... is that some obligations are merely pro tanto, not all-things-considered; in other words, “ought” (understood as corresponding to pro tanto obligations) 1 does not imply “must” (understood as corresponding to all-things-considered obligations). Taken together, these two ideas yield the following slogan...

... that the obligation is a special instance of the general requirement to respect rational agents. In chapter 9, Goldberg argues that the No Silent Rejection norm—that is, our pro tanto obligation to speak up when we disagree—partially explains the architecture of oppression. When a dominant party speaks...

... can have an all things considered obligation to punish a person for having broken a law that it was his all things considered obligation to break. A second approach to the dilemma favors the other horn, arguing that the least moral cost would result from strictly adhering to weak retributivism...

... on, could be read as factoral theories. One could agree with phenomenal conservatives and some evidentialists that a belief is justified iff it is probable conditional on the all-things-considered nondoxastic seemings, 22 but find oneself left with a deeper question about why such beliefs...

... John's demand-right against Jane that she continue toward sex may both conflict with and be outweighed by other considerations, including moral ones. This means that if Jane changes her mind about sex with John, she may be morally permitted all-things-considered to violate her obligations of joint...

... be irrational. This is not a contradiction: adapting may be pro-tanto irrational in one way, but not in another, and if there is a relevant notion of all-things-considered rationality, it may be all-things-considered rational as well. In fact, this is a common phenomenon in the vicinity of reasons of the wrong...

... that criticizing others for ϕ'ing when you have ϕ'ed yourself is always wrong, all things considered . It may be that, when sufficiently grave moral issues are at stake, the all-things-considered best thing to do is to “dirty one's hands” with hypo-criticism in order to avoid some graver wrong. 22 All...

... their support in terms of fairness, justice, entitlements, claims, and so on (see the references in note 3). And, again, these are just not the types of considerations that could give us advisability or goodness without duties (either pro tanto or all things considered). So, to sum up, it is not clear what...

... forgiving, I may acknowledge that another person has an all-things-considered duty to do something that the person has a pro-tanto obligation to me not to do. For example, suppose that you have mistakenly made two conflicting promises about what you will do on Saturday. Recognizing that your promise...

... in a certain respect , not its goodness or badness as an end when all of the ways in which it might be good or bad as an end are weighed against each other). Since the arguments to follow depend more on the instrumental value vs. final value distinction than on the pro tanto value vs. all-things-considered...

... of marriage. The claim that vivid images intensify desire, then, should be understood not as an all-things-considered claim about their overall effects but as a pro tanto claim about immediate effects that may be overwhelmed by other less immediate effects or by immediate effects on opposing desires...

... principles, the universal acceptance of which would make things go impartially best. So far, this is pretty much a conceptual truth. A wide value-based objective view of practical reasons then ensures that these pro tanto reasons will be sufficient reasons. Furthermore, Parfit argues, there are no other...

... particularists consider a generalist, held this view.) All discussions of metaphysical particularism here follow Dancy’s earlier writings in regarding it as an outcrop of a holistic view of reasons.3 According to holism, a full specification of a (pro tanto) reason for acting in a certain way may...

..., without requiring that response. By contrast, insistent reasons to φ are either decisive, implying that one ought to φ, or contribute to such requirements, as pro tanto reasons. Insistent reasons combine to yield stronger reasons and fix what one should do, all things considered. If we think of people's...

..., this implies (roughly) that an act is punishable whenever it would be optimific for an agent to feel guilty over doing it.46 But that cannot be Mill’s view. In the first place, when Mill says, too casually, that wrong acts ought to be punished, he cannot be expressing an all-things-considered...

.... The promise, if it is one at all, does not seem binding. Mightn’t this support either an acceptance require- ment, a requirement that the thing promised or the promise itself at least appear, reasonably, to the promisor as something desirable to the promisee...

... features of art has concerned the extent to which aesthetic valence tracks moral valence—is a morally repugnant feature of an artwork thereby a pro tanto aesthetic flaw, for example? Guyer argues forcefully that neither Shaftesbury nor Kant employ the concept of aesthetic disinterest in a way...

... to say that Mary now knows that Ph-red is Wow: all she learns after being shown the star is that either Ph-red or Ph-green is Wow. Thus despite her direct acquaintance with Wow, Stalnaker recommends diagonalization in this case: Mary’s thoughts in terms of Wow are assessed by considering Ph-red...

... features of art has concerned the extent to which aesthetic valence tracks moral valence—is a morally repugnant feature of an artwork thereby a pro tanto aesthetic flaw, for example? Guyer argues forcefully that neither Shaftesbury nor Kant employ the concept of aesthetic disinterest in a way...

... features of art has concerned the extent to which aesthetic valence tracks moral valence—is a morally repugnant feature of an artwork thereby a pro tanto aesthetic flaw, for example? Guyer argues forcefully that neither Shaftesbury nor Kant employ the concept of aesthetic disinterest in a way...