..., detailed work on a conception of freedom, crucial to which is Ragland's defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), “according to which an agent does something freely only if she could have done otherwise. . . . If PAP is correct, then freedom consists in a ‘two-way power’ to do or not do...

.... Philosophical Review, Vol. 119, No. 3, 2010 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2010-002 © 2010 by Cornell University 315 JOHN MARTIN FISCHER (PAP): An agent is morally responsible for performing...

... Frankfurt's highly influential challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) while pronouncing its success a hollow victory for compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility. According to PAP, “Someone is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise...

.... Assuming the claim ingenuous, how are we to adjudicate its truth? Pap- pas's procedure is to codify a set of common sense propositions (hereafter, CSP)—theses that are affirmed in common sense—and then check whether more CSP are affirmed by Berkeley or by his opponents. From the procedure, Pappas...

... (PAP), according to which one is blameworthy for doing some- thing only if one can do otherwise than do it: (1) Necessarily, S is morally blameworthy for w-ing only if S ought not to w. (2) Necessarily, S ought not to w only if S can not-w.(OIC) (3) Therefore...

... of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he or she could have done otherwise. In a typical case, an agent S delib- erates about whether to perform some action A. Unbeknownst to S, a “coun- terfactual intervener” has arranged things such that, if S is not about...

... of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he or she could have done otherwise. In a typical case, an agent S delib- erates about whether to perform some action A. Unbeknownst to S, a “coun- terfactual intervener” has arranged things such that, if S is not about...

... of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he or she could have done otherwise. In a typical case, an agent S delib- erates about whether to perform some action A. Unbeknownst to S, a “coun- terfactual intervener” has arranged things such that, if S is not about...

... of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he or she could have done otherwise. In a typical case, an agent S delib- erates about whether to perform some action A. Unbeknownst to S, a “coun- terfactual intervener” has arranged things such that, if S is not about...

... of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he or she could have done otherwise. In a typical case, an agent S delib- erates about whether to perform some action A. Unbeknownst to S, a “coun- terfactual intervener” has arranged things such that, if S is not about...

... of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he or she could have done otherwise. In a typical case, an agent S delib- erates about whether to perform some action A. Unbeknownst to S, a “coun- terfactual intervener” has arranged things such that, if S is not about...

... of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he or she could have done otherwise. In a typical case, an agent S delib- erates about whether to perform some action A. Unbeknownst to S, a “coun- terfactual intervener” has arranged things such that, if S is not about...

... of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he or she could have done otherwise. In a typical case, an agent S delib- erates about whether to perform some action A. Unbeknownst to S, a “coun- terfactual intervener” has arranged things such that, if S is not about...

... of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he or she could have done otherwise. In a typical case, an agent S delib- erates about whether to perform some action A. Unbeknownst to S, a “coun- terfactual intervener” has arranged things such that, if S is not about...

... of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he or she could have done otherwise. In a typical case, an agent S delib- erates about whether to perform some action A. Unbeknownst to S, a “coun- terfactual intervener” has arranged things such that, if S is not about...

... against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): one is morally responsible for what one has done only if one could have done otherwise (Frankfurt 1969). Notice that PAP can be directly inferred from the AP and the FW conditions. Failing to distinguish...

... of Alternate Possibilities that applies specifi- cally to deliberation: PAP Deliberation: I can deliberate rationally only if, for some number of options $ 2, I believe that each of the options under consideration is open to me. Indeed, van Inwagen states that “all philosophers who have...

..., the following definition by George Pap- pas will be adequate for our purposes: A person S directly perceives an object O at a time t = (1) S perceives O at t, and (2) it is false that: S would perceive O at t only if S were to perceive R at t, where R϶O, and where R is not a part of O nor is O...