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phenomenal similarity
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
... correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This article argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem for the standard framework is that it cannot capture precision structure : for example, consider...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 355–388.
Published: 01 July 2006
... and the Odd
experiences. One straightforward account of the phenomenal difference
is that, in the move from the Good to the Odd experience, these very
conditionals cease to be represented in visual experience.
A third reason to believe the hypothesis is suggested by the phe-
nomenal similarity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 481–531.
Published: 01 October 2021
... aspects will also be phenomenally similar, due to their representing the same high-level property (for example, being a predator or a stinging little creature). That is, this notion of Intrinsicality coheres with the possibility that a leopard and a grizzly bear, as well as a spider and a scorpion...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 511–518.
Published: 01 July 2013
... closely akin to the phenomenal properties that we encounter in experience. Protophenomenalism is the idea that the intrinsic properties of fundamental entities “are nonmental and similar enough to paradigmatic properties of current physics to count as physical, while at the same time they have a crucial...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 303–357.
Published: 01 July 2004
...) qualia and phenomenal properties are what in particular it is
like to have mental states.
Given that the ways specifying ‘something’—values that potentially
determine what it is like for c to have M—are supposed to be trouble-
some “qualia,” there is no way to rescue a literal “is similar...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
... with the possibility of a reduction of phenom-
enal character to representational content. The key feature of this theory
is that the crucial elements of phenomenal content consist of relations
between the subject and the subject’s environment similar to those that
James Gibson (1979) dubbed affordances. I claim...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 139–168.
Published: 01 April 2006
... that an argument similar in spirit to that given above
can be mounted for the conclusion that absent qualia are conceptually impossible in
functional duplicates without appealing to (P). To see this, note fi rst that if NN and
I are functionally alike, then if I fi nd what I have (phenomenal consciousness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 464–467.
Published: 01 July 2012
...Richard Price Tye Michael , Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts . Cambridge, MA : MIT Press , 2009 . xiv + 229 pp . © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 BOOK REVIEWS
Paul Bartha, By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 451–457.
Published: 01 July 2012
... is not modest, but careful arguments support it well. The
claim seems quite plausible.
Analogical arguments involve “source” (S) and “target” (T) domains
that are similar to each other in certain respects. Positive analogies occur when
property P and relation R pertain to domain S, and corresponding...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 457–460.
Published: 01 July 2012
... quite plausible.
Analogical arguments involve “source” (S) and “target” (T) domains
that are similar to each other in certain respects. Positive analogies occur when
property P and relation R pertain to domain S, and corresponding property P *
and relation R * pertain to T. If the target...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 461–464.
Published: 01 July 2012
... quite plausible.
Analogical arguments involve “source” (S) and “target” (T) domains
that are similar to each other in certain respects. Positive analogies occur when
property P and relation R pertain to domain S, and corresponding property P *
and relation R * pertain to T. If the target...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 467–471.
Published: 01 July 2012
... quite plausible.
Analogical arguments involve “source” (S) and “target” (T) domains
that are similar to each other in certain respects. Positive analogies occur when
property P and relation R pertain to domain S, and corresponding property P *
and relation R * pertain to T. If the target...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 472–474.
Published: 01 July 2012
... is not modest, but careful arguments support it well. The
claim seems quite plausible.
Analogical arguments involve “source” (S) and “target” (T) domains
that are similar to each other in certain respects. Positive analogies occur when
property P and relation R pertain to domain S, and corresponding...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 315–360.
Published: 01 July 2001
... of the physical.
University of Arizona (Chalmers)
Australian National University (Jackson)
consciousness) could engage in similar reasoning with true premises and a
false conclusion. Balog’s argument crucially requires the premise that a
zombie’s utterance of ‘I am phenomenally conscious’ is true...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 199–240.
Published: 01 April 2001
...” for
the subject to undergo the experience (Farrell 1950; Nagel 1974). We
can give everyday examples of similarity and difference in phenome-
nal character: the experience of seeing purple is more like, in respect
of phenomenal character, the experience of seeing blue than it is like
the experience...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 43–95.
Published: 01 January 2011
... to recognize the
relevant quality persists). A similar view is suggested by Brewer (1999, secs. 5.3.1–5.3.2).
Michael Tye (1999, 712; 2003, secs.16–17) claims that a phenomenal concept “disposes”
one to form a certain conscious image or is “apt” to trigger such an image. Loar (1997
[1990], 600, 605) makes...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 441–463.
Published: 01 July 2007
... of similarity is
somehow tacitly specifi ed which is necessary and suffi cient for conscious-
ness. Lormand argues against a number of candidates for this necessity
and suffi ciency. Since there is no way to make sense of the phenomenal
import of (3) on the resemblance understanding, Lormand takes...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
... that p , the relevant partition is just {Seems p , ¬Seems p }. We won't pursue the complications that result from allowing for more fine-grained partitions, since these make it even harder for the phenomenal conservative to make good on (PC3). 38. Similar remarks apply to the case of its seeming...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 125–131.
Published: 01 January 2012
...
of the same phenomenal property. But it seems as though their primary inten-
sions differ. After all, the subject might legitimately wonder whether the
phenomenal property represented by C 1 is the same as, or merely quite similar
to, the phenomenal property represented by C 2; and it might really...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 131–137.
Published: 01 January 2012
...
of the same phenomenal property. But it seems as though their primary inten-
sions differ. After all, the subject might legitimately wonder whether the
phenomenal property represented by C 1 is the same as, or merely quite similar
to, the phenomenal property represented by C 2; and it might really...
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