Search Results for norms of inquiry

...Jane Friedman Call the norms of inquiry zetetic norms. How are zetetic norms related to epistemic norms? At first glance, they seem quite closely connected. Aren't epistemic norms norms that bind inquirers qua inquirers? And isn't epistemology the place to look for a normative theory of inquiry...

... to start to orient you.) Chapter 1 lays out the functional approach in the abstract, paying special attention to the ways in which it involves weaving together descriptive and normative inquiry into human causal cognition. Chapter 3 draws out a number of specific and important lessons for how inquiry...

... is deflationary. He denies that they possess a robust nature that is amenable to scientific, metaphysical, or normative inquiry (66). Instead, Hill argues that the semantic concepts of truth, correspondence, reference, and denotation can be defined via the use of the logical concepts of substitutional quantifiers...

... as possible to reach skeptical conclu- sions by following out a naturalist inquiry into the understanding. To do this, I will identify the norms that guide his inquiry and explain their role in generating the skeptical conclusions. Second, Hume occupies a naturalist’s stance after he draws his skeptical...

..., given the contribution made by this book to these important issues. Taylor’s final contribution to philosophy will have a lasting and positive impact. Taylor diagnoses the urge toward the way of ideas as symptomatic of the fear that philosophy will have nothing to contribute to metaphysical inquiry...

... or her own lights. For De Pierris, then, Hume gives skeptical arguments targeting what are, by his own lights, our best methods of scientific inquiry. So how can he continue to endorse and rely on those methods, as a practicing scientist of man? De Pierris claims that Hume's philosophy involves two...

... of the idea that truth can constitute a norm or a goal of inquiry. Rorty and Davidson both claim that we can never tell which of our beliefs are true, since, as Davidson puts it in his contribution to this volume, “truths do not come with a ‘mark’, like the date in the corner of some photographs, which...

..., the agreement reached by the natural philosophers who consti- tuted Galileo’s community of inquiry. Formulating epistemic relationalism in terms of agreement is not an unfamiliar idea. It is at least entertained if not endorsed by Wittgenstein. Relativizing the truth of a particular normative proposi...

... such as belief and desire. These representational attributions draw explanatory and predictive power from their affiliation with a network of informal norms and generalizations, such as norms linking belief and desire to action. Cognitive scientists refine folk psychological explanation by articulating...

..., and evidence nevertheless get traction. What are arguably the central normative aspects of inquiry needn't be—and ultimately are not —grounded in the relationship between that inquiry and the truth. The idea—less a specific position than an expression of a distinctive (but not unfamiliar, for readers...

... the virtue of avoiding the Frege-Geach problem that faces metaethical expressivism. In chapter 1, Kalderon argues for noncognitivism from what he claims to be asymmetric norms governing our reaction to disagreement with epi- stemic peers...

... that this program has the virtue of avoiding the Frege-Geach problem that faces metaethical expressivism. In chapter 1, Kalderon argues for noncognitivism from what he claims to be asymmetric norms governing our reaction to disagreement with epi...

... of avoiding the Frege-Geach problem that faces metaethical expressivism. In chapter 1, Kalderon argues for noncognitivism from what he claims to be asymmetric norms governing our reaction to disagreement with epi- stemic peers concerning moral and nonmoral...

... to be asymmetric norms governing our reaction to disagreement with epi- stemic peers concerning moral and nonmoral questions.2 Chapter 2 argues against the expressivist alternative in semantics, taking Allan Gibbard’s norm expressivism as its exemplary target. Chapter 3...

... of avoiding the Frege-Geach problem that faces metaethical expressivism. In chapter 1, Kalderon argues for noncognitivism from what he claims to be asymmetric norms governing our reaction to disagreement with epi- stemic peers concerning moral and nonmoral...

... the virtue of avoiding the Frege-Geach problem that faces metaethical expressivism. In chapter 1, Kalderon argues for noncognitivism from what he claims to be asymmetric norms governing our reaction to disagreement with epi- stemic peers...

... to be asymmetric norms governing our reaction to disagreement with epi- stemic peers concerning moral and nonmoral questions.2 Chapter 2 argues against the expressivist alternative in semantics, taking Allan Gibbard’s norm expressivism as its exemplary target. Chapter 3...

... the virtue of avoiding the Frege-Geach problem that faces metaethical expressivism. In chapter 1, Kalderon argues for noncognitivism from what he claims to be asymmetric norms governing our reaction to disagreement with epi- stemic peers...

... as unworthy of care, and thus we, if we accept Darwall’s account, are committed to thinking that they do have a reason to pursue their good, even if they would deny it. If it is correct, Darwall’s account shows that the normativity of an agent’s welfare for his own rational deliberation depends...

... argument, as he makes his main claims in a roundabout way. Chakravartty begins by describing the common ground between realists and empiricists. Members of both camps, he suggests, can subscribe to “the norm of naturalized metaphysics,” according to which: Naturalized Metaphysics . Only...