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objective chance

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Christian List; Marcus Pivato This article offers a new argument for the claim that there can be nondegenerate objective chance in a deterministic world. Using a formal model of the relationship between different levels of description of a system, the article shows how objective chance at a higher...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Huw Price In “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” David Lewis says that he is “led to wonder whether anyone but a subjectivist is in a position to understand objective chance.” The present essay aims to motivate this same Lewisean attitude, and a similar degree of modest subjectivism, with...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
... set of credences that violates the probability axioms, there is a set that satisfies those axioms that is closer to every possible set of truth values. This article replaces truth values with objective chances in this argument; it shows that for any set of credences that violates the probability...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
... . 2006 . “ The Future Similarity Objection Revisited .” Synthese 150 : 57 – 67 . Haecceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals Boris Kment Princeton University Imagine a symmetrical world w...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
... Public Life: A Reader , ed. Stone P. , 133 – 60 . Exeter : Imprint Academic (originally published in Social Science Information 27: 483–516). Citations refer to the Imprint Academic reprint . Lewis David 1986 . “ A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance .” In Philosophical...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 130–132.
Published: 01 January 2002
...Edward Stein FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE. By Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels, and Daniel Wikler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xiv, 398 Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
... objective expected posterior accuracy would be the same (invariant), regardless of whether her prior credences reflect a particularly accurate hunch or not, then that hunch plausibly plays no role in explaining why she has a particularly high (or low) chance of attaining a particularly high (or low...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 307–339.
Published: 01 July 2016
... to Lewis's results is to claim that conditional claims, or claims about subjective value, lack truth conditions. For this strategy to have a chance of success, it needs to give up basic structural principles about how epistemic states can be updated—in a way that is strikingly parallel to the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
... of mental systems that stand at the border of perception and belief, and has been extensively studied in developmental psychology. Core cognition's borderline states do not fit neatly into the traditional epistemic picture. What is the epistemic role of these states? Focusing on the core object...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
...Jennifer Lackey This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs— inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
... . Lemmon E. J. 1962 .“ Moral Dilemmas .” Philosophical Review 71 , no. 2 : 139 - 58 . Lewis D. 1974 .“ Radical Interpretation .” Synthese 23 : 331 - 44 . ———. 1986 .“ A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance .” In Philosophical Papers , vol. 2 , 83 - 132 . New York...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 289–306.
Published: 01 April 2013
...Arif Ahmed The essay presents a novel counterexample to Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Its interest is that it generates a case in which CDT violates the very principles that motivated it in the first place. The essay argues that the objection applies to all extant formulations of CDT and that the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 55–93.
Published: 01 January 2012
... counterexamples with which the essay began. The essay briefly discusses the relevance of the Dragging Condition to the recently much-discussed topic of “transmission failure” in epistemology, applies the Dragging Condition to the problem of “bootstrapping” in epistemology, and discusses three important objections...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (2): 205–239.
Published: 01 April 2016
... about the existence of material objects and their qualities for the most part, it seems plausible that, for any given sensory experience we have, there is some chance that it misinforms us about the objects in our environment. But how can I know by sensation, for example, that there is a white coffee...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 323–393.
Published: 01 July 2020
... that DRH enjoys both theoretical and empirical support, and also defends the view against several objections. © 2020 by Cornell University 2020 Fodor argued that perceptual processes are not like this. They lack freewheeling access to our background beliefs, and they do not search laboriously...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 263–266.
Published: 01 April 2003
... would be enough to enable the world to contain such things as minds, causation, people, and languages; and in princi- ple, Lewis claims, his Humean world has everything needed for truths of coun- terfactual conditionals and statements of objective chances. Lewis leaves open the question of whether...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
... awakenings she will undergo is determined by the outcome of a random process. Let S be a partition of alternative hypotheses concerning the outcome of this pro- cess. Beauty knows the objective chance of each hypothesis in S,andshe also knows how many times she will awaken conditional on each of these...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 116–118.
Published: 01 January 2014
... necessity of laws), the relationship between laws and objective chances, and the nature of instantaneous velocity and acceleration. The latter, argues Lange, are best understood in terms of certain subjunctive facts. This, in turn, is one advantage of what might otherwise seem to be a disadvantage, the fact...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 484–489.
Published: 01 July 2020
... . “ The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory .” Mind 128 , no. 509 : 69 – 107 . Lewis, David. 1980. “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.” In Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, vol. 2, edited by Richard C. Jeffrey. Berkeley: University of California Press . Moss, Sarah...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 279–322.
Published: 01 July 2018
... sets if you want. But play fair in naming it. Don't call it “naturalness” until you've shown that it is something that should guide our theorizing. I just paraphrased Lewis's famous objection to anti-Humean conceptions of objective chance, because my objection to realism is exactly analogous...