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The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 447–452.
Published: 01 July 2011
...Mark Balaguer Mele Alfred R. , Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will . New York : Oxford University Press , 2009 . ix + 178 pp. © 2011 by Cornell University 2011 BOOK REVIEWS Alfred R. Mele, Effective Intentions: The Power...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 318–322.
Published: 01 April 2013
...Gillian Brock Miller Richard W. , Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2010 . 341 pp . © 2013 by Cornell University 2013 BOOK REVIEWS Berys Gaut, A Philosophy of Cinematic Art. Cambridge...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 429–435.
Published: 01 July 2002
...Hannah Ginsborg Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment. Edited by Paul Guyer. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. lii, 423. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (1): 135–138.
Published: 01 January 2016
...Robert Howton Johansen Thomas Kjeller The Powers of Aristotle's Soul . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2012 . 302 pp. © 2016 by Cornell University 2016 Johansen seeks in The Powers of Aristotle's Soul to establish Aristotle as the progenitor of faculty psychology...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 531–563.
Published: 01 October 2010
... are, as a matter of course, conscious of ourselves, but we do not, as a matter of course, know ourselves. A second group of remarks, all of which occur in part 5 of the Ethics , emphasizes a different point about consciousness and knowledge: the knowledge that distinguishes the minds of the most powerful...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 481–524.
Published: 01 October 2008
...Seana Valentine Shiffrin The power to promise is morally fundamental and does not, at its foundation, derive from moral principles that govern our use of conventions. Of course, many features of promising have conventional components—including which words, gestures, or conditions of silence create...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
..., and this limitation undermines skeptical epistemological claims. The only views about the nature of belief on which there are no metaphysical hurdles to adopting the agnosticism recommended by the skeptic are views that face powerful objections—objections that are completely independent of antiskeptical...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 345–383.
Published: 01 July 2017
... in part how to do something, or that one knows how to do something better than somebody else. When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions of know-how can be used to mount a powerful argument against intellectualism about know-how—the view that know-how is a species of propositional...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
... correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This article argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem for the standard framework is that it cannot capture precision structure : for example, consider...
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The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 315–336.
Published: 01 July 2010
... a powerful “Dilemma Defense.” In the last decade or so, many philosophers have been persuaded by the Dilemma Defense that the Frankfurt cases do not show what Frankfurt (and others) thought they show. This essay presents a template for a general strategy of response to the Dilemma Defense. It thus seeks...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 565–591.
Published: 01 October 2010
... theory of causation is the notion of a real ground or causal power that is non-Humean (since it doesn't reduce to regularities or counterfactual dependencies among events or states) and non-Leibnizean because it doesn't reduce to logical or conceptual relations. However, we raise questions about...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 205–239.
Published: 01 April 2016
... are real, adequate, and true signs, or representations, of powers in things. Moreover, I argue that this helps solve the first problem as well, by explaining how having sensitive knowledge can consist in perceiving an agreement or disagreement between ideas and still be knowledge of real existence. Finally...
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 57–96.
Published: 01 January 2003
... to identify colors with dispositions—powers that bodies have to produce certain ideas in us. Many interpreters find two or more incompatible strands in his account of color, and so are led to distin- guish an “official,” prevailing view from the conflicting remarks into which he occasionally lapses...
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (2): 203–248.
Published: 01 April 2004
... of how God’s causal power relates to the natural causal activity of creatures, Leibniz held that both God and the creature are directly involved in the occurrence of these effects. A divine concurrentist, in general, intends to satisfy two theses that were held by the vast majority of theologians...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 404–410.
Published: 01 July 2017
... of the book, a view of the metaphysics of powers emerges, as well as sketches of how powers relevant to agency relate to event causation and causal, teleological, and rational explanation. 1 Hyman's arguments are compelling. It is difficult to find criticisms that are not mere quibbles. In what follows...
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 317–354.
Published: 01 July 2006
... naturata, not to Natura naturans. By “Natura naturans,” Spinoza means God’s productive power by means of which he produces all things.15 By “Natura naturata,” Spinoza means all the modes that follow from God’s productive power.16 1p32, which Spinoza cites in the appendix by way of its corollaries...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 633–645.
Published: 01 October 2007
... then argue that Locke does not offer his thesis that secondary qualities are powers to produce ideas in us as a careful description of a being in the world but rather as a corollary to his semantics. I’ll go on to criticize some of what Stuart writes in defense of his own interpretation, according...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 523–528.
Published: 01 October 2018
...> is used to think about everything God has the power to posit (327). Stang also uses this view to resolve a putative “tension” (146) of the Beweisgrund between Kant's denial that God grounds possibility through his powers (because his powers are among the possibilities that need grounds), and—on Stang's...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 308–310.
Published: 01 April 2002
... of the will, and the immateriality (and immortality) of the soul. Des Chene bypasses this well-trodden material in favor of such less-studied topics as the definition of life, the distinction between the soul’s powers, and the divisi- bility of the soul. The goal is both “to understand the Aristotelian theories in their own...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 519–523.
Published: 01 October 2018
... is correct, then freedom consists in a ‘two-way power’ to do or not do something” (84). Ragland's determination to defend PAP is striking. The Will to Reason joins a number of philosophical works that take Descartes's conception of freedom seriously, and builds on Ragland's work on the topic in recent...