...Adam D. Moore Despite my worries, Anita Allen's Unpopular Privacy is a welcome addition to privacy scholarship. Her conclusion is surprising: some types of privacy are so important that we should prohibit children and adults from waiving their rights. For over twenty-five years, Anita Allen...

.... We can call this thought, the thought that I am repeatedly appealing to here, defeasible privacy : When you know that an action will affect the well-being of only one person, and you know who that person is, then it is morally appropriate, in the absence of powerful defeating considerations, to act...

...: European Dircourses of Toleration, c. 11OO-c. 1550. By Cary J. Nederman. University Park Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. Pp. x, 157. Rites of Privacy and the Privacy Trade: On the Limits of Protection fw the Seg By Elizabeth Neill. Toronto: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001. Pp...

... objects that one could point to inwardly in the interest of defending a conception of privacy renders the identity of the alleged mental objects irrelevant. Brenner is very good on Wittgenstein’s stress on the centrality to our mental concepts of our attitudes toward others, our responsiveness...

... obligated to tell you when I reject your assertion. In the push and pull between the individual and the collective, Goldberg tends to side with the latter. Goldberg’s silences are telling. He rarely discusses the values of privacy and individual autonomy. To be clear, all parties to the debate agree...

.... The New Intuitionism. With an introduction by Robert Audi. New York: Continuum. xvii þ248 pp. Hirstein, William. 2012. Mindmelding: Consciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind’s Privacy. New York: Oxford University Press. x þ 282 pp. Horty, John Francis. 2012. Reasons as Defaults. New York: Oxford...

... for persons that Kant derives from the categorical imperative. Treating persons as ends involves respecting their capacity to direct their own lives and respecting their privacy in various ways. One aspect of morality is thus a general normative principle of non-interference with others...

... 80. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. xii þ293 pp. Moore, Adam D. 2010. Privacy Rights: Moral and Legal Foundations. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. x þ 237 pp. Narveson, Jan, and James P. Sterba 2010. Are Liberty and Equality Compatible? New York: Cambridge University...

... Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Richmond, Sarah D., Geraint Rees, and Sarah J. L. Edwards, eds. 2012. I Know What You’re Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rist, John M. 2012. Plato’s Moral Realism: The Discovery of the Presuppositions...

... Secrets under the Sea. Popular Culture and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court. xv þ222 pp. Gilead, Amihud. 2011. The Privacy of the Psychical. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 144 pp. Goetz, Stewart, and Charles Taliaferro. 2011. A Brief History of the Soul. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 228 pp. Green...

... © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 BOOKS RECEIVED Adorno, Theodor W., and Max Horkheimer. 2011. Towards a New Manifesto. Translated by Rodney Livingstone. London: Verso Books. x þ 112 pp. Allen, Anita L. 2011. Unpopular Privacy: What Must We Hide. New York...

.... Ethics without Ontology. By Hilary Putnam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004. Pp. ix, 160. Seeing and Visualizing: It’s Not What You Think. By Zenon Pylyshyn. Cambridge: MIT Press, Bradford Books, 2003. Pp. xviii, 563. Privacies: Philosophical Evaluations. By Beate Rössler, editor...

... and Eduardo Mendieta. Malden: Blackwell, 2003. Pp. xv, 428. Why Privacy Isn’t Everything: Feminist Reflections on Personal Accountability. By Anita L. Allen. Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld, 2003. Pp. vii, 211. The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy. Cultural Memory in the Present. By Gil Anidjar...

... more obviously relevant: Protagoras’s challenge at 166c that Socrates should “attack my actual statement itself, and refute it, if you can, by showing that each man’s perceptions are not his own private events” does not arise in Fine’s essays, in spite of her interest in showing that privacy...

... more obviously relevant: Protagoras’s challenge at 166c that Socrates should “attack my actual statement itself, and refute it, if you can, by showing that each man’s perceptions are not his own private events” does not arise in Fine’s essays, in spite of her interest in showing that privacy...

... more obviously relevant: Protagoras’s challenge at 166c that Socrates should “attack my actual statement itself, and refute it, if you can, by showing that each man’s perceptions are not his own private events” does not arise in Fine’s essays, in spite of her interest in showing that privacy...

... more obviously relevant: Protagoras’s challenge at 166c that Socrates should “attack my actual statement itself, and refute it, if you can, by showing that each man’s perceptions are not his own private events” does not arise in Fine’s essays, in spite of her interest in showing that privacy...

... more obviously relevant: Protagoras’s challenge at 166c that Socrates should “attack my actual statement itself, and refute it, if you can, by showing that each man’s perceptions are not his own private events” does not arise in Fine’s essays, in spite of her interest in showing that privacy...

... more obviously relevant: Protagoras’s challenge at 166c that Socrates should “attack my actual statement itself, and refute it, if you can, by showing that each man’s perceptions are not his own private events” does not arise in Fine’s essays, in spite of her interest in showing that privacy...

... more obviously relevant: Protagoras’s challenge at 166c that Socrates should “attack my actual statement itself, and refute it, if you can, by showing that each man’s perceptions are not his own private events” does not arise in Fine’s essays, in spite of her interest in showing that privacy...