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normatively relevant properties
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1
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... universalism and relativism. A theory with reasons structure ℛ = 〈 N , ⊵ 〉 is structurally universalist if the set of normatively relevant properties N ( K ) is the same across all contexts; that is, the normative relevance function N is constant. The theory is structurally relativist...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 451–457.
Published: 01 July 2012
... around a set of indexes that includes every factor
deemed to be relevant” (61). The author finally asserts,
No existing computation theory provides a good, normative model of
analogical arguments in science. Both the structuralist and case-based
approaches encounter difficulties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 457–460.
Published: 01 July 2012
... that includes every factor
deemed to be relevant” (61). The author finally asserts,
No existing computation theory provides a good, normative model of
analogical arguments in science. Both the structuralist and case-based
approaches encounter difficulties in identifying relevant...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 461–464.
Published: 01 July 2012
... that includes every factor
deemed to be relevant” (61). The author finally asserts,
No existing computation theory provides a good, normative model of
analogical arguments in science. Both the structuralist and case-based
approaches encounter difficulties in identifying relevant...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 464–467.
Published: 01 July 2012
... that includes every factor
deemed to be relevant” (61). The author finally asserts,
No existing computation theory provides a good, normative model of
analogical arguments in science. Both the structuralist and case-based
approaches encounter difficulties in identifying relevant...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 467–471.
Published: 01 July 2012
... that includes every factor
deemed to be relevant” (61). The author finally asserts,
No existing computation theory provides a good, normative model of
analogical arguments in science. Both the structuralist and case-based
approaches encounter difficulties in identifying relevant...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 472–474.
Published: 01 July 2012
... around a set of indexes that includes every factor
deemed to be relevant” (61). The author finally asserts,
No existing computation theory provides a good, normative model of
analogical arguments in science. Both the structuralist and case-based
approaches encounter difficulties...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 447–482.
Published: 01 October 2003
... that p must be considerations that are
taken as relevant of the truth of p. Thus, my hypothesis also accounts
for the essentially evidential character of norms of rational belief,
something noncognitivist accounts of rationality leave inexplicable.
Because my proposal is that exercising...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
... usually make their stand, however, is with the claim that normative properties can be reduced to or are natural properties. Why can't they cheerfully concede Parfit's point about normative facts and hold the line on properties? Here it just seems much more plausible that the relevant properties can...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 1–51.
Published: 01 January 2020
... of why these factors are the S-relevant factors . Despite being foundational in one sense, the latter are first-order rather than metanormative. These theories do not seek analyses of normative properties, but rather the deepest normative explanations of why the factors relevant to the instantiation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 41–71.
Published: 01 January 2018
... interpretation, and first-order normative assumptions. This story is distinguished from extant “reference magnetic” explanations of the phenomenon, and objections and replies are considered. The property P is the property of being morally wrong. In order to have a concrete thesis to work with, I take...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 563–601.
Published: 01 October 2007
...-
responding to the predication over and above this reaction to atomic
stimuli. Similarly, predicating ‘unique green’ of the chip is sanctioned
by our linguistic conventions, given the way the relevant collection of
atoms impinges on Norm’s organs of sight, but there is nothing in the
atoms themselves...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 515–566.
Published: 01 October 2011
... to be false and also agree
on the moral status of Sue’s assertion and other relevant properties. A
says, ‘Sue did not lie’. B initially says, ‘Sue lied’, believing falsely that ‘lie’
3. If an opponent insists that these disputes are not in any sense verbal, because they
are disputes over...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 429–484.
Published: 01 October 2014
... to which an explanation of the relevant normativity must adhere, rather than offering a substantive explanation of the relevant normativity, given that our understanding of these higher-order telic attitudes comes only from the role those attitudes are supposed to play in the relevant theory. What...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 211–249.
Published: 01 April 2020
... the semblance that, in many cases, the relevant standards are normative. They do not seem to be nonnormative properties. They are not merely motivating reasons—though we are sometimes motivated by them. And neither are they merely nonnormative explanatory reasons. 31 The fact that this or that consideration...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 289–337.
Published: 01 July 2003
... as useful in one species and be retained in
another that no longer has a use for it. A dodo’s visual system might
have retained representations of properties relevant to flight although
dodos cannot fly. Perhaps perception could yield a fear reaction in a
species after the species lost any ability...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2001
... task is to give an account
’Such metaphysical accounts of the nature of a moral property need not
follow immediately from such an account of the meaning of the relevant moral
term. They may follow only from the conjunction of this semantic account
with certain further truths (whether...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 481–527.
Published: 01 October 2017
... skeptic's claim, though, seems to be that we evolved to care about norm violators and so evolved to get angry with them because doing so promoted our ancestors' reproductive success. That is to say, there was a (response-independent) property—nonbenign norm violator—that some agents responded...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
... these steps when they were
first instantiated.” (2) “Epistemic norms and warrant attach to theagent
of the inference.” (3) “Epistemic norms for inference, and the warrant
an agent has in a step in an inference, must be explained in terms of
epistemologically relevant capacities, acts, experiences...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... from deontic logic, syntax, semantics, normative eth-
ics, and metaethics that bears on these questions and at least attempt to
see the forest, over the particular concerns of the linguists, logicians, and
moral philosophers who have been interested in some but not all of the
relevant issues...
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