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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
...Jason Konek Sarah Moss (2013) argues that degrees of belief, or credences, can amount to knowledge in much the way that full beliefs can. This essay explores a new kind of objective Bayesianism designed to take us some way toward securing such knowledge-constituting credences, or “probabilistic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 139–144.
Published: 01 January 2020
.... In (2), the compositional contribution of the prejacent under “likely”—since it includes “might”—seems itself to be probabilistic. Hence there's a puzzle for the compositional semantics: what type of object—a set of worlds or a set of probability spaces—best models the argument of “it is .9 likely...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 393–406.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Catrin Campbell-Moore In Michael Caie's article “Rational Probabilistic Incoherence,” Caie argues that in light of certain situations involving self-reference, it is sometimes rational to have probabilistically incoherent credences. This essay further considers his arguments. It shows...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
...Michael Caie Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 371–398.
Published: 01 July 2018
...Jan Sprenger This article develops axiomatic foundations for a probabilistic theory of causal strength as difference-making. I proceed in three steps: First, I motivate the choice of causal Bayes nets as an adequate framework for defining and comparing measures of causal strength. Second, I prove...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Sarah Moss This paper argues that just as full beliefs can constitute knowledge, so can properties of your credence distribution. The resulting notion of probabilistic knowledge helps us give a natural account of knowledge ascriptions embedding language of subjective uncertainty, and a simple...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
Published: 01 July 2019
... defended in the literature. In addition, my account complements fruitful probabilistic theories of assertion and knowledge. To sum up, the classification of simple sentences as loose speech is supported by several analogies between simple sentences and paradigmatic instances of loose speech. Having...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 361–396.
Published: 01 July 2001
.... Eells, E. 1991 . Probabilistic Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eells, E., and E. Sober. 1983 . “Probabilistic Causality and the Question of Transitivity.” Philosophy of Science 50 : 35 -57. Fogel, R. 1964 . Railroads and American Economic Growth. Baltimore: Johns...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 277–281.
Published: 01 April 2000
.... Balke, A., and J. Pearl. 1994 . “Probabilistic Evalution of Counterfactual Queries.” Proceedings of the Twelfth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 1994, 230 -37. Dubois, D., and H. Prade. 1991 . “Possibilistic Logic, Preferential Models, Non-monotonicity and Related Issues...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
... justified (a thesis the article labels Standard Phenomenal Conservatism ). This thesis captures the special kind of epistemic import that seemings are claimed to have. To get clearer on this thesis, the article embeds it, first, in a probabilistic framework in which updating on new evidence happens...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jeffrey Sanford Russell; John Hawthorne Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... by other sorts of probabilistic evidence. Far from excluding cases of the latter kind, Lewis’s Principal Principle explicitly allows for them, in the form of the caveat that credences should follow beliefs about chances only in the absence of “inadmissible evidence.” The essay then exhibits a tension...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
... way of modeling precision but also yields a variety of further theoretical fruits: it enables one to formulate novel hypotheses about the space and structures of mental qualities, formally differentiate two dimensions of phenomenal similarity, generate a probabilistic model of the phenomenal sorites...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 89–145.
Published: 01 January 2023
..., knowledge about parameters measured using imperfect instruments, the connection between knowledge, belief, and probability, and the dynamics of knowledge and belief in response to new evidence. 28. For other probabilistic, contextualist, and question-sensitive accounts applied directly to belief, see...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 484–489.
Published: 01 July 2020
... do seem to learn something when we are shown a proof that—on natural ways of measuring accuracy—if a credence function is not probabilistic, it is guaranteed to be less accurate than some specifiable probabilistic one ( Joyce 1998, 2009 ). At a first pass: since you should try to be accurate, you...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 227–251.
Published: 01 April 2005
... on the overwhelming probabilities. Indeed, let us suppose that when the win- ning ticket is announced, it turns out that Alice’s has lost. Still, as Wil- liamson notes (2000, 246), Alice is entitled to feel resentment against Sarah for asserting (1) on merely probabilistic grounds. Prima facie, this means...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
... according to the Equal Weight view. I define and implement two measures of reliability for probabilistic belief-revision rules, calibration and Brier scoring, and show how we should understand epistemic peerhood and subject-reliability in terms of such measures. I then show that, if two subjects...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
... is probabilistically certain are to be believed. But this cannot be right, at least if it is taken as a requirement on believed propositions that is meant to hold in each and every context. For example: it is morning; I rationally believe that I am going to receive an e-mail today. However, I would not regard...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
... the following function F, which takes probabilistic credence functions to probabilistic cre- dence functions: X F : b 7! bðC chi Þchi i Then it is straightforward to show that when we represent credence functions as points in Euclidean...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 373–408.
Published: 01 July 2000
... about what the newspaper says, its coherence with other things I believe, and perhaps on my belief that the news- paper is reporting correctly. Thus, identifying the probabilistic na- ture of the evidence in the lottery case as the epistemically relevant feature makes it possible to distinguish...