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phenomenal

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 43–95.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Pär Sundström Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
...Simon Prosser Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is wholly determined by, or even reducible to, its representational content. This essay puts forward a version of intentionalism that allows (though does not require) the reduction of phenomenal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 464–467.
Published: 01 July 2012
...Richard Price Tye Michael , Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts . Cambridge, MA : MIT Press , 2009 . xiv + 229 pp . © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 BOOK REVIEWS Paul Bartha, By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
... follows. Modal rationalists claim that for all nonphenomenal macro properties, the appropriate supervenience conditional is both necessary and a priori. Hence, type-B materialists must engage in special pleading when they claim that the relevant supervenience conditional for phenomenal properties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 565–591.
Published: 01 October 2010
... Watkins's more specific claims that Kant completely rejects a model on which the first relatum of a phenomenal causal relation is an event and that he maintains that real grounds are metaphysically and not just epistemically indeterminate. © 2010 by Cornell University 2010 Our thanks are owed to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 277–284.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Robert Van Gulick In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 511–518.
Published: 01 July 2013
... principally with phenomenal consciousness, but it also has very useful things to say about a range of other topics, including representation, causation, causal exclusion, reduction, constitution, and the question of whether, and if so how, relational properties are grounded in intrinsic properties. It is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2006) 115 (2): 139–168.
Published: 01 April 2006
... . “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identification.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 : 249 -58. Loar, B. 1997 . “Phenomenal States.” In The Nature of Consciousness , ed. N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere, 597 -616. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. McGinn, C. 1989 . “Can We Solve the Mind-Body...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 125–131.
Published: 01 January 2012
... Cornell University 125 BOOK REVIEWS The book starts off with a discussion of the nature of the problem of consciousness, distinguishing the “hard problem”—the task of giving an ac- count of phenomenal consciousness—from other problems...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 131–137.
Published: 01 January 2012
... of consciousness, distinguishing the “hard problem”—the task of giving an ac- count of phenomenal consciousness—from other problems with which it can be confused. From there, Chalmers moves on (chapters 2–4) to scientific attempts to grapple with this problem. Chalmers argues that a science...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 137–139.
Published: 01 January 2012
... q 2011 by Cornell University 125 BOOK REVIEWS The book starts off with a discussion of the nature of the problem of consciousness, distinguishing the “hard problem”—the task of giving an ac- count of phenomenal consciousness—from...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 598–602.
Published: 01 October 2002
... Philosophy 83 : 291 -95. Kripke, Saul. 1972/ 1980 . Naming and Necessity . Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Lewis, David. 1972 . Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 : 249 -58. Loar, Brian. 1990 . Phenomenal States. In Philosophical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2001) 110 (2): 199–240.
Published: 01 April 2001
... Theory of the Mind.” Philosophical Review 79 : 394 -403. ____. 1974 . “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83 : 435 -50. Neander, Karen. 1998 . “The Division of Phenomenal Labor: a Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness.” In Philosophical Perspectives , vol...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 619–620.
Published: 01 October 2011
... and the Abandonment of Propositions 151 Prosser, Simon, Affordances and Phenomenal Character in Spatial Perception 475 Schroeder, Mark, Ought, Agents, and Actions 1 Sundstro¨m, Pa¨r, On Imagism about Phenomenal Thought 43 Szabo´, Zolta´n Gendler, Bare Quantifiers 247 Todd, Patrick...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2001) 110 (3): 315–360.
Published: 01 July 2001
.... ____. 1999. “Materialism and the metaphysics of modality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-96. < consc.net/papers/modality.html >. ____. 2002a. “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.” In Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, ed. Q. Smith and A. Jokic. Oxford: Oxford...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 303–357.
Published: 01 July 2004
.... Phenomenal Illusions. In Perceptual Experience , edited by T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ____. In preparation. Inner Sense until Proven Guilty. Available online at www.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/cons . Moore, George. 1903 . The Refutation of Idealism. Mind 12 : 433...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 135–138.
Published: 01 January 2002
... along the qualitative dimension if they vary with respect to their qualitative properties. But what are qualitative properties? In the terminology that Clark adopts from Galen Strawson (Strawson 1989), qualitative properties are distinguished from phenomenal ones. Phenomenal properties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2006) 115 (3): 355–388.
Published: 01 July 2006
... mere sensations also differ in their phenomenal character. How can this difference be understood? In this essay, I will argue that there is a representational difference between perceptual experiences and mere sensations. In particular, in ordinary perceptual experiences of seeing, unlike...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2007) 116 (3): 441–463.
Published: 01 July 2007
...Benj Hellie Cornell University 2007 Beaney, Michael, ed. 1997 . The Frege Reader . London: Blackwell. Byrne, Alex. 2004 . “What Phenomenal Consciousness Is Like.” In Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness , ed. Rocco Gennaro, 203 -25. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Fara, Delia...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 285–320.
Published: 01 April 2011
... . Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Arthur, Richard. 1998 . “Infinite Aggregates and Phenomenal Wholes.” Leibniz Society Review [later: The Leibniz Review] 8 : 25 –45. Blackburn, Simon. 1990 . “Filling in Space.” Analysis 50 , no. 2 : 62 –65...