Search Results for point
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The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 127–131.
Published: 01 January 2006
...John W. Carroll John Heil, From an Ontological Point of View . Oxford: Clarendon, 2003. xv + 267 pp. Cornell University 2006 BOOK REVIEWS Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xix + 388 pp. This volume...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 531–563.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Michael LeBuffe Spinoza's remarks about consciousness in the Ethics constitute two theories about conscious experience and knowledge. Several remarks, including 3p9 and 4p8, make the point that self knowledge—an especially valuable good for Spinoza—is not available to introspection. We are, as a...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that the probability of...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 323–348.
Published: 01 July 2008
... after. For biological conception is most plausibly seen as a momentous event in the continuing life of a preexisting organism—the egg—rather than a cataclysmic event ending one life and creating another. This article considers and rebuts the most likely challenges to this claim. This metaphysical point...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2009) 118 (4): 425–464.
Published: 01 October 2009
... objectionable on independent theoretical grounds: it conflicts with physicalism and requires us to posit hidden facts about our persistence. This essay shows how to resolve this conflict using the idea that imagining from the first-person point of view is a guide to centered possibility , a type of possibility...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2009) 118 (4): 501–532.
Published: 01 October 2009
... debate on mind-world relations shaping Kant's early cosmology points us to a widely recognized motivation for interactionism, turning on a constraint on agency within certain noninteractionist cosmologies. In particular, Kant's early conversion to a libertarian theory of freedom, together with his...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 515–566.
Published: 01 October 2011
...David J. Chalmers The philosophical interest of verbal disputes is twofold. First, they play a key role in philosophical method. Many philosophical disagreements are at least partly verbal, and almost every philosophical dispute has been diagnosed as verbal at some point. Here we can see the...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
... committed to antihaecceitism. The goal of this paper is to point out some problems for antihaecceitism (and therefore for the thesis that all fundamental facts are qualitative). The article focuses on two common assumptions about possible worlds: (i) Sets of possible worlds are the bearers of objective...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2008) 117 (1): 77–98.
Published: 01 January 2008
...'-claims, they say, only get truth-values with respect to contexts, indices, and—the new wrinkle—points of assessment (hence, cia ). Here we argue against such “relativist” semantics. We begin with a sketch of the motivation for such theories and a generic formulation of them. Then we catalogue central...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 197–224.
Published: 01 April 2018
... critics have raised. I also show how the argument fails because, at a crucial point, it begs the question in favor of the value of humanity. It thus fails for internal reasons that do not depend on rejecting Korsgaard's metaethical constructivism or her conception of rational agency. With these...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Kenny Easwaran Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones—they...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 173–204.
Published: 01 April 2014
... should be read as having as their antecedent “from the point of view of the universe.” The essay replies to the objection that this makes these axioms analytic. In reply to the threat of a commonsense moralist's disagreement, this essay argues that each axiom states, in effect, a prima facie duty. The...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 219–240.
Published: 01 April 2017
... existence of the null-determiner ‘the’ preceding bare singular names. This essay argues that they have incorrectly discerned the syntactic facts: their critical data point concerning the ungrammaticality of sentences like “The Katherine wants coffee” is mistaken. Such sentences’ grammaticality undermines...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 301–343.
Published: 01 July 2017
... point on the role of agentive modal ascriptions in practical discourse: ability ascriptions serve as a kind of hypothetical guarantee, and compulsion ascriptions as a kind of nonhypothetical guarantee. © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 ability compulsion conditional analysis of ability...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 418–422.
Published: 01 July 2018
... him), the problem with the overwrite option is it tries to add a unique foliation back to relativity when what we should have done is distribute the past/present/future distinction across all of the space-time points. Metaphors are typically helpful in grasping these theories. The old Moving...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 269–272.
Published: 01 April 2015
... will supply easy exemplars, but these expectations are soon confounded. At first sight, our subject's contours appear evident enough—worlds of point masses held together through action-at-a-distance forces monitored by Newton's three laws of motion—yet these simple outlines grow misty as we approach...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 373–416.
Published: 01 July 2002
... purposes, apparent magnitude must be regarded as a relation that is irreducibly dyadic (or perhaps I should say, unexpandably dyadic), involving just the object and the observer (or his point of view). It is not to be analyzed into a triadic relation involving the object, the observer, and an...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 592–595.
Published: 01 October 2000
... require us to distinguish between the theoretical and practical points of view. This distinction is at the heart of the Kantian approach to moral philosophy. But while the Kantian strategy is deeply suggestive, it has proved difficult to work out the idea that freedom and responsibility are...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 427–431.
Published: 01 July 2004
... a blindsighter who can reliably point to the person a normally sighted speaker is talking about whenever she uses the expression ‘that woman’. Even if the blindsighter points correctly all the time, she does not understand the speaker’s use of ‘that woman’. Common sense (according to Campbell...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 422–424.
Published: 01 July 2003
... view folk psychology as being insu- lated in an important theoretical sense, and hence as providing no causal explanations at all. The following paper, by Robinson, makes the point that contemporary discussion of nonreductive physicalism confuses two senses of ‘reduction’, one appropriate to...