Search Results for principle of sufficient reason
1-20 of 314 Search Results for
principle of sufficient reason
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 495–532.
Published: 01 October 2007
... . “Advertisement for a Sketch of an Outline of a Prototheory of Causation.” In Collins, Hall, and Paul 2004, 119 -37. Prevention, Preemption, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason Christopher Hitchcock California Institute of...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 397–430.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Samuel Levey It can be shown by means of a paradox that, given the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), there is no conjunction of all contingent truths. The question is, or ought to be, how to interpret that result: Quid sibi velit? A celebrated argument against PSR due to Peter van Inwagen and...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
... propositions. His further move to the stronger position of full eliminativism concerning propositions is motivated only by his late-in-the-day espousal of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 For comments and illuminating discussion of issues in this article, I am...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2004) 113 (2): 272–275.
Published: 01 April 2004
... developed explicitly—that the Faktum revealed by awareness of self- responsibility expresses an interest of reason sufficiently authoritative to deflect sub-personalism. Second, and connectedly, Moran seems to put a strong construal on the internality of explanation thesis: he considers, as I read...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 1–58.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Christian Onof; Dennis Schulting In his argument for the possibility of knowledge of spatial objects, in the Transcendental Deduction of the B-version of the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant makes a crucial distinction between space as “form of intuition” and space as “formal intuition.” The...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
... concepts of rational belief and rational degree of belief figure simultaneously. In spite of what is commonly believed, this essay will show that this combination of principles is satisfiable (and indeed nontrivially so) and that the principles are jointly satisfied if and only if rational belief is...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 565–591.
Published: 01 October 2010
... disagreements with Watkins over the passages and authors included. For example, Watkins includes Wolff’s proof of the all-important “Principle of Suffi- cient Reason” (PSR) in section 30 of a book known as the “German Meta- physics,” but omits the section 28 proof of the “ex nihilo nihil fit” principle on...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 618–620.
Published: 01 October 2008
...- tion of faith and reason. I found this book philosophically rich, and, as usual, a review doesn’t provide sufficient space to explore enough of it. For example, I cannot gointo Gassendi’s novel account of space that requires a significant revision of the...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 201–242.
Published: 01 April 2010
... reasons morally justifying them) coincide. The essay calls this the Coincident Reasons Thesis and argues that it provides plausible necessary and sufficient conditions for morally worthy action, defending the claim against proposed counterexamples. It ends by showing that the plausibility of the thesis...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 519–522.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Stefan Sienkiewicz Perin Casey , The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2010 . 130 pp. © 2013 by Cornell University 2013 To give a complete and completely consistent account of Pyrrhonian skepticism as it is found in...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 519–523.
Published: 01 October 2018
... most reasons in its favor would be an error of judgment manifesting the lowest degree of worthiness of freedom. The sufficient reason for holding back is not acceptance of the PAP, but the sake of the supreme good: freedom. Despite Ragland's gallant efforts to enlist Descartes in support of PAP...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 635–638.
Published: 01 October 2001
... consistent with its truth? Though I do have further doubts—for example, about the han- dling of Russell’s Principle of Acquaintance—I think the book includes valu- able lessons about what is entailed by a given psychological state’s providing reasons for belief. Beliefs, for example, uncontroversially...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2000) 109 (3): 441–444.
Published: 01 July 2000
... having been created out of nothing is sufficient to explain our ignorance, it does not account for our tendency for errox Like Augustinian evil, error is a privation, an act of judgment made in ignorance. (4) All acts of judgment issue from our will; we are thus re- sponsible for them...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 349–383.
Published: 01 July 2008
... David Widerker. It shows that neither is sufficient to reject the Direct Argument. The article then proceeds to challenge the argument in a novel fashion. Van Inwagen has not given us good reason to think that the principle in question has an adequate anchor in our inferential practices, especially in...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2018) 127 (1): 115–117.
Published: 01 January 2018
...Walter Ott Goldschmidt Tyron and Stapleford Scott , Berkeley's Principles Expanded and Explained . New York: Routledge , 2017 . xxviii + 231 pp . © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 More than two decades have passed since Jonathan Bennett asserted that “the majority of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 533–562.
Published: 01 October 2007
... in determining the rational status of actions. And since these roles are neither physical nor psychological, they are limited only by the form that principles of rationality can take. That is, if the fundamental prin- ciples of rationality allow reasons to contribute to the rational status of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 483–523.
Published: 01 October 2000
... commit myself is close enough in spirit to Evans’s, and sufficiently consistent with it, that-as much in acknowledgment of his per- vasive influence on my work, as for any other reason-I shall often speak of “Evans’s view,” without pausing to defend the interpretive claim implicit in my so...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Jacob Ross This essay argues that there is a conflict between the principle of Countable Additivity and standard views of how we should update centered or de se beliefs. The latter views, this essay argues, entail a general principle, which the essay calls the Generalized Thirder Principle, that...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
... counterexamples that are licensed by innocuous assumptions about particular kinds of ordinary object. Since both the anticoincidence principle and the assumptions driving the counterexamples flow from the folk conception of ordinary objects, the paradoxes threaten this conception with inconsistency. Typical...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... argues against Loewer's. Bennett (2008) argues that Loewer's strategy doesn't work, for rejecting “oomphy” causation in favor of a counterfactual conception is not itself sufficient to falsify Kim's “exclusion principle.” So Bennett, like me, doubts that the force of the exclusion problem turns on any...