1-20 of 72 Search Results for

perceptual confidence

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
... phenomenal precision formal phenomenology structure of experience phenomenal sorites phenomenal similarity perceptual confidence Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard approach...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
... compared to Close . Moreover, even if one was highly confident in Seems match given Match , one's prior estimation of one's perceptual powers was not so immense as to make the likelihood of Seems match extremely low conditional on Close . And this combination will render the conditional probability...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 303–357.
Published: 01 July 2004
.... Phenomenal Illusions. In Perceptual Experience , edited by T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ____. In preparation. Inner Sense until Proven Guilty. Available online at www.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/cons . Moore, George. 1903 . The Refutation of Idealism. Mind 12 : 433...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 241–245.
Published: 01 April 2019
.... Yet what the puzzle of material constitution shows us is that some or other of these intuitions must be mistaken, on pain of contradiction. This gives us reason to doubt the reliability of the postulated capacity, which in turn casts doubt upon the accuracy of our perceptual experiences (since...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... of the position postulate conditions on objective empirical representation that are more intellectual than are warranted. Such views leave it doubtful that animals and human infants perceptually represent elements in the physical environment. By appeal to common sense and to empirical perceptual psychology...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 131–134.
Published: 01 January 2019
... perceptual contents . Madary argues against these approaches throughout chapter 3. 3. Officially, Madary presents the remarks below as an illustration of (AF) rather than as an argument for (AF), but I suggest that Madary is understating the force of his remarks here. 2. Madary borrows...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 55–93.
Published: 01 January 2012
... this Bayesian analysis. But I think that CP has a good deal of intuitive plausibility even when it’s read in the way that I’m recom- mending; so understood, it says that if we acquire a reason to become more confident in H1, and if H1 entails H2, then we’ve also acquired a reason to become more confident...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 323–393.
Published: 01 July 2020
..., and Vogels). 45. Recall from section 1, however, that I do not intend DRH to provide sufficient conditions for being perceptual. Rather, the aim is to supply criteria for determining whether a state is perceptual or cognitive provided that we are antecedently confident that it is one or the other...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 352–356.
Published: 01 July 2019
...) in the explanation of perceptual experience, thought, action, and personal identity. The first chapter does an impressive job of defining the target of the Buddhist no-self theories, which Ganeri calls the “Authorship view” (18). In this view, there is no intelligent agent in the proverbial driver's seat, rather...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2021
... thereby has defeasible justification for the possession of it. Perception tells us about our environment. Intuitively, if two people are looking at numerically distinct but qualitatively indiscernible objects, then each has perceptual justification for a belief about the seen object...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 159–194.
Published: 01 April 2000
... a particular epistemic property, war- rant say, if it is reliably formed. Then our sense-perceptual, mem- ory, introspective, and inductive beliefs will be warranted if those ways of forming beliefs are reliable. But then, if those ways are reliable, we can employ their outputs as premises...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 239–292.
Published: 01 April 2023
... in cognition. I argue that we have no compelling reason to believe that encapsulation explains (or even contributes to an explanation of) perceptual tractability, and much reason to doubt it. This is because there exist much deeper computational challenges for perception than information access...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 199–240.
Published: 01 April 2001
... Varieties of Visual Field.” Philosophical Psychology 9 : 477 -95. Chalmers, David J. 1996 . The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davies, Martin. 1991 . “Individualism and Perceptual Content.” Mind 100 : 461 -84. ____. 1992 . “Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 451–506.
Published: 01 October 2004
... important of these is that Averill considers fewer sources of perceptual variation than I have discussed in section 3, and consequently rela- tivizes colors to far fewer parameters than I have argued is necessary. Second, Averill is much more confident than I am in the possibility of a nonstipulative...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 535–539.
Published: 01 October 2005
... done that could also refer to the concept of the object of which an intuition is taken to be a repre- sentation in order to be able to refer to the intuition itself. (Sicha tries to split the difference between Kant and Sellars on this point by including as part of perceptual takings themselves...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 463–509.
Published: 01 October 2019
... to the process type, so these hallucination beliefs will be as justified as their perceptual counterparts. 26 (Such hallucination needn't be widespread enough to significantly reduce the reliability of the process, but even if it is, the diminished epistemic status will apply to all outputs of that process...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 360–366.
Published: 01 July 2014
... in which the brain of a person, Adam, is replaced with a rudimentary, silicon pseudobrain—able to “control the body's vital functions and support a minimal substrate of perceptual experience (think Frankenstein's monster, minus the ability to talk)”—while a duplicate of Adam is simultaneously created...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 580–586.
Published: 01 October 2003
... of the aesthetic/nonaesthetic distinction, and nobody would be able to describe, with proper confidence, the aesthetic features of a thing merely as a result of having understood its nonaesthetic features. According to Sibley, in calling a vase graceful we exercise taste, which he conceived as a broadly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 103–107.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., since he explicitly limits means-ends reasoning to rational moti- vation4 but also seeks to explain animal behavior, needs an account of the cognition involved in nonrational motivation. L argues that according to Aris- totle, perceptual imagination (phantasia) enables animals that are capable...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 108–112.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., since he explicitly limits means-ends reasoning to rational moti- vation4 but also seeks to explain animal behavior, needs an account of the cognition involved in nonrational motivation. L argues that according to Aris- totle, perceptual imagination (phantasia) enables animals that are capable...