Search Results for people
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The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
.... © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 fairness justice allocation conflicts chances lotteries Suppose two people, call them A and B, need to be rescued from deadly danger. Nobody else is around to help but you. You can save either A or B, but you cannot save both. (Think of two castaways on...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 140–146.
Published: 01 January 2017
...Philipp Schink Pettit Philip , On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2012 . xii +338 pp. © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 Are law and freedom inevitably in tension with each or reconcilable? It is this old...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Sydney Shoemaker Tyler Burge argues on the basis of an account of memory that the notion of quasimemory cannot be used to answer the circularity objection to psychological accounts of personal identity. His account implies the impossibility of the “Parfit people,” creatures psychologically like us...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 531–563.
Published: 01 October 2010
... virtuous people is conscious. The characterization of human consciousness that underlies both theories is best understood as one on which a wide variety of ideas in human minds are conscious, and the intensity or degree of consciousness of a given idea is a function of its power. For human minds, because...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 209–239.
Published: 01 April 2012
... people through the same nondeliberative, nonvoluntary capacities to think and act for reasons that they are enhancing the effectiveness of by deliberating. © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 We would like to thank a number of people for helpful discussion of the ideas presented here, including...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 93–117.
Published: 01 January 2013
...Nicolas Bommarito The contemporary discussion of modesty has focused on whether or not modest people are accurate about their own good qualities. This essay argues that this way of framing the debate is unhelpful and offers examples to show that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
...) and (ii) are inconsistent with the popular belief that, other things being equal, when people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they ought to be punished for this—even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing them would benefit no one. Insofar as we cannot deny (i), we are either...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
...Caspar Hare Some moral theories (for example, standard, “ex post” forms of egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and constraint-based deontology) tell you, in some situations in which you are interacting with a group of people, to avoid acting in the way that is expectedly best for everybody. This essay...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 541–545.
Published: 01 October 2018
... preferences. For example, inhabitants of a city will routinely converge on similar aesthetic preferences, and similar assumptions about what's cool. Likewise, people from similar cultural backgrounds will often accept similar dietary norms, and pursue the same child rearing and marriage practices. Finally...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2004) 113 (2): 284–288.
Published: 01 April 2004
... which people possess “robust” character traits (which help their possessors withstand situational pressures) and thus typically behave consistently across situations, and (ii) situationism, according to which people lack robust charac- ter traits and thus typically behave inconsistently across...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 258–260.
Published: 01 April 2015
... gives pride of place to the Aristotelian virtues of character, highlights the relationship between justice and friendship, and provides an account of moral development, giving a taxonomy of different types of people. He also argues for a novel view of contemplation as reflecting and concentrating on...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 609–611.
Published: 01 October 2001
... pluralistic account of morality evidently requires, lest morality be entirely detached from reason. That this is a problem depends on the assump- tion, first, of some form of internalism about practical reason, some kind of necessary connection between people’s reasons and their desires—suggesting that...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 251–256.
Published: 01 April 2018
... are no grounds for assuming that the lives of many or most people with disabilities would go better without them. In chapter 1, Barnes searches for a unifying or explanatory definition of disability that includes paradigm conditions, doesn't beg normative questions about the (dis)value of...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2004) 113 (1): 133–135.
Published: 01 January 2004
... in the com- mon-law systems of the English-speaking world, he continually makes clear how his discussions bear on the moral judgments involved in holding people accountable for their actions and decisions. Moral philosophers will profit from this volume nearly as much as legal philosophers...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 237–240.
Published: 01 April 2018
... “there is nothing more to the value of true belief than the fact that some people, contingently, care about, or love, or value, true belief” (274). This suggestion jibes with his defense of a form of antirealism about epistemic value, on which, whatever it is that makes the epistemic evaluation of...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 611–614.
Published: 01 October 2001
... of values. This ideal of integrity is the backbone of Myers’s account of practical reason. What reason requires, in Myers’s view, is self-governance, and self-governance, in turn, is a matter of being true to all one’s values. But now having emphasized that people’s values differ, and what...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 647–650.
Published: 01 October 2013
... second characterization of the book reflects the fact that he is quite informed about how the treatment of blacks has unfolded in the United States. From start to finish, Boonin has written a most rewarding book to read. On page 8, Boonin writes, “As far as we can tell, the first black people to...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 262–270.
Published: 01 April 2002
... implemented by the governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what respect for human dignity require.” As she sees it, “the best approach to this idea of a basic social minimum is provided by an approach that focuses on human capabilities, that is, what people are actually able to do and be” (WHD, 5...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2005) 114 (2): 288–290.
Published: 01 April 2005
... touches on many other issues related to assisted reproduction, from the nature of rights, to whether people need children, to the status of the embryo, to whether children should always be told who their father is. The book covers a lot of ground, and it does so quickly. Making Babies has a...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 419–422.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Patrick Tomlin Kagan Shelly , The Geometry of Desert . New York : Oxford University Press , 2012 . xviii+656 pp. © 2015 by Cornell University 2015 Desert claims are common enough in our moral and political discourse. But do people really deserve things? If so, what do they...