... with supererogation, and they cannot be applied to agents with credence in indeterminate evaluative theories. The authors propose a unified view that solves all these problems. According to this view, permissible options maximize expected utility relative to permissible preferences , and different kinds...

... and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rationality flaw (they are typically formed for reasons of the wrong kind) but that it's not clear that this flaw matters morally or politically. What...

... the voters unanimously adopt the same set of preferences. In such situations, all plausible voting rules and all plausible decision rules agree. Arrow, Kenneth. 1951 . Social Choice and Individual Values . New York: Wiley. Bostrom, Nick. 2001 . “The Meta-Newcomb Problem.” Analysis 61 : 309 -10...

...] 1932 . Mathematical Psychics . Reprinted by the London School of Economics and Political Science. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. Goodin, Robert. 1986 . Laundering Preferences. In Foundations of Social Choice Theory , ed. Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press...

... to you whether the train is the “Express” or not, though you’d mildly prefer it was. He answers, “Yeah, this one makes all those little stops. They told me when I bought the ticket.” Nothing about him seems particu- larly untrustworthy. You believe what he says. Intuitively...

... that the most plausible (nonhedonic) accounts of well-being also assume a relative rather than an absolute conception of that notion. For instance, Višak presents Peter Sandøe’s (1996: 12) version of preference satisfaction: A subject’s welfare at a given point in time, t 1 , is relative...

.... In this paper, I shall present a new approach to this question, an approach that I call “conceptual role semantics for moral terms.” In conclusion, I shall try to indicate briefly why my approach is preferable to those three more familiar alternatives. First, however, I shall say something about...

...) The main motivation for egocentric presentism . Most of us have certain egocentric preferences. “All other things being equal, we prefer that pain befall others rather than ourselves and pleasure befall ourselves rather than others” (2). If someone is going to suffer from boiling water spilled on his...

... high, and so is the probability that T is his father conditional on his choosing B S is P's father T is P's father Pchooses G .9 .1 Pchooses B .1 .9 Pwould prefer that T be his father, since S died of some terrible inherited...

... caring about when certain things happen as such . One kind of time bias is familiar and almost universally condemned, namely, the preference for good things to happen sooner and bad things later, even at the cost of a worse overall ratio of goods to bads. This is near bias. But as the plural...

... argues at length against Field's position, he has much less to say against the other alternatives. He briefly considers approaches that would assign sets or ranges of credences to vague propositions, rejecting them because they imply that we can have incomparable preferences, but giving no compelling...

... of reasons—but to do so we need to shift our point of view. When we say that it is rationally permissible to do either Y or Z, we primarily mean that there is noth- ing a priori irrational about preferring Y over Z and about preferring Z over Y. It is rationally permissible to have both sets...

... to prefer Procedure One, or to be ready to pay a sum of money for it. (If so, this is probably because you have a so-called ambiguity aversion, not because you find that the chance has an extra value over and above the prospect of survival offered by the lottery.) 6 Anyway, I invite you to imagine...

... and preferences. For example, inhabitants of a city will routinely converge on similar aesthetic preferences, and similar assumptions about what's cool. Likewise, people from similar cultural backgrounds will often accept similar dietary norms, and pursue the same child rearing and marriage practices. Finally...

... of resources is an equal division if, once the division is complete, any [person] would prefer someone else’s bundle of resources to his own bundle” (Dworkin 1981b, 285). And the mechanism he proposes to satisfy this test is a hypothetical auction in which individuals bid on resources using some...

..., though not goods, are “preferred indifferents,” to the pursuit of which we are prompted by nature (which is itself identical with the rational self-direction of the universe toward the maximal good), and he argues that in directing his or her life toward the achievement of these values, the Stoic lives...

... of ‘most reason’ (where ‘reason’ is now a mass noun rather than a count noun) and cites a whole cluster of facts (invitation B is for burgers, invitation A is for Armenian, I greatly prefer burgers to Armenian, my preference for Ada's company over Burt's is only slight . . . ) that explain why I have...

... psychological continuity) by the sort of person she would like (given her cur- rent values) to “become.” Martin claims that he and others like him have actual values such that they would in some such cases in fact prefer being merely “con- tinued” by such successors to their own identity-preserving...

..., which also appeals to idealized desires or preferences, but restricts the set of desires or preferences that are relevant to welfare. Third is a consequentialist moral theory that, unusually, rejects welfarism in favor of what Sobel calls the “autonomy principle” (77). This consequentialism demands...

... may not reasonably be preferred to that of the future on account of its greater certainty: or again, that a week ten years hence may not be more important to us than a week now, through an increase in our means or capacities of happiness. All that the principle affirms...