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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 179–207.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Wesley H. Holliday According to the Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), no one can now do anything that would require the past to have unfolded differently than it actually did, for the past is fixed, over and done with. Why might doing something in the future require the past to be different...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 417–420.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Mary Salvaggio Michaelian Kourken , Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press , 2016 . xx + 291 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 Mental Time Travel defends the extraordinary claim that episodic memory is imagination, or...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 349–383.
Published: 01 July 2008
...Michael McKenna Peter van Inwagen contends that nonresponsibility transfers across deterministic relations. Suppose it does. If the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every truth about what one does, and no one is even in part morally responsible for the past and the laws, then no one...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 97–115.
Published: 01 January 2011
... that truth depends on the world and not the other way around. The present essay argues that mere invocation of this truism does not establish that the basic argument for incompatibilism is question-begging. Further, it seeks to clarify important elements of the debate, including the fixity-of-the-past...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 209–239.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Nomy Arpaly; Timothy Schroeder Theoretical and practical deliberation are voluntary activities, and like all voluntary activities, they are performed for reasons. To hold that all voluntary activities are performed for reasons in virtue of their relations to past, present, or even merely possible...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 619–639.
Published: 01 October 2013
... commitments really are. In particular, investigating prepunishment can help to bring out the inadequacy of the “Ockhamist” reply to the argument, as well as the sense in which God's past beliefs need to depend on what we do, if we are plausibly to have a choice about those beliefs. © 2013 by Cornell...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
... this view, which this essay calls the “diary model,” one's memory ordinarily serves as a means for one's present self to gain evidence about one's past judgments, and in turn about the truth. This essay rejects the diary model's analogy between memory and testimony from one's former self, arguing first...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 278–281.
Published: 01 April 2002
... expression (for example, “The tomato”) by virtue of a property-token possessed by the referent (the tomato) (46). If Ludlow wishes to hold that only what is present possesses property-tokens, he will have to argue that nothing possesses property-tokens of pastness or futurity. Few attempts have even been...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
...-begging. “Truth and Freedom” also considers a descendant of the Main Argument that has the following additional premise: 568 Foreknowledge and Freedom (0) The past is appropriately necessary; and, necessarily, if the past...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
... and Belief . Oxford: Clarendon. Stump, Eleonore, and Norman Kretzmann. 1991 . “Prophecy, Past Truth, and Eternity.” In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 5: Philosophy of Religion , ed. James Tomberlin, 395 -424. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Van Inwagen, Peter. 1983 . An Essay on Free Will...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2002) 111 (2): 235–241.
Published: 01 April 2002
... β 4. NS(P0 & L) 2, 3; rule * α 5. NSP 1, 4; rule * → where is entailment, P0 is a true proposition describing the com- plete state of the universe at some time in the distant past, L is the con- junction...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2018) 127 (3): 418–422.
Published: 01 July 2018
... therapy for those of us who, like Auden, feel alienated by the non-Euclidean space-time that modern physics offers us. Here is one way of understanding the tension. Suppose you think there is a real difference between the past, present, and future. And there is some kind of change in our world that is...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2016) 125 (2): 241–286.
Published: 01 April 2016
... suppose that if things had gone differently in the recent past—if, say, you had blinked one more time than you actually did while reading the previous sentence—the state of the world in the distant past would still have been exactly as it actually was. It is also natural to suppose that if you had blinked...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 289–306.
Published: 01 April 2013
...’ denote possible worlds at which a proposition P is true, they are: (2) Closeness semantics:P! Q is true at @ iff some (P ^ Q)-world is closer to @ than any (P ^ :Q)-world. (3) Past match: If P describes a possible dated event, then some P-world that matches @ over...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 256–260.
Published: 01 April 2018
... are going to have to adjust our way of thinking about before we have a complete answer to the argument: laws of nature, causation, and the relationship between past and future” (88). Specifically she argues for Humean conceptions of laws and causation. Physical laws should not be viewed as things that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 420–422.
Published: 01 July 2004
... forensic one, according to which the self is to be identified in terms of what is mine to take responsibility for, and identity through time is a function of what I am accountable for in the past. Keller’s reconstruction and defense of 421...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2000) 109 (4): 592–595.
Published: 01 October 2000
... to past events (such as shame, remorse, regret, and so on). Moreover, it may be doubted whether the interest we take in past failures to abide by the standards that regulate deliberation really justifies the claim that we hold ourselves morally re- sponsible for such failures. Our...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2003) 112 (3): 289–337.
Published: 01 July 2003
... remember it from the outside. When I remember my act or event from the inside, the memory is indexed to mark all three de se grades. It is indexed to my having expe- rienced the act or event, to my having been the agent or subject of it, and to my perspective as agent in the past act or event.6 All...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2004) 113 (3): 411–416.
Published: 01 July 2004
... that I originally used to criticize Lewis): (1) If, in order for me to do B, something would have to have happened in the past that did not in fact happen, then I can- not now do B. (2) If determinism is true, then in order for me to do B, some- thing would...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
... Press, 1975. ____. 1984 . Reasons and Persons . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rovane, C. 1990 . “Branching Self-Consciousness.” Philosophical Review 99 : 355 -95. Shoemaker, S. 1970 . “Persons and Their Pasts.” American Philosophical Quarterly 7 ( 4 ): 269 -85. ____. 1984...