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normatively relevant properties

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... represented in terms of two parameters: (i) a specification of which properties of the objects of moral choice matter in any given context, and (ii) a specification of how these properties matter. The first parameter tells us what the normatively relevant properties are, the second which sets of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 266–269.
Published: 01 April 2009
...Sonia Roca-Royes Penelope Mackie, How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon, 2006. xii + 212 pp. Cornell University 2009 Chalmers, David. 2002 . “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” In Conceivability and Possibility , ed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2010) 119 (1): 97–99.
Published: 01 January 2010
...Marc Lange Alexander Bird, Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 256 pp. Cornell University 2010 BOOK REVIEWS Alexander Bird, Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 256...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2018) 127 (1): 41–71.
Published: 01 January 2018
... normatively central properties (wrongness, personhood) are “normative reference magnets.” Part 4 consists of replies to objections, leading to refinements of the referential stability thesis itself and clarifying the role that first-order normative theory and normative psychology play in the argument...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 105–107.
Published: 01 January 2006
...David Merli Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xix + 388 pp. Cornell University 2006 BOOK REVIEWS Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xix + 388 pp. This...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2006) 115 (2): 169–198.
Published: 01 April 2006
... it is to be an agent, someone who performs actions. Perhaps the normative standards relevant for actions will fall out of an understanding of what is constitutive of action just as the normative standards relevant for cars fall out of an understanding of what is con- stitutive of cars...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2000) 109 (3): 313–347.
Published: 01 July 2000
... names, as, Hobbes thinks, words like ‘general’ and ‘universal’ refer to. Where, in this framework, can a normative claim fit? In what properties of bodies might laws or the right of nature consist? Indeed, since Hobbes believes that only terms with these referents can have meaning, what saves...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
... arguments against identifying normative with natural statements and facts do not transfer seamlessly to identifying normative with natural properties. Volume 2, by contrast, focuses mostly on metaethics. Here, nothing like a Triple Metaethical Theory is in the offing. Parfit vigorously defends his...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
...) does not ascribe an attitude toward truths. (22) You know that it is more likely that your specimens belong to G. hackmani than to G. balachowskyi. We can also give an attractively simple theory of the cases discussed in section 2. The relevant properties of credence distributions...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
...]. Deontic theory (for deontic focal point {acts} and deontic property being right ): S's φ-ing at time t is right iff the motive-set that caused S to φ at t is right. Both of these normative theories are examples of ethical teleologies: they specify certain ultimate ends that we, as agents...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2012) 121 (2): 241–275.
Published: 01 April 2012
... vindications of David Lewis’s original Principal Principle as well as recent reformulations due to Ned Hall and Jenann Ismael. Joyce enumerates properties that a function must have if it is to measure the distance from a set of credences to a set of truth values; he shows that, on any such measure, and for any...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
...Andrew Bacon Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centered around what this essay calls “linguistic” accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or nonparadoxical status. “No...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 441–480.
Published: 01 October 2015
... might agree with the conditionals and then conclude—on the basis of a norm advising against believing in unknowable structure—that the metaphysical thesis expressed in the antecedent is false. 6 Having drawn that conclusion, you may then deny that there is any ignorance about the relevant subject...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 147–190.
Published: 01 April 2017
... aside the role of intuition for the nonce to investigate Kant's conception of natural number. Although Kant himself doesn't distinguish between a cardinal and an ordinal conception of number, some of the properties Kant attributes to number can be characterized as cardinal or ordinal. This essay argues...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
... of the relevant states. Cornell University 2009 Perceptual Objectivity Tyler Burge University of California, Los Angeles A central preoccupation of philosophy in the twentieth century was to determine conditions...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2017
..., tells us that the factual knowledge that this is what it is like to experience red is based on knowledge by acquaintance with the relevant phenomenal property (which he takes to be the color red). 19 I will not attempt to adjudicate these accounts here. What matters is that each of them identifies...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2014
... mistake, which this essay calls the “numerical fallacy,” is to assume that a distinction that isn't represented by different numbers isn't represented at all in a mathematical representation. In this case, the essay claims that although the real numbers do not make all relevant distinctions, the full...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... there are two distinct normative senses of 'ought', which actually exhibit different syntactic behavior, and then going on to argue that the deliberative sense of 'ought' relates agents to actions, rather than to propositions. It closes by drawing lessons for a range of issues in moral theory...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
... view that this essay goes on to develop and defend, called the group epistemic agent account : groups are epistemic agents in their own right, with justified beliefs that respond to both evidence and normative requirements that arise only at the group level but that are nonetheless importantly...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
..., too. So what is the relevant procedural norm? One seemingly plausible candidate should be discussed first, as it is important to see that it does not apply in conflict cases. One might think that a lottery is required because it shows a kind of equal concern , in the sense that it manifests the...