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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 481–531.
Published: 01 October 2021
... is suffused with valence. What it’s like to undergo perceptual experiences—from pains to supposedly “neutral” visual experiences—standardly feels good or bad to some degree. The second aim is to argue, by appealing to theoretical and empirical considerations pertaining to the phenomenon of (perceptual...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
...Andrew Y. Lee Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in multidimensional spaces, where distances between points inversely...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 139–168.
Published: 01 April 2006
... is in pain (has pain), for example, according to the functionalist: Where ‘xk’ is the variable replacing ‘pain’, ∃ ∃ A subject S is in pain if and only if x1 x2 T x1 ,x2 & S has xk . Since there are no mental-state terms left on the right-hand side...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 409–413.
Published: 01 July 2003
... affects help with ethics? Tsouna seems to think that this is pretty easy: There is an obvious connection between the ethical thesis that the only things that matter are the pathe-, pleasurable or painful, that we are experiencing and the epis- temological thesis that the pathe...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 57–96.
Published: 01 January 2003
... Sickness or Pain is in Manna. Take away the Sensation of them; let not the Eyes see Light, or Colours, nor the Ears hear Sounds; let the Palate not 58 LOCKE’S COLORS Taste, nor the Nose Smell, and all Colours, Tastes, Odors, and Sounds...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 601–605.
Published: 01 October 2021
... for unit, human welfare is weightier than animal welfare? After all, isn’t part of the point of talking of a ‘unit of welfare’ precisely to grant ourselves a neutral medium of moral exchange? To motivate Kagan’s approach, let us start by comparing pains: assume for the moment that pain detracts from...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 360–366.
Published: 01 July 2014
... for egocentric presentism . Most of us have certain egocentric preferences. “All other things being equal, we prefer that pain befall others rather than ourselves and pleasure befall ourselves rather than others” (2). If someone is going to suffer from boiling water spilled on his or her hand, we prefer...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 199–240.
Published: 01 April 2001
..., Gareth. 1982 . The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fales, Evan. 1996 . A Defense of the Given. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Farrell, B. A. 1950 . “Experience.” Mind 59 : 170 -98. Graham, George, and G. Lynn Stephens. 1985 . “Are Qualia a Pain...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 79–103.
Published: 01 January 2006
... level and that is at the right level of generality to beat out tak- ing an aspirin in the competition for causal relevance. Taking a pain reliever is an obvious candidate. If you had taken a pain reliever that wasn’t an aspirin, your headache would still have gone away. And if you had taken...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 303–307.
Published: 01 April 2021
... and pain, natural instincts, and those desires and other desire-defined passions that respond to current or anticipated pleasure or pain. This last category is the focus of debate. Some antitraditionalists argue that for Hume a belief that something has future pleasure or pain in store for someone can...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 339–342.
Published: 01 July 2014
... that desire leads to physical motion (when it does) by virtue of the pleasures and pains (and their physical accompaniments) that inevitably come along with evaluative phantasia . Adding to this the consideration that practical thinking requires phantasia no less than theoretical thinking does, Moss argues...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 251–256.
Published: 01 April 2018
... such as being stigmatized, complicating routine tasks, requiring assistive technology, and causing chronic pain, access barriers, or shame. References Campbell Stephen , and Stramondo Joseph 2016 . “ Review of Elizabeth Barnes, The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability .” Notre Dame...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 595–598.
Published: 01 October 2000
...-being is ex- haustively constituted by how well or poorly she is faring ‘from the inside”’ (22). Experientialism “is committed to there being no deeper phenomena than these subjective experiences [of pleasure and pain (25)] that account for well-being” (31). After many challenges...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 120–122.
Published: 01 January 2001
... do, those choices all too often will harm others (for example, by causing them pain). God could prevent that harm, but only by curtailing our freedom and responsibility. Furthermore, the pain others experience can and often does elicit in us a sense of compassion that otherwise never would...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 300–303.
Published: 01 April 2001
... to a distinction at the level of facts” (20).Thus, according to McGinn, %hat makes the concept pain distinct from the concept Gfiberfiring is precisely that the two concepts express different properties” (20). In addition to arguing for his theory by criticizing alternative doctrines, McGinn attempts...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 264–268.
Published: 01 April 2018
... (that is, perceptual/representational) account of experiential awareness (192). Still, he rejects that type-materialism can be successfully combined with such a model of experiential awareness. In the case of pain, a combination of the two theses would lead, Hill argues, to the conclusion that awareness of pain...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 361–364.
Published: 01 July 2022
... agents. We thus start the process of moral development already equipped with what is needed to act from virtuous motives and enjoying virtuous actions. Moral education, then, involves “ reorienting and shaping … the already-present capacity to enjoy nobility and be pained by the shameful” (15), rather...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 473–480.
Published: 01 July 2020
... some points of disagreement. The biggest challenge to this claim flows from the seeming naturalness of a nonintentional conception of pain and pleasure experiences. Kriegel does a nice job summarizing Brentano’s response, according to which the nonintentional conception of pain and pleasure...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 338–343.
Published: 01 April 2023
... questionable. Tye argues that there can be borderline cases of having a particular phenomenal character, such as a borderline case of pain (13–14). We agree that the term “pain” is vague and that, if we accept that corresponding to vague terms there are vague properties, the property of having a pain is vague...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (1): 77–81.
Published: 01 January 2024
... a class of unjustifiable attitudes of moral anger (for example, resentment and indignation) that are retributive, in that they reflect the presumption that their targets deserve to suffer or experience pain. In earlier work, Pereboom held that this kind of blame should be replaced with “moral sadness...