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objective chance

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 119–152.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Christian List; Marcus Pivato This article offers a new argument for the claim that there can be nondegenerate objective chance in a deterministic world. Using a formal model of the relationship between different levels of description of a system, the article shows how objective chance at a higher...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Huw Price In “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” David Lewis says that he is “led to wonder whether anyone but a subjectivist is in a position to understand objective chance.” The present essay aims to motivate this same Lewisean attitude, and a similar degree of modest subjectivism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
... set of credences that violates the probability axioms, there is a set that satisfies those axioms that is closer to every possible set of truth values. This article replaces truth values with objective chances in this argument; it shows that for any set of credences that violates the probability...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 573–609.
Published: 01 October 2012
...-individualism clearly in mind, the reader may be tempted to raise an objection. In the introduction, I described the two-particle world by saying things like: it’s true at this world that A could have decayed. And I said that I expected 582 Haecceitism, Chance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
... scoring rule, namely, the Brier score (section 5.2). And measure variance in objective expected posterior accuracy across chance hypotheses, var ( Exp c ′ ( B ) ) , in the usual way (by the difference in its maximum and minimum expected inaccuracies). Now note that   var...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
... be a partition of alternative hypotheses concerning the outcome of this pro- cess. Beauty knows the objective chance of each hypothesis in S,andshe also knows how many times she will awaken conditional on each of these 4. See Lewis 2001 for an early defense of this position...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
... achieves what PA claims should be achieved. But proponents of PA may have something to say in response to this example. Later on, I will discuss whether they could simply bite the bullet. Maybe they can hold that although some of our intuitions seem to call for chances of a more objective variety...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (2): 263–266.
Published: 01 April 2003
... would be enough to enable the world to contain such things as minds, causation, people, and languages; and in princi- ple, Lewis claims, his Humean world has everything needed for truths of coun- terfactual conditionals and statements of objective chances. Lewis leaves open the question of whether...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 241–294.
Published: 01 July 2022
... are stamped on the outside, so people inside a universe can’t see them.) If there is one universe, then the objective chance that Universe One has life is 1 ∕ n . If there are two universes, then the chance that Universe One has life is 1 ∕ n , and the chance that Universe Two has life is 1...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 484–489.
Published: 01 July 2020
... . “ The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory .” Mind 128 , no. 509 : 69 – 107 . Lewis, David. 1980. “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.” In Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, vol. 2, edited by Richard C. Jeffrey. Berkeley: University of California Press . Moss, Sarah . 2011...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 116–118.
Published: 01 January 2014
... for the necessity of laws), the relationship between laws and objective chances, and the nature of instantaneous velocity and acceleration. The latter, argues Lange, are best understood in terms of certain subjunctive facts. This, in turn, is one advantage of what might otherwise seem to be a disadvantage, the fact...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
... . “ Possibility .” Philosophical Review 76 ( 2 ): 143 – 68 . Hájek Alan . 2003 . “ What Conditional Probability Could Not Be .” Synthese 137 ( 3 ): 273 – 323 . Hall Ned . 1994 . “ Correcting the Guide to Objective Chance .” Mind 103 ( 412 ): 505 – 18 . Hall Ned Hájek...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 149–177.
Published: 01 April 2012
... DARREN BRADLEY (objective chances), our metaphorical procedures generate subjective (or inductive) probabilities (Maher 2006). So what matters for us is what the agent believes (or ought to believe) about the probability of learning the evidence given the hypotheses. I will mostly leave...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
... . Lemmon E. J. 1962 .“ Moral Dilemmas .” Philosophical Review 71 , no. 2 : 139 - 58 . Lewis D. 1974 .“ Radical Interpretation .” Synthese 23 : 331 - 44 . ———. 1986 .“ A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance .” In Philosophical Papers , vol. 2 , 83 - 132 . New York...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 555–606.
Published: 01 October 2008
... . “Subjective Probability and Acceptance.” Philosophical Studies 77 : 147 -79. Lewis, D. 1979 . “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se.” Philosophical Review 88 : 513 -43. ———. 1980 . “A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance.” In Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability , vol. 2 , ed. R. C...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 27–56.
Published: 01 January 2003
... & Littlefield. Jordan, Jeff. 1998 . Pascal's Wager Revisited. Religious Studies 34 : 419 -31. Kemeny, J. 1955 . Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities. Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 : 263 -73. Lewis, David. 1980 . A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance. In Studies in Inductive Logic...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 523–527.
Published: 01 October 2019
... that her flight will be on time, since this ignores the agent's uncertainty. Similarly, it can't be the objective chance if Sara's uncertainty is merely due to lack of information rather than genuine chanciness. Alternatively, the reason might be the fact that it is somewhat likely on Sara's evidence...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 230–235.
Published: 01 April 2022
... the credences and utilities of distinct selves are aggregated. This move is modeled explicitly on the literature for collective decision-making. Chapter 5 nicely develops the way the weak reflection principle applies in cases of credal (or value) change, showing how principles for credences about objective...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 279–322.
Published: 01 July 2018
... is that our acquaintance with pain removes the mystery. 30. Of course, one might now leverage the argument into an objection to the metaphysical posit itself. Compare Lewis's argument against anti-Humean conceptions of chance. Strictly speaking, all he argued was that the unHumean whatnot does...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... : Chelsea . Lewis D. 1980 . “ A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance .” In Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability , ed. Jeffrey R. , 263 – 93 . Berkeley : University of California Press . Lewis D. 1996 . “ Desire as Belief 2 .” Mind 105 , no. 418 : 303 – 13...