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The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 140–144.
Published: 01 January 2018
...Michael J. Raven Sattig Thomas , The Double Lives of Objects: An Essay in the Metaphysics of the Ordinary World . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2015 . xi + 259 pp . © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 Thomas Sattig's The Double Lives of Objects introduces a new theory of...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 241–245.
Published: 01 April 2019
...Asya Passinsky Korman Daniel Z. , Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2015 . x + 251 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 Most philosophers and nonphilosophers alike believe in the existence of “ordinary objects” like tables and chairs...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (2): 205–233.
Published: 01 April 2002
...Crispin Wright Cornell University 2002 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 111, No. 2 (April 2002) What Could Antirealism about Ordinary Psychology Possibly Be? Crispin Wright 1. If you cannot...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
...Thomas Sattig It seems to be a platitude of common sense that distinct ordinary objects cannot coincide, that they cannot fit into the same place or be composed of the same parts at the same time. The paradoxes of coincidence are instances of a breakdown of this platitude in light of...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 325–349.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Anthony S. Gillies What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 95–124.
Published: 01 January 2012
... from ordinary interpersonal relationships. On this basis, he concluded that relinquishing moral blame isn't a real possibility for us, given our commitment to personal relationships. If well founded, this conclusion puts the traditional free-will debate in a new light. In particular, insofar as...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... mathematical structure of a probability function does. The second mistake is that the hyperreals make too many distinctions. They have a much more complex structure than credences in ordinary propositions can have, so they make distinctions that don't exist among credences. While they might be useful for...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 209–239.
Published: 01 April 2012
... up ordinary deliberation. These nondeliberative, nonvoluntary processes by means of which we are able to deliberate for reasons are the fundamental processes by means of which we can think or do anything for a reason: once it has been seen that they must exist, it can be recognized that they are...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 1–40.
Published: 01 January 2018
... undermine his suggestion that there is room at a fundamental metaphysical level for ordinary material objects. 22. Compare the claim in Kaufman 2014 that “a uniform general picture of what body in general is emerges” from the relevant texts from the Synopsis and the Principles (78). In a note...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 281–338.
Published: 01 July 2014
... attributing any particular meaning to an expression is modally plastic: its truth depends very sensitively on the exact microphysical state of the world. However, such plasticity seems to threaten ordinary counterfactuals whose consequents contain speech reports, since it is hard to see how we could...
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 273–277.
Published: 01 April 2018
...-functional compounds of atomic sentences; and, crucially, ordinary talk of things and qualities can be paraphrased away by supposing that the atomic sentences define a Tractarian geometry. In the nihilistic factalist language, the geometric constants (tetradic parallelism, similarity) and identity will have...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 258–260.
Published: 01 April 2015
... his ground in front of the dragon is an ordinary act of virtue performed under extremely trying conditions and stepping forward is an extremely virtuous action performed under ordinary conditions (142). It certainly looks as if advancing on a dragon is better than merely confronting wild animals...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 82–84.
Published: 01 January 2001
... the possible exception of causation, disposition concepts are as prevalent in ordinary thought as any of the nomic concepts. Progress on their nature has been hard to come by. No doubt the difficulty of saying anything illuminating and suitably general about their nature is a function of their...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 255–291.
Published: 01 July 2019
... often weaker than the straightforward proposal suggests. Sentences like (7) are context sensitive. As uttered in many ordinary contexts, (7) denotes a content that is true even at worlds where Jones arrived at 2:58. But in a context where we are setting our watches and every second matters, (7) may...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 399–404.
Published: 01 July 2017
... judgment. The initial target may be the judgment. But if Sosa is right and a judgment is an action made in a certain endeavor, then it is hard to see why the skeptic should have an epistemic objection to the endeavor, at least if we consider an ordinary low-stakes example in which someone aims to affirm...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 126–132.
Published: 01 January 2017
... possibilities of error are brought to our attention, with us perhaps being made to take them seriously and it becoming harder to ‘know’. Rather, it's the view that we lack knowledge, even in ordinary contexts, and by ordinary standards, as we have no good reason to suppose that skeptical possibilities do not...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 1–23.
Published: 01 January 2002
... about deciding what actions to perform at any given time. For example, I may want to decide whether to go to a movie this evening or stay home and read a book. The actions between which we want to choose are perfectly ordinary actions, and the presumption is that to make such a decision we should...
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 451–506.
Published: 01 October 2004
... at most one of the perceptual effects can veridically repre- sent the color of the patch. But which one, and why? Notice that the question here is intended metaphysically, rather than epistemically: it is not “how do ordinary perceivers know which of the varying percep- tual effects veridically...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 633–645.
Published: 01 October 2007
... ordinary assertions about external things, we therefore use concrete terms, such as ‘man’, ‘animal’, ‘rational’, and ‘white’. “All our Affirmations,” Locke writes, “are only in concrete, which is the affirm- ing, not one abstract idea to be another, but one abstract Idea to be join’d to another...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 296–299.
Published: 01 April 2008
... introduces a new device to deal with all these truth- endorsements, which he calls “anaphorically unrestricted quantification,” to make good on his deflationary aims. In ordinary language, the only devices obviously available for anaphora seem to be pronouns, which must always appear in object positions...