... set of normatively relevant properties; we can therefore write N  ( x ), N  (  y ), and N  ( z ) for N   ( x , K ) , N   (   y , K ) , and N   ( z , K ) , respectively. To represent the theory according to our original definition, we must have N   ( x...

...Sonia Roca-Royes Penelope Mackie, How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon, 2006. xii + 212 pp. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS Aaron V. Garrett, Meaning in Spinoza’s Method. Cambridge: Cambridge...

...Marc Lange Alexander Bird, Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 256 pp. Cornell University 2010 BOOK REVIEWS Alexander Bird, Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 256...

.... This is because no matter how you fill that role and property in, we can run the same form of argument by appropriately filling in the following schemata for normative premises, together with analogues for the judgments that acts are not wrong: A reason-responsive agent would be such that for any x...

...David Merli Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xix + 388 pp. Cornell University 2006 BOOK REVIEWS Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xix + 388 pp. This...

... it is to be an agent, someone who performs actions. Perhaps the normative standards relevant for actions will fall out of an understanding of what is constitutive of action just as the normative standards relevant for cars fall out of an understanding of what is con- stitutive of cars...

... names, as, Hobbes thinks, words like ‘general’ and ‘universal’ refer to. Where, in this framework, can a normative claim fit? In what properties of bodies might laws or the right of nature consist? Indeed, since Hobbes believes that only terms with these referents can have meaning, what saves...

... arguments against identifying normative with natural statements and facts do not transfer seamlessly to identifying normative with natural properties. If reasons are, in their nature, considerations that agents can see as reasons from the perspective they take up in deliberating about what to desire...

...) does not ascribe an attitude toward truths. (22) You know that it is more likely that your specimens belong to G. hackmani than to G. balachowskyi. We can also give an attractively simple theory of the cases discussed in section 2. The relevant properties of credence distributions...

..., clairvoyants, and dogmatists. That is, such “bad ideology” cases are, in all relevant respects, just like cases that are thought to count against externalism—except that they intuitively favor externalism. This, the author argues, is a serious worry for internalism. What is more, it bears on the debate over...

... participate in weighing explanations of strict normative facts. Our main point is that we see no compelling reason to deny the semblance that, in many cases, the relevant standards are normative. They do not seem to be nonnormative properties. They are not merely motivating reasons—though we are sometimes...

... that systematically affect processing. The relevant process type for a given token is given by the complete algorithmic characterization of the token, along with the values of all the causally relevant parameters. The typing that results is far removed from the typings of folk psychology, and from much...

... the motive-set that caused S to φ at t is right. Both of these normative theories are examples of ethical teleologies: they specify certain ultimate ends that we, as agents, should promote and then assign deontic properties on the basis of how well acts, motive-sets, and the like conduce...

... vindications of David Lewis’s original Principal Principle as well as recent reformulations due to Ned Hall and Jenann Ismael. Joyce enumerates properties that a function must have if it is to measure the distance from a set of credences to a set of truth values; he shows that, on any such measure, and for any...

...Andrew Bacon Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centered around what this essay calls “linguistic” accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or nonparadoxical status. “No...

.... One might agree with the conditionals and then conclude—on the basis of a norm advising against believing in unknowable structure—that the metaphysical thesis expressed in the antecedent is false. 6 Having drawn that conclusion, you may then deny that there is any ignorance about the relevant...

... aside the role of intuition for the nonce to investigate Kant's conception of natural number. Although Kant himself doesn't distinguish between a cardinal and an ordinal conception of number, some of the properties Kant attributes to number can be characterized as cardinal or ordinal. This essay argues...

... one should think of attitude formation like one does (practical) choices among options. The article motivates this view linguistically, extending “relevant alternatives” theories of the attitudes to both belief and to the other, non-doxastic attitudes. Given a natural principle governing choice, and...

... of the relevant states. Cornell University 2009 Perceptual Objectivity Tyler Burge University of California, Los Angeles A central preoccupation of philosophy in the twentieth century was to determine conditions...

... based on knowledge by acquaintance with the relevant phenomenal property (which he takes to be the color red). 19 I will not attempt to adjudicate these accounts here. What matters is that each of them identifies a direct way of thinking of a look, which helps explain the “just see” phenomenology in...