Search Results for personal identity
1-20 of 401 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 425–430.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Paul F. Snowdon © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 Gasser Georg Stefan Matthias , eds., Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2012 . xi+259 pp. The papers in this collection are committed to contributing to the debate as to whether...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
... mind in action, this essay examines a debate between David Lewis and Derek Parfit over what matters in survival. Lewis argued that indeterminacy in personal identity allows caring about psychological connectedness and caring about personal identity to amount to the same thing. The essay argues that...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Sydney Shoemaker Tyler Burge argues on the basis of an account of memory that the notion of quasimemory cannot be used to answer the circularity objection to psychological accounts of personal identity. His account implies the impossibility of the “Parfit people,” creatures psychologically like us...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 533–569.
Published: 01 October 2015
... section “Of personal identity” and the Appendix—there cannot be a further perception in that mind, and so those perceptions do not form a whole. Hence, Hume's views were inconsistent. This essay argues that, unlike most others, this interpretation explains his retreat to skepticism in the Appendix. To...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2000) 109 (1): 118–121.
Published: 01 January 2000
...Naomi Scheman INTERPRETING THE PERSONAL: EXPRESSION AND THE FORMATION OF FEELINGS. By Sue Campbell. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. Pp. x, 204. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REVlEWS ferences between geometry and the theory of numbers. Frege put the...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2005) 114 (1): 115–117.
Published: 01 January 2005
... Gerson also holds that disembodied persons are nothing more than states of knowing (236), cognitional identity cannot be anything other than numerical identity. So, Plato ends up being committed to the numerical identity of knowing subject and object. As textual evidence for this, Gerson offers...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2009) 118 (4): 425–464.
Published: 01 October 2009
.... 2000 . Persons and Bodies . New York: Cambridge University Press. Blackburn, Simon. 1997 . “Has Kant Refuted Parfit?” In Reading Parfit , ed. Jonathan Dancy, 180 -201. Oxford: Blackwell. Butler, Joseph. 1736 . Of Personal Identity . First appendix to The Analogy of Religion. Reprinted in...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 289–337.
Published: 01 July 2003
... identity. I try to elicit ways in which having memory, with its presupposition of agent identity over time, is integral to being a person, indeed to having a representational mind. 1. Three types of memory figure in the discussion. The first is remembering x, where x...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 138–141.
Published: 01 January 2002
.... But then how are we material persons related to our bodies, which are also material things? Unlike many materialists, she rejects the following answer to this question: We are identical with our bodies 138 BOOK REVIEWS (or with...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 586–588.
Published: 01 October 2002
... overdetermination (by mental and microphysical causes) of the effects of the mental; (2) it elim- inates the threat to free will posed by the thesis of the supervenience of the mental on the microphysical; and (3) it accounts for the sense that many of us have that the identity of persons is less a matter of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 634–637.
Published: 01 October 2008
...José Luis Bermúdez Maximilian De Gaynesford, I: The Meaning of the First Person Term . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. x + 198 pp. © 2008 by Cornell University 2008 xxx prjuly2008-04 October 21, 2008 11:39 BOOK REVIEWS...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 323–348.
Published: 01 July 2008
... metaphysical argument bears. That argument has some commonalities with, and some bearing on, recent attempts to establish moral conclusions about abortion via the metaphysics of personal identity. See David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2001) 110 (1): 91–94.
Published: 01 January 2001
... are dis- covering that progress on fundamental issues in, say, philosophy of mind, requires delving into metaphysics. Questions about the nature of minds and their contents, like those concerning free action, personal identity, or the existence of God, belong to applied metaphysics. They...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2000) 109 (3): 469–471.
Published: 01 July 2000
...Alan Sidelle OCCASIONS OF IDENTITY: THE METAPHYSICS OF PERSISTENCE, CHANGE, AND SAMENESS. By André Gallois. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xiii, 296. Cornell University 2000 BOOK REVIEWS sciousness (Andy Clark, Daniel Dennett, Ruth Millikan...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2002) 111 (3): 462–465.
Published: 01 July 2002
...John MacFarlane Colin McGinn, Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. vi, 114. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS If the complement clause ascribes a first-person content, it expresses...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
... context of personal fusion. It is difficult to see how to maintain a particular family of desert views in light of the cases here presented. But people who accept Desert Requires Identity would reject Irrelevance of Others. They would claim that the Only Lefty Survives and Only Righty Survives cases...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 323–369.
Published: 01 July 2018
... not epistemically possible that Alyssa is identical to Einstein), in which case ( Einstein Ind ) would not generally sound marked. But the assumption that ‘is Einstein’ picks out a property that is known to only be had by Einstein is incredibly unrealistic. If a property of a person or object is...
Includes: Supplementary data
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
... Parfitian challenge concerned personal identity. Rawls had argued that the dignity of persons entailed the moral significance of “the plurality and distinctness of individuals” ( Rawls 1971 , 29). Whereas utilitarianism holds that a cost to A can be offset by the same benefit to B that would offset it for A...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 577–617.
Published: 01 October 2013
...John Mackay A person of average height would assert a truth by the conditional ‘if I were seven feet tall, I would be taller than I am,’ in which an indicative clause ‘I am’ is embedded in a subjunctive conditional. By contrast, no one would assert a truth by ‘if I were seven feet tall, I would be...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
... ambiguous between de re * and de dicto * interpretations. This fact is used to account for asymmetric mistaken identity attributions (for example, Biron thinks Katherine is Rosaline, but he doesn't think Rosaline is Katherine ). The variable theory compares favorably with its alternatives, including...