat phony world-bound properties that depend on what the laws of nature happen to be. Ellis calls his alternative metaphysic scientific essentialism, and he summarizes it in five contrasting theses (7): 1. Causal relations are relations between events in causal processes...

... the causal processes that enable vision. I am less confident about—though still intrigued by—(AF) when it is understood as a hypothesis about visual phenomenology. I am certain, however, that Madary's book has wonderfully advanced the discussion. Madary notes that the precise significance...

... of computing (121). Nevertheless, the success of this account does not turn primarily on the details of the teleological theory that precedes it; rather, the real work is in the notion of computation on offer: Generic Computation : the processing of vehicles by a functional mechanism according to rules...

... cognition follow. 15. Fodor (2000) writes, “Indeed, I am inclined to think that, sooner or later, we will all have to give up on the Turing story [of computation] as a general account of how the mind works…” (47). Why? Because “…the computational theory of mental processes doesn’t work...

... is right that the explanatory and moral benefits we gain from recognizing the falsity of the imagined self are diminished if we allow a “surrogate” self—such as a process view of the self, a “minimal” subjective self, or even a conventional designation—to take up the self’s role in our reasoning. Chadha...

... to be made into two (or more) tables. When we have such a block, we can make either exactly one table using only, say, the left half of it or make two tables, one from the left half and another from the right one. And the production process of making a table from the left half is ontologically independent...

...) and chronesthesia (the feeling that the experience is from the past). Michaelian claims that the usefulness of these feelings is found in their metacognitive roles as part of process monitoring. The explanation is an original attempt to account for the evolution of the conscious forms of episodic memory, without...

.... But what is this ‘something’ of the virtues we already possess, which allows us to be receptive to the process of habituation that culminates in mature virtue? That ‘something’, says Jimenez, are desiderative and emotional tendencies that orient us toward the noble. In particular, we are born with a sense...