Search Results for premise
1-20 of 351 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 487–514.
Published: 01 October 2018
... premise that becoming overridden can result in “moral residue” (e.g., in the appropriateness of feeling regret). But then, I note, one could similarly infer not-OIC—via not-(1)—from the premise that becoming infeasible can result in moral residue. So there is an argument against OIC which parallels the...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 153–181.
Published: 01 April 2009
... necessary connections between material objects and their material origins. This essay argues that the primary motivation for the Humean claim, Hume's datum , also motivates the key premise in an argument for the necessity of origins. The very considerations that the Humean takes to show that necessary...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
... that thirders are committed to the GTP since it follows from the premises that underlie each of the main arguments for the one-third solution. In section 4, it discusses the relevance of Dutch book arguments to the conflict between CA and the GTP. And the essay argues that both synchronic and...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
... transmit only because of premise circularity. Finally, it applies this account to the Neo-Moorean and Zebra Deductions and shows that, given the essay's permissive view, these deductions transmit in an intuitively acceptable way—at least if either a certain type of circularity is benign or a certain view...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 97–115.
Published: 01 January 2011
... premise in the incompatibilist's argument and the Ockhamist response. It sketches some potential links between the issues here and recent work on ontological dependence, and it connects the issues raised by Merricks to important work that has appeared in (among other places) the Philosophical Review...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... overdetermination problem by invoking counterfactuals rest on a false premise, and then respond to the argument that the overdetermination problem simply does not arise on a dependency conception of causation (e.g., Burge 1993 ; Loewer 2002 , 2007 ). I show why this idea, though initially appealing, does not...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 289–293.
Published: 01 April 2008
... concepts, while reason takes these empirical judgments and out of them attempts to construct more general premises from which these judgments can be deduced, and hence aims to relate judgments into syllo- gisms. However, to his successors, it appeared that Kant’s position left several tensions...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2004) 113 (2): 284–288.
Published: 01 April 2004
... available shock. From these and other results, Doris infers the first premise (namely D1 below) of his main argument for situationism, an argument that can be formulated as fol- lows (38): (D1) Many situations are strongly conducive to compassion (in the sense that in such situations most...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 286–289.
Published: 01 April 2015
... us to draw a conclusion/perform an action C once we've accepted a premise P, which “triggers” the default. For example, a default rule tells us to conclude that Tweety flies (F ) if we accept the premise that Tweety is a bird (B). Horty proposes that the premise P of a triggered default is what...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 235–241.
Published: 01 April 2002
... van Inwagen’s Conse- quence Argument,1 and argues that, given that interpretation, the Consequence Argument is sound. I have no quarrel with Huemer’s claim that the Consequence Argument is valid. I shall argue instead that his defense of its premises—a defense that allegedly involves refut- ing...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 197–224.
Published: 01 April 2018
... clarifications in hand, we can reconstruct Kant's Argument a bit more formally as follows. I have named the premises for convenient reference: We regard the objects of our choices as good. (Choice Premise) If we regard the objects of our choices as good, then we are committed to regarding them as good...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2014) 123 (4): 541–544.
Published: 01 October 2014
... ideas in the mind” (129). Dicker then objects that no truth is really shared here, because in the two premises, “immediately perceive” means two different things. In the first premise, to perceive something immediately is to perceive it without engaging in any inference. This is what Dicker calls...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2019) 128 (2): 241–245.
Published: 01 April 2019
... universalism, the permissivist view on which any given objects compose a further object. Here is the argument as Korman formulates it (27): (1) If universalism is true, then there are trogs. (2) There are no trogs. (3) So, universalism is false. Premise (2), of course, is the key premise. Korman...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 244–247.
Published: 01 April 2014
... international institutions. (C) So, these institutions must ensure that their subjects secure food, water, and whatever else they need for sufficient autonomy (45). I assume that premises (1) and (4) are uncontroversial and that premise (3) follows easily from the idea that persons must possess some...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2005) 114 (3): 411–413.
Published: 01 July 2005
... premise to the effect that one’s desire is worth satisfy- ing, and (ii) an evaluative premise to the effect that the desire gives one more reason to act than anything else gives one reason not to. To suppose that one can move from the premises “I want to X” and “To X, I must Y” to the conclu- sion “I...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 635–638.
Published: 01 October 2001
... sets out the structure of his essay as follows. The central focus throughout part 1 is the following thesis: (R) Perceptual experiences provide reasons for empirical beliefs. And the argument for (R) rests on two premises: (1) The most basic beliefs about the spatial world have their...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 411–416.
Published: 01 July 2004
.... Consider some action of mine, A, that a compatibilist claims to be free despite its occurrence being causally determined. Let B be some alternative action that the compatibilist says I could have performed instead of A. I propose the following simple argument against the com- patibilist (premise (1) is...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
... the necessity. (Freedom of the Will, pt. 2, sec. 12 [1957, 263]) An argument that moves from premises invoking truths about the future to the conclusion that the future is determined, and determined in such a way as to preclude freedom, is not thereby committed to the claim that those...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... credence 0 in any doxastically possible proposition. Premise 1 seems straightforward. 8 For premise 2, consider what Skyrms (1980, 74) says on his version of this argument: How do we assimilate new knowledge of a proposition with a prior probability of zero?…[P]erhaps at any rate we will need...