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occurrence

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 219–240.
Published: 01 April 2017
...Robin Jeshion Clarence Sloat, Ora Matushansky, and Delia Graff Fara advocate a Syntactic Rationale on behalf of predicativism, the view that names are predicates in all of their occurrences. Each argues that a set of surprising syntactic data compels us to recognize names as a special variety...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
... uniformly occur as predicates. Predicativism flies in the face of the widely accepted view that names in argument position are referential, whether that be Millian Referentialism, direct-reference theories, or even Fregean Descriptivism. But names are predicates in all of their occurrences...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 415–448.
Published: 01 October 2006
... of (2), under A, as (2) occurs in (1)? Classical Tarski semantics does not specify what the second ‘x ’ i n (1) designates under the original assignment. This is because the sec- ond ‘x ’ in (1) is not the variable ‘x ’, which designates Brando under A. It is a bound occurrence of ‘x...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 99–117.
Published: 01 January 2008
... occurrences of expressions in sentences from the expressions themselves. So, for example, the expression ‘that car’ has two occur- rences in the sentence 1. That car is nicer than that car. Now suppose someone proposes a semantic theory of some expression (or some sort of expression...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 417–428.
Published: 01 July 2002
... to be completely internal to W. On the other hand, “content externalism” implies that mental events and states do not always supervene on states and events internal to the person. There is an apparent conflict here, but is it real? I suggest that if we distinguish particular occurrences of mental states...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 341–371.
Published: 01 July 2002
... it stands in. Since I wish to allow that different occurrences of the same expression might des- ignate different things, I really need to characterize designation for occurrences of expressions in sentences as follows: an occurrence of expression e in sentence S designates o iff this occurrence of e...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 1–50.
Published: 01 January 2006
... dependence of the effect on its cause. The simplest such treat- ment, which forms the basis for David Lewis’s early (1986) account of causation, takes as its point of departure the counterfactual dependence of the occurrence of the effect on the occurrence of its cause. Thus, in the case under...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 497–537.
Published: 01 October 2002
... occurrences of the same demonstrative can converge on the same designatum (hence the same content) yet differ in cognitive value, Kaplan reasons, the characters of those different occurrences must be different. But how can the characters differ when the two occurrences are of the very same univocal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... occurs bare within a sentence just in case none of the domains of that occurrence are restricted by the extension of any expression in the sentence. If we ignore multiple occurrences of a quantifier in a single sentence as well as multiple domains associated with an occurrence of a single quantifier,10...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 179–225.
Published: 01 April 2005
.... Frege’s example was (1) Jupiter has four moons, where the occurrence of ‘four’ seems to be just like that of ‘green’ in (2) Jupiter has green moons. On the other hand, ‘four’ occurs as a singular term, which is to say that it occurs in a position that is commonly occupied by paradigmatic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 173–238.
Published: 01 April 2023
..., but it involves the property of being a proposition which ascribes some property to the proposition that snow is white that it doesn’t itself have: λ p ∃ X . ( p = X s ∧ ¬ X p ) . While the two occurrences of the bound variable X can be paraphrased away using our coordinated quantifiers (see...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
... as well. 25. One closely related view says that it is your apparent memory itself rather than your awareness of its occurrence that justifies you currently in believing that p. This view might also be coupled with the further claim that one's apparent memories justify beliefs even in the absence...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 141–144.
Published: 01 January 2000
... to a familiar clime” (49 He is perfectly willing to concede, for example, that having recently heard the first occurrence of an A section has an important effect on how one experiences its second occurrence and that that effect depends on the first occurrence being somehow registered in memory. He...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 327–358.
Published: 01 July 2005
... assumptions. First, I shall need to speak of the causal relata, and so I will assume that these are events (or sets thereof). In particular, I will treat the causal relata as concrete, coarse-grained, worldbound occurrences. Second, I 328 CONTRASTIVE...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
... classified with constant terms (such as ‘0 while pronouns (such as ‘he’) are usually allied with variables (such as ‘x The argument for this is elementary. Whereas proper names and constants have only one kind of occurrence in a sentence or formula, pronouns, like...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 359–406.
Published: 01 July 2012
... antecedent is false in all of Lingens’s knowledge worlds. This is a radical route to take: claiming that Lingens knows the outcome of the coin toss is obviously a large bullet to bite.9 In any case, the suggestion can be dismissed on independent grounds. The key point is that occurrences...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 275–287.
Published: 01 April 2008
... volume will contain his papers on these topics. Fine’s defense of modalism proceeds by careful disassembly of Quine’s critique of quantifying in. There are five steps (55): (a) The starting point that substitution fails for occurrences of co-designating singular terms...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 267–269.
Published: 01 April 2001
... ways’ applies correctly to every term to which ‘homonymous’correctly applies, he does not think that the con- verse is true. The payoff is that, on my view, Aristotle does not require that we be able to paraphrase away existential occurrences of ‘is’to exhibit the fact that ‘to be’ is said...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2015
... that mental properties (properties we have privileged access to) are not identical to physical properties and mental events are not identical to physical events, and concludes by cataloging which mental properties/events are pure (whose instantiation or occurrence does not entail the instantiation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
... not interfere with the truth of inferences resulting from making what is verbally the substitution of ‘Scott’ for ‘the author of Waverley’, so long as ‘the author of Waverley’ has what I call a primary occurrence in the proposition considered. (Russell 1956, 52) No adequate account...