1-20 of 144 Search Results for

phenomenal character

Follow your search
Access your saved searches in your account

Would you like to receive an alert when new items match your search?
Close Modal
Sort by
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
...Simon Prosser Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is wholly determined by, or even reducible to, its representational content. This essay puts forward a version of intentionalism that allows (though does not require) the reduction of phenomenal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 481–531.
Published: 01 October 2021
...Hilla Jacobson Attempts to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences have so far largely focused on their sensory aspects . The first aim of this article is to support the claim that (perceptual) phenomenal character has another, significant, aspect—the phenomenal realm...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 199–240.
Published: 01 April 2001
... Character of Experience.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 : 219 -314. ____. 1994b . “Phenomenal Character.” Noûs 28 : 21 -38. ____. 1996 . “Intrasubjective/Intersubjective.” In Shoemaker, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays , 141 -54. Cambridge: Cambridge University...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 338–343.
Published: 01 April 2023
... that combines representationalism (the view that an experience’s phenomenal character is determined by its representational content) with a tracking theory of representation (the view that mental representation is a matter of causal covariation, carrying information, or, more generally, tracking...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 341–348.
Published: 01 July 2019
.... The Thesis of Minimal Multimodality presented in chapter 8 is carefully developed and incrementally fortified to provide the strongest target: “The phenomenal character of each perceptual episode is exhausted by that which could be instantiated by a corresponding merely visual, merely auditory, merely...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 139–168.
Published: 01 April 2006
... Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem (2) There could be a state functionally exactly like pain but lacking its phenomenal character (ersatz pain). Since ersatz pain would have the same causal consequences as real pain, it follows that (3) The phenomenal character...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
... as follows. Modal rationalists claim that for all nonphenomenal macro properties, the appropriate supervenience conditional is both necessary and a priori. Hence, type-B materialists must engage in special pleading when they claim that the relevant supervenience conditional for phenomenal properties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 385–389.
Published: 01 July 2017
... causal covariation. But other remarks suggest that he understands this specifically in terms of phenomenal character: as he later says of seeing the sun, “ what that perceptual experience is like depends on and derives from what the sun is actually like prior to perception, namely, brilliant white” (182...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (3): 355–388.
Published: 01 July 2006
... and mere sensations also differ in their phenomenal character. How can this difference be understood? In this essay, I will argue that there is a representational difference between perceptual experiences and mere sensations. In particular, in ordinary perceptual experiences of seeing, unlike...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 315–360.
Published: 01 July 2001
... concerning unperceived objects, for example. Second, for those truths M about which my perceptual experience gives guidance, it "Note that as before, Qwill characterize the experience according to its phenomenal character alone, leaving causal relationships to the environment unspecified...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 427–431.
Published: 01 July 2004
... (that is, the claim that experience is necessary for understanding demon- strative reference), but rather the explanatory claim that “experience is what explains our grasp of substantial objects” (120). This claim is supposed to con- strain theorizing about phenomenal character, and it is supposed to be evident...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 619–620.
Published: 01 October 2011
... and the Abandonment of Propositions 151 Prosser, Simon, Affordances and Phenomenal Character in Spatial Perception 475 Schroeder, Mark, Ought, Agents, and Actions 1 Sundstro¨m, Pa¨r, On Imagism about Phenomenal Thought 43 Szabo´, Zolta´n Gendler, Bare Quantifiers 247 Todd, Patrick. See Martin...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2021
... states at that time. Phenomenally individuated states include both current experiences which are defined by their phenomenal character and standing states which are defined by their dispositions to cause experiences—for example, standing beliefs, which Smithies takes to be defined by their dispositions...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 527–531.
Published: 01 October 2019
... of sensory experience, and in what format? Prosser insists, along intentionalist lines, that “motion is part of the phenomenal character of a motion experience, and this is because motion is part of the representational content of experience” (126). Yet he does little to characterize how such dynamic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
... similarity. On the one hand, two mental qualities might be similar with respect to qualitative character , or the aspects of phenomenal character characterized by phenomenal properties such as hue, loudness, and painfulness and that correspond to the dimensions of quality-space models. On the other hand...
FIGURES | View All (7)
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 264–268.
Published: 01 April 2018
... on, or even take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences are conceptually (or logically) isolated from the concepts that we use to represent (conceive of, categorize, etc.) physical or brain states. By utilizing this claim (what Hill calls “conceptual dualism” [149]), he argues that phenomenal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 327–359.
Published: 01 July 2022
..., the pencil looks straight and is straight, and so on. What is it like to see this quotidian scene? As a philosopher might put it: what is the “phenomenal character” of your experience? Since a central point of perception is to enable the organism to know about its environment, one might expect...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 430–437.
Published: 01 July 2015
... with the same phenomenal character as whatever experience that subject may be undergoing at that time. Third, the cosmoscope can calculate, given a specification of a physical setup, what the counterfactual consequences of the laws would be were that setup to be realized. Finally, the cosmoscope can specify...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 117–121.
Published: 01 January 2018
... of them, and they contribute to the phenomenal character of our overall perceptual experience. Van Cleve finds that an adverbial theory of sensation best accommodates Reid's view: a sensation is a modification of a sensing subject's mind; it is a way of sensing, of sensing F-ly. Perception, by contrast...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 126–130.
Published: 01 January 2019
... maintain that perceptual experiences have fixed potential to support beliefs, Siegel says experiences that share content and phenomenal character can differ epistemically. In particular, they can differ by degree in their capacity to support cognition. Thus, they are assessable epistemically, as better...