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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 451–454.
Published: 01 July 2021
...John Palmer palmerj@ufl.edu Clarke Timothy , Aristotle and the Eleatic One . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2019 xiv + 227 pp. © 2021 by Cornell University 2021 Timothy Clarke’s monograph offers a detailed explication of Aristotle’s Physics 1.2–3, two...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 329–333.
Published: 01 April 2023
...J. P. Studd Florio Salvatore Linnebo Øystein and The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2021 . xiv + 314 pp. © 2023 by Cornell University 2023 Logicians and philosophers have had a good 120 years to get used...
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Published: 01 April 2023
Figure 2. Visual inference can be affected by information about what one is looking at. Look at the image and search for anything out of the ordinary before reading this footnote for a hint. 54 Image reprinted from Lupyan 2017 (original photographer unknown). More
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
...David James Barnett A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous view of memory. According...
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Published: 01 July 2023
Figure 9. Two groups are presented with arguments favoring q ; red group never scrutinizes, while blue group always does. Top left: 0 % chance of finding flaw if there is one; full blue polarization. Top right: 100 % chance of finding flaw if there is one; no blue polarization More
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Published: 01 July 2023
Figure 10. Schematic simple-argument model. If it is an argument for s , then P ( s | G ) > P ( s ) > P ( s | B ) ; for ¬ s , vice versa. Since bad arguments are more ambiguous than good ones, y ≤ x . More
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 591–642.
Published: 01 October 2020
...Daniel Drucker This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 191–226.
Published: 01 April 2021
...Lara Buchak In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disagreement among peers on many important matters; peer disagreement is a serious challenge to one's own opinion; and yet one should be able to maintain one's opinion on important matters...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 611–618.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Joshua Gert Julia Markovits has recently argued for what she calls the ‘Coincident Reasons Thesis’: the thesis that one’s action is morally worthy if and only if one’s motivating reasons for acting mirror, in content and strength, the reasons that explain why the action ought, morally...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (3): 349–383.
Published: 01 July 2008
...Michael McKenna Peter van Inwagen contends that nonresponsibility transfers across deterministic relations. Suppose it does. If the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every truth about what one does, and no one is even in part morally responsible for the past and the laws, then no one...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 95–130.
Published: 01 January 2020
... for present actions are grounded in present or future desires. Futurist subjectivism promises to answer Parfit's Agony Argument , and it is motivated by natural extensions of some of the considerations that support subjectivism in general. However, it faces a problem: because which desires one will have...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Delia Graff Fara One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 425–464.
Published: 01 October 2009
...Dilip Ninan When one considers one's own persistence over time from the first-person perspective, it seems as if facts about one's persistence are “further facts,” over and above facts about physical and psychological continuity. But the idea that facts about one's persistence are further facts...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 327–359.
Published: 01 July 2022
...Alex Byrne; Riccardo Manzotti When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each has...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 89–145.
Published: 01 January 2023
...Jeremy Goodman; Bernhard Salow We offer a general framework for theorizing about the structure of knowledge and belief in terms of the comparative normality of situations compatible with one’s evidence. The guiding idea is that, if a possibility is sufficiently less normal than one’s actual...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 345–383.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Carlotta Pavese Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees (absolutism about propositional knowledge). On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 441–480.
Published: 01 October 2015
... in space and the identities of individuals. In these cases, one does not know something, and yet one cannot give voice to one's ignorance in a certain way. But what does the ignorance in these cases consist in? This essay argues that many standard models of ignorance cannot account for the phenomenon...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
...Peter A. Graham A principle that many have found attractive is one that goes by the name “'Ought' Implies 'Can'.” According to this principle, one morally ought to do something only if one can do it. This essay has two goals: to show that the principle is false and to undermine the motivations...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 49–75.
Published: 01 January 2008
... monistic or inclusivist. According to the monists, happiness consists exclusively of contemplation. According to the inclusivists, contemplation is one constituent of happiness, but morally virtuous activity is another. In this essay I will examine influential defenses of monism. Finding these accounts...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 173–204.
Published: 01 April 2014
... in Benevolence : “Each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable by him.” The axioms face challenges from two sides. First, one test requires that a claim...