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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 43–95.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Pär Sundström Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 475–513.
Published: 01 October 2011
...Simon Prosser Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is wholly determined by, or even reducible to, its representational content. This essay puts forward a version of intentionalism that allows (though does not require) the reduction of phenomenal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 464–467.
Published: 01 July 2012
...Richard Price © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 Tye Michael , Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts . Cambridge, MA : MIT Press , 2009 . xiv + 229 pp . BOOK REVIEWS
Paul Bartha, By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
...John Hawthorne; Maria Lasonen-Aarnio The main aims in this article are to discuss and criticize the core thesis of a position that has become known as phenomenal conservatism . According to this thesis, its seeming to one that p provides enough justification for a belief in p to be prima facie...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
... as follows. Modal rationalists claim that for all nonphenomenal macro properties, the appropriate supervenience conditional is both necessary and a priori. Hence, type-B materialists must engage in special pleading when they claim that the relevant supervenience conditional for phenomenal properties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 481–531.
Published: 01 October 2021
...Hilla Jacobson Attempts to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences have so far largely focused on their sensory aspects . The first aim of this article is to support the claim that (perceptual) phenomenal character has another, significant, aspect—the phenomenal realm...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
... correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This article argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem for the standard framework is that it cannot capture precision structure : for example, consider...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 565–591.
Published: 01 October 2010
... Watkins's more specific claims that Kant completely rejects a model on which the first relatum of a phenomenal causal relation is an event and that he maintains that real grounds are metaphysically and not just epistemically indeterminate. © 2010 by Cornell University 2010 Our thanks are owed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 277–284.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Robert Van Gulick In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 139–168.
Published: 01 April 2006
... . “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identification.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 : 249 -58. Loar, B. 1997 . “Phenomenal States.” In The Nature of Consciousness , ed. N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere, 597 -616. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. McGinn, C. 1989 . “Can We Solve the Mind-Body...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 511–518.
Published: 01 July 2013
... principally with phenomenal consciousness, but it also has very useful things to say about a range of other topics, including representation, causation, causal exclusion, reduction, constitution, and the question of whether, and if so how, relational properties are grounded in intrinsic properties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 125–131.
Published: 01 January 2012
...
125
BOOK REVIEWS
The book starts off with a discussion of the nature of the problem of
consciousness, distinguishing the “hard problem”—the task of giving an ac-
count of phenomenal consciousness—from other problems with which it can
be confused.
From...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 131–137.
Published: 01 January 2012
... of
consciousness, distinguishing the “hard problem”—the task of giving an ac-
count of phenomenal consciousness—from other problems with which it can
be confused.
From there, Chalmers moves on (chapters 2–4) to scientific attempts to
grapple with this problem. Chalmers argues that a science...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 137–139.
Published: 01 January 2012
... 2011 by Cornell University
125
BOOK REVIEWS
The book starts off with a discussion of the nature of the problem of
consciousness, distinguishing the “hard problem”—the task of giving an ac-
count of phenomenal consciousness—from other...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 619–623.
Published: 01 October 2021
...). The Centered Mind concludes that there’s no such thing as conscious thought (Carruthers 2015). Now, in Human and Animal Minds , Carruthers concludes that there’s no fact of the matter as to whether nonhuman animals are phenomenally conscious or not. Even if you don’t like the final destination, reading...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 199–240.
Published: 01 April 2001
... . “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83 : 435 -50. Neander, Karen. 1998 . “The Division of Phenomenal Labor: a Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness.” In Philosophical Perspectives , vol. 12 , ed. James E. Tomberlin, 411 -34. Oxford: Blackwell. Peacocke...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 338–343.
Published: 01 April 2023
... that combines representationalism (the view that an experience’s phenomenal character is determined by its representational content) with a tracking theory of representation (the view that mental representation is a matter of causal covariation, carrying information, or, more generally, tracking...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 303–357.
Published: 01 July 2004
.... Phenomenal Illusions. In Perceptual Experience , edited by T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ____. In preparation. Inner Sense until Proven Guilty. Available online at www.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/cons . Moore, George. 1903 . The Refutation of Idealism. Mind 12 : 433...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2021
.... In his ambitious new book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness , Declan Smithies pursues the following line. What happens in our minds matters for epistemology because we are phenomenally conscious. Philosophical zombies who are physical and functional duplicates of us but lack phenomenal consciousness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 315–360.
Published: 01 July 2001
... and the metaphysics of modality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-96. < consc.net/papers/modality.html >. ____. 2002a. “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.” In Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, ed. Q. Smith and A. Jokic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. < consc.net...
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