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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2000
...Joseph Y. Halpern PROBABILITY AND CONDITIONALS: BELIEF REVISION AND RATIONAL DECISION. Edited by Ellery Eells and Brian Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. vii, 207 Cornell University 2000 Adams, E. 1966 . “Probability and the Logic of Conditionals.” In Aspects...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 371–375.
Published: 01 July 2019
...Igor Douven Leitgeb Hannes , The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2017 . xiv + 365 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 There is an ongoing debate about how to connect categorical beliefs to graded beliefs...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 489–495.
Published: 01 July 2020
... indeterminate: how many books one must own to own a lot of books is not settled by the conventions of English. Suppose that we know Smith has some number of books on the borderline of a lot : perhaps 100. What do we think about sentences like: (3) a. Smith probably has a lot of books. b. It’s fifty...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 438–441.
Published: 01 July 2004
...James M. Joyce David Howie, Interpreting Probability: Controversies and Developments in the Early Twentieth Century. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2002. Pp. xi, 262. Cornell University 2004 BOOK REVIEWS
The Philosophical Review, Vol...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Richard Bradley Adams’s Thesis, the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents, has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible-world semantics. This essay proposes a modification...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Richard Pettigrew In “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism,” James M. Joyce attempts to “depragmatize” de Finetti’s prevision argument for the claim that our credences ought to satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. This article adapts Joyce’s argument to give nonpragmatic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
... level can coexist with its absence at a lower level. Unlike previous arguments for the level-specificity of chance, the present argument shows, in a precise sense, that higher-level chance does not collapse into epistemic probability, despite higher-level properties supervening on lower-level ones...
FIGURES
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Published: 01 July 2023
Figure 1. (Color online.) Standard Bayesian model of a Headser’s rational opinions. Left: Generalized-Kripke (Markov) diagram, in which blue numbers within circles represent the prior probabilities of possibilities, and labeled red arrows from circles represent the posterior probabilities
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
...Hannes Leitgeb This essay develops a joint theory of rational (all-or-nothing) belief and degrees of belief. The theory is based on three assumptions: the logical closure of rational belief; the axioms of probability for rational degrees of belief; and the so-called Lockean thesis, in which...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jeffrey Sanford Russell; John Hawthorne Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Kenny Easwaran Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 371–398.
Published: 01 July 2018
... make for the probability of the effect. I conclude by discussing my results and outlining future research avenues. © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 causality causal strength causal Bayes nets probability difference-making measure sensitivity Causation is a central concept in human...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
... will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a “Distorted Reflection” principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain that he or she...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
...Barry Lam If you are currently a reliable epistemic agent in some domain, you would not want to adopt a rule of belief-revision in that domain that rendered you less reliable. However, you probably would want to adopt a rule that rendered you more reliable in that domain. In the epistemology...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 89–145.
Published: 01 January 2023
..., knowledge about parameters measured using imperfect instruments, the connection between knowledge, belief, and probability, and the dynamics of knowledge and belief in response to new evidence. [email protected] [email protected] © 2023 by Cornell University 2023 knowledge...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
... (or experience) should depend on its content in a plethora of ways that phenomenal conservatism is insensitive to. In effect, the oomph view easily leads to rather egregious violations of the principle of Reflection where not only is your expectation of your future evidential probability higher than your...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 241–294.
Published: 01 July 2022
..., even if each universe is overwhelmingly likely to be devoid of life, it is probable that there is life somewhere or other. 3 Our second result generalizes to arbitrarily large multiverses; but it relies on a principle whose status does not seem nearly as clear as the others. The idea...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (1): 96–101.
Published: 01 January 2024
...Carl Hoefer 3. EC is also only partially applicable to quantum mechanical probabilities. For reasons of space I cannot discuss Myrvold’s chapter 9 in detail. In my estimation, only in the context of Bohmian Mechanics is the EC framework clearly and fully applicable. 2. Albert’s Past...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
... . 1991 . “ Epistemic Possibilities .” Philosophical Review 100 ( 4 ): 581 – 605 . ———. 2009 . The Case for Contextualism . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Diaconis Persi Zabell Sandy L. . 1982 . “ Updating Subjective Probability .” Journal of the American Statistical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 27–56.
Published: 01 January 2003
.... de Finetti, Bruno. 1972 . Theory of Probability . New York: Wiley. Diderot, Denis. 1875-77 . Pensées Philosophiques, 59, Oeuvres . Edited by J. Assézat, vol. 1 . Duff, Antony. 1986 . Pascal's Wager and Infinite Utilities. Analysis 46 : 107 -9. Edwards, W., H. Lindman, and L. J...
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