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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
... uniformly occur as predicates. Predicativism flies in the face of the widely accepted view that names in argument position are referential, whether that be Millian Referentialism, direct-reference theories, or even Fregean Descriptivism. But names are predicates in all of their occurrences; they are...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 219–240.
Published: 01 April 2017
...Robin Jeshion Clarence Sloat, Ora Matushansky, and Delia Graff Fara advocate a Syntactic Rationale on behalf of predicativism, the view that names are predicates in all of their occurrences. Each argues that a set of surprising syntactic data compels us to recognize names as a special variety of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 415–448.
Published: 01 October 2006
... bound occurrence of ‘x ’, which does not. Classical semantics imputes 1. Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number, trans. J. L. Austin (Evanston, IL.: Northwestern University Press, 1968), x, 71, 73...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 99–117.
Published: 01 January 2008
... some obvious methodological points. Let’s dis- tinguish occurrences of expressions in sentences from the expressions themselves. So, for example, the expression ‘that car’ has two occur- rences in the sentence 1. That car is nicer than that car. Now suppose someone proposes a semantic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 417–428.
Published: 01 July 2002
... completely internal to W. On the other hand, “content externalism” implies that mental events and states do not always supervene on states and events internal to the person. There is an apparent conflict here, but is it real? I suggest that if we distinguish particular occurrences of mental states...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 341–371.
Published: 01 July 2002
... proposition that mathematics reduces to logic and the relations it stands in. Since I wish to allow that different occurrences of the same expression might des- ignate different things, I really need to characterize designation for occurrences of expressions in sentences as follows: an occurrence of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 141–144.
Published: 01 January 2000
... satisfaction of coming home to a familiar clime” (49 He is perfectly willing to concede, for example, that having recently heard the first occurrence of an A section has an important effect on how one experiences its second occurrence and that that effect depends on the first occurrence being somehow...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 255–258.
Published: 01 April 2015
... to work, arguing that mental properties (properties we have privileged access to) are not identical to physical properties and mental events are not identical to physical events, and concludes by cataloging which mental properties/events are pure (whose instantiation or occurrence does not entail the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 497–537.
Published: 01 October 2002
... 4. As mentioned, Kaplan’s attention to Frege’s Puzzle also motivates his distinction between demonstratives and the so-called pure indexicals. Since different syntactic occurrences of the same demonstrative can converge on the same designatum (hence the same content) yet differ in cognitive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 1–50.
Published: 01 January 2006
...- terfactual dependence of the effect on its cause. The simplest such treat- ment, which forms the basis for David Lewis’s early (1986) account of causation, takes as its point of departure the counterfactual dependence of the occurrence of the effect on the occurrence of its cause. Thus, in the case...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 247–283.
Published: 01 April 2011
... threat can be averted. 2. Clarification Let’s say that a quantifier occurs bare within a sentence just in case none of the domains of that occurrence are restricted by the extension of any expression in the sentence. If we ignore multiple occurrences of a quantifier in a single sentence as well as...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 432–434.
Published: 01 July 2004
... 3 turns to S-type terms, that is, terms whose referent is determined by a procedure roughly along the lines of Kripke’s reference-fixing descrip- tions. Berger’s attention focuses here on occurrences of arguably anaphoric pronouns, and on examples of (at least prima facie) intersentential...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 483–486.
Published: 01 July 2002
... occurrence. (2) Control Principle: I am responsible for a harm only if I could control its occurrence, by producing or preventing it. (116–17) These two principles are deeply imbedded in Western conceptions of morality and law. Kutz juxtaposes these principles to another principle, which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 267–269.
Published: 01 April 2001
... existential occurrences of ‘is’to exhibit the fact that ‘to be’ is said in many ways, although he would have accepted that requirement if he had considered ‘to be’ homonymous. Shields, by contrast, thinks that Aristotle draws a mistaken inference at 1003a34-35 by either forgetting or fail- ing to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (2): 179–225.
Published: 01 April 2005
.... Frege’s example was (1) Jupiter has four moons, where the occurrence of ‘four’ seems to be just like that of ‘green’ in (2) Jupiter has green moons. On the other hand, ‘four’ occurs as a singular term, which is to say that it occurs in a position that is commonly occupied by paradigmatic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
... characterizes person-level mental phenomena in a way that seems to presuppose a restricted conception of genuinely mental states, like the state of believing something for a given set of reasons. Pollock says that one's current reasons for believing that p can include only the contents of one's occurrent mental...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 327–358.
Published: 01 July 2005
... require three main assumptions. First, I shall need to speak of the causal relata, and so I will assume that these are events (or sets thereof). In particular, I will treat the causal relata as concrete, coarse-grained, worldbound occurrences. Second, I 328...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 359–406.
Published: 01 July 2012
... of the coin toss is obviously a large bullet to bite.9 In any case, the suggestion can be dismissed on independent grounds. The key point is that occurrences of epistemic shift are not limited to conditionals. Rather than (5) and (6), the amnesiac could say simply: (11) I might be in Main...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 540–544.
Published: 01 October 2005
... conceptualized in thinking; rather, conceptual capacities are already operative in experience itself. Another main idea concerns a resistance to the first idea: Experience is our sensibility in operation and as such simply an occurrence in nature; thus, conceptual capacities cannot possibly be operative in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 419–422.
Published: 01 July 2003
... (preempting) causes. The most troublesome cases are those involving direct or “occurrent” preemption, in which the preempted cause, had it been allowed to be active, would have directly brought about its effect. Ehring’s complex exam- ples here do not permit quick summary, but the central idea is that a...