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ought-implies-can
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 487–514.
Published: 01 October 2018
...Peter B. M. Vranas The claim that (OIC) “ought” implies “can” (i.e., you have an obligation only at times at which you can obey it) entails that (1) obligations that become infeasible are lost (i.e., you stop having an obligation when you become unable to obey it). Moreover, the claim that (2...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
...Peter A. Graham A principle that many have found attractive is one that goes by the name “'Ought' Implies 'Can'.” According to this principle, one morally ought to do something only if one can do it. This essay has two goals: to show that the principle is false and to undermine the motivations...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
... an epistemic “ought implies can”
principle, according to which the metaphysical impossibility of being a
skeptic implies that it is not the case that one ought to be a skeptic. With
this principle in place, my arguments from section 1 constitute a novel
objection to traditional skeptical epistemological...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 315–319.
Published: 01 April 2021
..., is in rejecting the principle that “ought implies can.” Accepting this principle “means thinking that there must be some guarantee that morality and nature are going to fit together somehow,” and “without some sort of theological underpinning there is simply no reason to believe that that's true” (218...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... of the deliberative ‘ought’ is developed
and defended by Broome n.d.
A fourth hallmark of the deliberative ‘ought’ illustrated by the case
of Luckless Larry is the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. When some-
one comes to you for advice about what he or she ought to do, answers
that are beyond his...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (1): 116–121.
Published: 01 January 2019
... in existing institutions to promote the now-identified ethical behaviors and valuable outcomes. This amounts to an extremely demanding form of naturalism, which asserts not just that “ought” implies “can,” but that “ought” implies “ is ;” we are permitted to identify some existing pattern as ethical once we...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (2): 279–283.
Published: 01 April 2004
... by the argu-
ment found in David Widerker’s paper (meant as a reply to Frankfurt-style
examples), which appeals to the “ought”implies “can” principle as well as the
principle that to say an action is wrong is to say that the agent should not have
performed it. It seems Pereboom is mistaken to assume...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 227–262.
Published: 01 April 2021
... (2000 : chap. 4) argument that no nontrivial conditions are luminous. If sound, this argument would show that one can believe that p without being able to know that one believes that p. 10 This might seem to spell trouble for self-knowledge requirements. On a controversial but plausible ought-implies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 429–484.
Published: 01 October 2014
... to fit my (enlarged) end, not to mention a capacity to be sensitive to when this is required, if we are to treat them as a normative subject of whom we could legitimately make this kind of normative demand. What we have exposed in this example is a mild form of an “ought implies can” principle...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 465–500.
Published: 01 October 2009
... the feeling of obligation can become violent.
If some version of the “ought implies can” principle is true, this
may also help responsible agents maintain their confidence in their abil-
ity to do as they ought. While circumstances beyond their control can tear
the objects of agents’ other desires...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 539–572.
Published: 01 October 2002
... is particularly
tempting when considering the role of maxims in deliberation. If we
follow Kant (and common sense) in holding that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’,
it seems that we cannot be required to engage in the moral review of
‘‘maxims’’ so deeply embedded in unconscious mental processes that
we are not capable...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 211–249.
Published: 01 April 2020
.... Suppose you are playing chess with a friend. Passing by, I threaten to punch you on the nose if you advance your knight to f4. 16 What ought you to do? Can you weigh the positional advantage in advancing your knight against the prudential disadvantage in getting a punch on the nose? Yes...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 411–422.
Published: 01 July 2000
..., Smith can
conclude that the most morally valuable course of action for Baker
to take, as of times prior to promising Classics the position, is to
allocate it to the History department. Principle I then implies that
Baker morally ought to assign the position to History and not
promise...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
... would have been made worse off to degree X. 32. Note that (5) is formulated in terms of desert-based reasons , whereas Desert (and thus Desert Comparability) is formulated in terms of what ought to be done. But the claims about desert-based reasons in (5) imply the relevant oughts when...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 511–515.
Published: 01 July 2023
..., the view implies that the consent-giver has not waived their rights until the consent-receiver finds out. So, even if I leave you a note saying that you can borrow my car, I have not succeeded in consenting until you have read the note. Dougherty finds this counterintuitive, and they therefore reject...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... requires that (good A ) is probabilistically independent of A ∨ B , for any proposition B . But suppose that B is itself the proposition (good A ): then B is independent of A ∨ B , and this can only hold if ¬ B implies A . (This follows because independence is symmetric , and so C...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 135–189.
Published: 01 April 2003
.... Since love for one person “exhausts the
attention that we might have devoted to finding and appreciating the
value in others,” “we are constitutionally limited in the number of peo-
ple we can love” (372). If “cannot” implies “not having reason to,” then
it is not the case that one has reason...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 589–592.
Published: 01 October 2016
... with approval, as a prominent advocate of TM. A formulation of TM he quotes from David Finkelstein tells us that “the question of whether I believe that P is, for me, transparent to the question of what I ought rationally to believe—i.e. to the question whether the reasons require me to believe that P. I can...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 551–554.
Published: 01 October 2017
... for the agent. But that doesn't imply—or doesn't obviously imply—that a deed's being good would not count, from a moral point of view, in favor of its being performed. And what about aesthetic value? Does beauty have no value if it serves no purpose? I think I can imagine beauty possessing value even...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 173–204.
Published: 01 April 2014
... This reconstruction gives personal irrelevance and general good separate and necessary roles. Personal irrelevance claims that I ought to be indifferent between equal distributions of good to myself and A, as well as between equal distributions to A and B. It also says that, when more good can be produced...
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