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perceptual justification

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
... of perceptual justification is false. © 2010 by Cornell University 2010 Michael Bergmann and Stewart Cohen gave especially generous and helpful comments. I also received very helpful comments from Rod Bertolet, E. J. Coffman, Ian Church, Martin Curd, Paul Draper, Marian David,Matthew Lee, Jeff Snapper...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2021
... thereby has defeasible justification for the possession of it. Perception tells us about our environment. Intuitively, if two people are looking at numerically distinct but qualitatively indiscernible objects, then each has perceptual justification for a belief about the seen object...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 515–519.
Published: 01 July 2023
... First epistemology. On this view, normative standings such as justification/rationality and knowledge bottom out in epistemic reasons. Yet it seems that only justified belief or knowledge can provide a subject S with reasons, so that we cannot take reasons as fundamental. So, apparently, perceptual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
... phenomenal conservatives think of their view as a general theory of foundationally justified beliefs, beliefs that don't depend for their justification on other beliefs. Perception provides foundations of justified belief by providing perceptual seemings, memory provides memory seemings, intuition provides...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
... relation core cognition reasons perception perceptual justification According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
... – 60 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Byrne Alex 2014 . “ McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism, etc .” In Scepticism and Perceptual Justification , ed. Dodd Dylan and Zardini Elia , 275 – 97 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Cath Yuri 2011...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 463–509.
Published: 01 October 2019
... different and much less reliable process than normal perception, even though the experiential element is indistinguishable. I think reliabilists should not be bothered by this. A&P does require us to reject the principle that the justification of a perceptual belief is determined by the intrinsic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 483–523.
Published: 01 October 2000
... understand the complaint that McDowell does not take externalist theories of perceptual justification seriously enough. But McDowell does not present the argument as depending upon any very spec@ claims about justification; I do not think he sees it as doing so, and I do not think it needs to do so...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
... of mental qualities is to first use data concerning perceptual discrimination judgments to construct a model of perceptible qualities, and to then extrapolate from that to a model of mental qualities. The justification is that mental qualities can be individuated by their perceptual roles: in particular...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 89–145.
Published: 01 January 2023
... of what Pryor ( 2000 ) calls “dogmatism” about perceptual justification. But even Pryor, who defends dogmatism about perception, in effect presupposes inductive anti-dogmatism . This is because he takes his position to be incompatible with an inductive epistemology of perception—that is, with a view...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
... of justification to believe that one's apparent memories are reliable, so long as one lacks justification to believe that they are unreliable. Such a view would have much in common with Pryor's (2000) dogmatism about perceptual justification, but with apparent memories in place of perceptual experiences...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 241–245.
Published: 01 April 2019
... justification for believing that your perceptual experiences are accurate (100–102). One reason to be skeptical of Korman's response is that it relies upon an internalist explanatory connection constraint on justification to the effect that S's beliefs about a subject matter are justified only if S does...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 103–107.
Published: 01 January 2000
... be measured. BonJour opens by arguing that a priori justification must be taken seri- ously. All beliefs directly justified solely by experience are particular in their content. The justification of beliefs whose content goes beyond direct ex- 103...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 609–614.
Published: 01 October 2021
.... According to Gupta, such an experience, considered in isolation, does not confer justification on any particular perceptual belief. If, for instance, one has good reason to be a sense-datum theorist, such an experience can make it rational for a subject to believe that one is presented with a red sense...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 453–456.
Published: 01 July 2000
... it at a number ofjunctures- for example, Firth argues that what is crucial for foundational beliefs is not their certainty, but their self-warrant. In “Radical Empiricism and Perceptual Relativity,” Firth defends a ver- sion of radical empiricism against the “argument from perceptual relativ- ity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 435–437.
Published: 01 July 2004
...Michael Bergmann Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. Pp. vii, 240. Cornell University 2004 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 159–194.
Published: 01 April 2000
... introspective and sense-perceptual beliefs can be justi- fied in the basic way. (It should be noted that the fact that Chisholm thinks the absence of a defeating belief is necessary for the justification of such beliefs doesn’t show that those beliefs aren’tjustified in the basic way. That would...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 499–502.
Published: 01 October 2022
... be considered a starting point in a merely causal sense. Sensible experience would contribute to the acquisition of knowledge not as a proper source of justification, but as a psychological trigger for the exercise of our rational faculties, which would be the only true source of justification and epistemic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 159–162.
Published: 01 January 2015
... (and is presumably outweighed by) your perceptual evidence. But on the view Zagzebski favors, the authority “stands in” for you intellectually; his or her testimony preempts your evidence. This would obviously be the wrong result. The problem is that, of the two justifications for authority Zagzebski has offered...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 239–292.
Published: 01 April 2023
... . 2012 . “ Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification .” Nous 46 , no. 2 : 201 – 22 . Siegel Susanna . 2017 . “ How Is Wishful Seeing like Wishful Thinking? .” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 , no. 2 : 408 – 35 . Silins Nicholas . 2016...