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personal identity

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 425–430.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Paul F. Snowdon Whether or not these negative remarks about the simple view are sound, it can be said that all the papers in this book are interesting and well worth reading. Gasser Georg Stefan Matthias , eds., Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge : Cambridge...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
... of mind in action, this essay examines a debate between David Lewis and Derek Parfit over what matters in survival. Lewis argued that indeterminacy in personal identity allows caring about psychological connectedness and caring about personal identity to amount to the same thing. The essay argues...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Sydney Shoemaker Tyler Burge argues on the basis of an account of memory that the notion of quasimemory cannot be used to answer the circularity objection to psychological accounts of personal identity. His account implies the impossibility of the “Parfit people,” creatures psychologically like us...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 533–569.
Published: 01 October 2015
...—as in the section “Of personal identity” and the Appendix—there cannot be a further perception in that mind, and so those perceptions do not form a whole. Hence, Hume's views were inconsistent. This essay argues that, unlike most others, this interpretation explains his retreat to skepticism in the Appendix. ©...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 399–410.
Published: 01 July 2005
..., The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. Prince- ton: Princeton University Press, 1998. Pp. 260. Carol Rovane and Raymond Martin each depart from an apparent philosoph- ical stalemate. Rovane, who is primarily concerned with what constitutes personal identity (both at and across...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
... who inherited the left hemisphere,” whether or not this person is identical to me (“Righty” is being used analogously). I went unconscious the moment I was hit by the drunk driver. The hospital, knowing that I own two cottages, one hundred miles apart, sent Lefty home to one cottage and Righty...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 261–263.
Published: 01 April 2015
...Matthew Stuart References Bolton Martha Brandt 1976 . “ Substances, Substrata, and Names of Substances in Locke's Essay .” Philosophical Review 85 : 488 – 513 . Law Edmund 1823 . “ A Defense of Mr. Locke's Opinion concerning Personal Identity .” In The Works of John...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 425–464.
Published: 01 October 2009
... analyzed in terms of centered worlds. Persistence and the First-Person Perspective Dilip Ninan University of St Andrews 1. Introduction A familiar divide in the theory of personal identity over time is between those who think personal identity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 529–532.
Published: 01 October 2017
... thinks, Locke claims that it's absurd to suppose that two persons might share one soul. In discussing personal identity, he claims that if the soul is an immaterial substance, it isn't absurd to suppose that two persons might share one soul. One might have thought that in the first edition...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 420–422.
Published: 01 July 2004
..., but to anyone who won- ders how the views and arguments put forward by Husserl and Heidegger might be brought to bear on contemporary analytic debates about the nature of intentionality, time, and personal identity. Heidegger scholars will also find what should (by this reviewer’s lights) be the last word...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 416–419.
Published: 01 July 2003
... and imagination. Lowe begins his discussion of personal identity with the following query: Are persons substances or modes? Although the language is somewhat antiquated (as Lowe recognizes) the distinction is familiar in the current literature. The view that human persons are substances takes one of two...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 289–337.
Published: 01 July 2003
... identity. I try to elicit ways in which having memory, with its presupposition of agent identity over time, is integral to being a person, indeed to having a representational mind. 1. Three types of memory figure in the discussion. The first is remembering x, where x...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 153–155.
Published: 01 January 2015
... for not considering the possibility that space has a non-Euclidean structure, and motion in a straight line takes you back to where you are (67). A more important exception follows his discussion of Locke on personal identity. A standard response to Reid's brave officer objection is to extend personal identity beyond...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 215–245.
Published: 01 April 2003
... Neutrality and Personal Identity Elsewhere, Parfit suggests that these doubts about the implications of prudence’s temporal neutrality for intrapersonal conflicts of value are reinforced by adoption of what he calls a psychological reductionist conception of personal identity that analyzes personal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 272–275.
Published: 01 April 2001
... worry about personal identity (25-33). Hume observes that the contents of consciousness continually suc- ceed one another and that, therefore, there is no constant and invariable impression to serve as the basis of a representation of the identical self throughout the succession. According...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
...: A Novel Account of the Relations among Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 : 591 –624. Chisholm, Roderick. 1968 . “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions.” Noûs 1 : 1 –18. ———. 1976 . Person and Object...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 360–366.
Published: 01 July 2014
... of argument from metaphysical premises to a metaphysical conclusion that I mentioned in the previous paragraph. The argument, in short, is that egocentric presentism allows one to make sense of some seemingly conflicting intuitions concerning personal identity that Hare reports having (and apparently expects...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 115–117.
Published: 01 January 2005
... persons are nothing more than states of knowing (236), cognitional identity cannot be anything other than numerical identity. So, Plato ends up being committed to the numerical identity of knowing subject and object. As textual evidence for this, Gerson offers primarily the Phaedo’s Affinity Argument...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 307–310.
Published: 01 April 2013
... Connexion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. xii þ165 pp. The central concern of Strawson’s book is, as that of any work on Hume on personal identity should be, with how we should understand Hume’s disavowal 314 BOOK REVIEWS...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 314–317.
Published: 01 April 2013
... Connexion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. xii þ165 pp. The central concern of Strawson’s book is, as that of any work on Hume on personal identity should be, with how we should understand Hume’s disavowal 314 BOOK REVIEWS...