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perceptual confidence
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
... and Munton 2016 for arguments in favor of the perceptual confidence theory. See Denison 2017 and Nanay 2020 for arguments against. 44. This notion of ‘field’ should be distinguished from the algebraic notion, where a field is an algebraic structure that permits addition, subtraction...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2021
... prior in Match was low compared to Close . Moreover, even if one was highly confident in Seems match given Match , one's prior estimation of one's perceptual powers was not so immense as to make the likelihood of Seems match extremely low conditional on Close . And this combination will render...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 303–357.
Published: 01 July 2004
.... Phenomenal Illusions. In Perceptual Experience , edited by T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ____. In preparation. Inner Sense until Proven Guilty. Available online at www.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/cons . Moore, George. 1903 . The Refutation of Idealism. Mind 12 : 433...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 241–245.
Published: 01 April 2019
.... Yet what the puzzle of material constitution shows us is that some or other of these intuitions must be mistaken, on pain of contradiction. This gives us reason to doubt the reliability of the postulated capacity, which in turn casts doubt upon the accuracy of our perceptual experiences (since...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... of the position postulate conditions on objective empirical representation that are more intellectual than are warranted. Such views leave it doubtful that animals and human infants perceptually represent elements in the physical environment. By appeal to common sense and to empirical perceptual psychology...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 131–134.
Published: 01 January 2019
... arguments for (AF) is their range. Madary buttresses (AF) with evidence from armchair phenomenology, from perceptual psychology, from neuroscience, and even from the Husserlian tradition. That strategy—of supporting one claim with many firm pillars—is one to be greatly admired, and in this book...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 55–93.
Published: 01 January 2012
... this Bayesian analysis. But I think that CP has a good
deal of intuitive plausibility even when it’s read in the way that I’m recom-
mending; so understood, it says that if we acquire a reason to become
more confident in H1, and if H1 entails H2, then we’ve also acquired a
reason to become more confident...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 323–393.
Published: 01 July 2020
... is perceptual or cognitive provided that we are antecedently confident that it is one or the other. I suggest that dimension restriction plausibly plays this role, but I don't claim that it is sufficient for being perceptual, since there may be systems that are neither perceptual nor cognitive that also...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 352–356.
Published: 01 July 2019
...) in the explanation of perceptual experience, thought, action, and personal identity. The first chapter does an impressive job of defining the target of the Buddhist no-self theories, which Ganeri calls the “Authorship view” (18). In this view, there is no intelligent agent in the proverbial driver's seat, rather...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 605–609.
Published: 01 October 2021
...Elijah Chudnoff While the jury is still out on that, I can confidently say that Smithies has enriched our understanding of the relevant issues, and in doing so has made an important contribution to the literature on epistemology and philosophy of mind. Let’s return to the claim that everyone...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 159–194.
Published: 01 April 2000
... a particular epistemic property, war-
rant say, if it is reliably formed. Then our sense-perceptual, mem-
ory, introspective, and inductive beliefs will be warranted if those
ways of forming beliefs are reliable. But then, if those ways are
reliable, we can employ their outputs as premises...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 199–240.
Published: 01 April 2001
... Varieties of Visual Field.” Philosophical Psychology 9 : 477 -95. Chalmers, David J. 1996 . The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davies, Martin. 1991 . “Individualism and Perceptual Content.” Mind 100 : 461 -84. ____. 1992 . “Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 451–506.
Published: 01 October 2004
... important of these is that Averill considers fewer sources of
perceptual variation than I have discussed in section 3, and consequently rela-
tivizes colors to far fewer parameters than I have argued is necessary. Second,
Averill is much more confident than I am in the possibility of a nonstipulative...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 535–539.
Published: 01 October 2005
... done that could also
refer to the concept of the object of which an intuition is taken to be a repre-
sentation in order to be able to refer to the intuition itself. (Sicha tries to split
the difference between Kant and Sellars on this point by including as part of
perceptual takings themselves...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 463–509.
Published: 01 October 2019
... thinks this for very different reasons than I do, and he solves it with something quite unlike parameters. I invoked parameters because algorithmic typing doesn't give us all the epistemic distinctions we need. Beebe's concern is that his algorithmic typing will yield processes like perceptual process...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 360–366.
Published: 01 July 2014
... in which the brain of a person, Adam, is replaced with a rudimentary, silicon pseudobrain—able to “control the body's vital functions and support a minimal substrate of perceptual experience (think Frankenstein's monster, minus the ability to talk)”—while a duplicate of Adam is simultaneously created...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 580–586.
Published: 01 October 2003
... of the aesthetic/nonaesthetic distinction, and nobody would
be able to describe, with proper confidence, the aesthetic features of a thing
merely as a result of having understood its nonaesthetic features. According to
Sibley, in calling a vase graceful we exercise taste, which he conceived as a
broadly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 103–107.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., since he explicitly limits means-ends reasoning to rational moti-
vation4 but also seeks to explain animal behavior, needs an account of the
cognition involved in nonrational motivation. L argues that according to Aris-
totle, perceptual imagination (phantasia) enables animals that are capable...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 108–112.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., since he explicitly limits means-ends reasoning to rational moti-
vation4 but also seeks to explain animal behavior, needs an account of the
cognition involved in nonrational motivation. L argues that according to Aris-
totle, perceptual imagination (phantasia) enables animals that are capable...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 112–115.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., since he explicitly limits means-ends reasoning to rational moti-
vation4 but also seeks to explain animal behavior, needs an account of the
cognition involved in nonrational motivation. L argues that according to Aris-
totle, perceptual imagination (phantasia) enables animals that are capable...
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