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phenomenal precision

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
... correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This article argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem for the standard framework is that it cannot capture precision structure : for example, consider...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
... (or functional) process. While the precise inter- pretation of “nothing over and above” is disputed, almost all agree that it entails metaphysical supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical.1 This means that there do not exist two metaphysically possible worlds that agree in all their physical respects...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
...Simon Prosser Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is wholly determined by, or even reducible to, its representational content. This essay puts forward a version of intentionalism that allows (though does not require) the reduction of phenomenal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 315–360.
Published: 01 July 2001
... phenomenal truths, to PTI. Qwill specify the phenomenal states and properties instantiated by every subject bearing such states and properties, at every time.5 That is, for every subject who is phenomenally conscious at a given time, Qwill specify precisely what it is like to be that subject...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 191–217.
Published: 01 April 2017
... previously compatible with her knowledge. This leads to what Lewis calls the hypothesis of phenomenal information : “Besides physical information there is an irreducibly different kind of information to be had: phenomenal information . The two are independent. Two possible cases might be exactly alike...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 338–343.
Published: 01 April 2023
... that combines representationalism (the view that an experience’s phenomenal character is determined by its representational content) with a tracking theory of representation (the view that mental representation is a matter of causal covariation, carrying information, or, more generally, tracking...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 598–602.
Published: 01 October 2002
... entailments that Chalmers’s scenarios aim to show are not available for phenomenal mentality. From this perspective, the appropriate conclusion of the zombie and inverted-world arguments is precisely that the type-identity claim is unjustified. Perry’s response to Jackson’s (1986) knowledge argument...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 355–388.
Published: 01 July 2006
... and mere sensations also differ in their phenomenal character. How can this difference be understood? In this essay, I will argue that there is a representational difference between perceptual experiences and mere sensations. In particular, in ordinary perceptual experiences of seeing, unlike...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 285–320.
Published: 01 April 2011
... perception and truth, it would be no surprise that a phe- nomenalism about bodies is the result. This is after all precisely the fa- miliar dialectic between skepticism and phenomenalism. 32. Cf. A 6.4.2262; A 6.4.1398; A 6.4.1501–3. 298 Critical Notice of Daniel...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 199–240.
Published: 01 April 2001
... Review 79 : 394 -403. ____. 1974 . “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83 : 435 -50. Neander, Karen. 1998 . “The Division of Phenomenal Labor: a Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness.” In Philosophical Perspectives , vol. 12 , ed. James E. Tomberlin, 411...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 464–467.
Published: 01 July 2012
...Richard Price Tye Michael , Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts . Cambridge, MA : MIT Press , 2009 . xiv + 229 pp . © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 BOOK REVIEWS Paul Bartha, By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 341–348.
Published: 01 July 2019
... are precisely examples of different specific meanings that sound the same. So: “The arguments from homophony cast doubt on the claim that semantic differences make any phenomenal difference to auditory perceptual experience in the absence of other audible experiences” (136). A second reason to reject...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 451–457.
Published: 01 July 2012
.... It deserves careful consideration by scientists, mathematicians, psychologists, and philosophers. Since it does not fit neatly into any usual cat- egory but rather stands athwart many research areas, its reception may depend on precisely who attends to its bold claims. This book aims to answer two ques...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 457–460.
Published: 01 July 2012
..., psychologists, and philosophers. Since it does not fit neatly into any usual cat- egory but rather stands athwart many research areas, its reception may depend on precisely who attends to its bold claims. This book aims to answer two ques- tions: “What criteria should we use to evaluate analogical arguments...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 461–464.
Published: 01 July 2012
..., psychologists, and philosophers. Since it does not fit neatly into any usual cat- egory but rather stands athwart many research areas, its reception may depend on precisely who attends to its bold claims. This book aims to answer two ques- tions: “What criteria should we use to evaluate analogical arguments...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 467–471.
Published: 01 July 2012
..., mathematicians, psychologists, and philosophers. Since it does not fit neatly into any usual cat- egory but rather stands athwart many research areas, its reception may depend on precisely who attends to its bold claims. This book aims to answer two ques- tions: “What criteria should we use to evaluate...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 472–474.
Published: 01 July 2012
... book. It deserves careful consideration by scientists, mathematicians, psychologists, and philosophers. Since it does not fit neatly into any usual cat- egory but rather stands athwart many research areas, its reception may depend on precisely who attends to its bold claims. This book aims to answer...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 125–128.
Published: 01 January 2005
... definition of retentive realization physicalism, the tokens that are physically realized are tokens of some functional type. But what if not all psychological tokens are tokens of functional types? For example, consider qualitative or phenomenal psychological tokens, such as my being in pain on Wednesday...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 481–531.
Published: 01 October 2021
...Hilla Jacobson Attempts to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences have so far largely focused on their sensory aspects . The first aim of this article is to support the claim that (perceptual) phenomenal character has another, significant, aspect—the phenomenal realm...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
... very closely related views that grant specific kinds of seemings a fundamental epistemic role (e.g., Brogaard 2013; McGrath 2013; Siegel 2017). Our main aim will be to argue that irrespective of the precise framework in which the position is embedded, phenomenal conservatism as captured by the core...