Search Results for normatively relevant properties

... the normatively relevant properties are, the second which sets of properties “outweigh” or “defeat” which others. We call a representation of a moral theory in terms of these two parameters a reason-based representation ; we give a precise definition below. Reason-based representations encode not only a theory's...

... around a set of indexes that includes every factor deemed to be relevant” (61). The author finally asserts, No existing computation theory provides a good, normative model of analogical arguments in science. Both the structuralist and case-based approaches encounter difficulties...

... that includes every factor deemed to be relevant” (61). The author finally asserts, No existing computation theory provides a good, normative model of analogical arguments in science. Both the structuralist and case-based approaches encounter difficulties in identifying relevant...

... that includes every factor deemed to be relevant” (61). The author finally asserts, No existing computation theory provides a good, normative model of analogical arguments in science. Both the structuralist and case-based approaches encounter difficulties in identifying relevant...

... that includes every factor deemed to be relevant” (61). The author finally asserts, No existing computation theory provides a good, normative model of analogical arguments in science. Both the structuralist and case-based approaches encounter difficulties in identifying relevant...

... that includes every factor deemed to be relevant” (61). The author finally asserts, No existing computation theory provides a good, normative model of analogical arguments in science. Both the structuralist and case-based approaches encounter difficulties in identifying relevant...

... around a set of indexes that includes every factor deemed to be relevant” (61). The author finally asserts, No existing computation theory provides a good, normative model of analogical arguments in science. Both the structuralist and case-based approaches encounter difficulties...

... that p must be considerations that are taken as relevant of the truth of p. Thus, my hypothesis also accounts for the essentially evidential character of norms of rational belief, something noncognitivist accounts of rationality leave inexplicable. Because my proposal is that exercising...

... usually make their stand, however, is with the claim that normative properties can be reduced to or are natural properties. Why can't they cheerfully concede Parfit's point about normative facts and hold the line on properties? Here it just seems much more plausible that the relevant properties can...

... of why these factors are the S-relevant factors . Despite being foundational in one sense, the latter are first-order rather than metanormative. These theories do not seek analyses of normative properties, but rather the deepest normative explanations of why the factors relevant to the instantiation...

..., the folklore Lewisian theory is very misleading if taken as a general model for concepts irrespective of their conceptual roles. In the first instance, substantive radical interpretation gives us normative reference magnets (and always relative to conceptual role), drawn from the properties that populate...

...- responding to the predication over and above this reaction to atomic stimuli. Similarly, predicating ‘unique green’ of the chip is sanctioned by our linguistic conventions, given the way the relevant collection of atoms impinges on Norm’s organs of sight, but there is nothing in the atoms themselves...

... to be false and also agree on the moral status of Sue’s assertion and other relevant properties. A says, ‘Sue did not lie’. B initially says, ‘Sue lied’, believing falsely that ‘lie’ 3. If an opponent insists that these disputes are not in any sense verbal, because they are disputes over...

... in which performances and beliefs are subject to norms: they are not as they ought to be when they are failures or false (respectively). But this is a derivative sense of being subject to norms; they would not be subject to those norms were they not exercises of the relevant underlying capacities...

... of strict normative facts. Our main point is that we see no compelling reason to deny the semblance that, in many cases, the relevant standards are normative. They do not seem to be nonnormative properties. They are not merely motivating reasons—though we are sometimes motivated by them. And neither...

... as useful in one species and be retained in another that no longer has a use for it. A dodo’s visual system might have retained representations of properties relevant to flight although dodos cannot fly. Perhaps perception could yield a fear reaction in a species after the species lost any ability...

...). Now one might attempt to tweak the theory to avoid these prima facie counterexamples, but how? As I will suggest below (when talking about shadow skepticism, a more sophisticated version of response-independence), the only way to do so is to restrict the relevant incongruity or benign norm violation...

... task is to give an account ’Such metaphysical accounts of the nature of a moral property need not follow immediately from such an account of the meaning of the relevant moral term. They may follow only from the conjunction of this semantic account with certain further truths (whether...

... these steps when they were first instantiated.” (2) “Epistemic norms and warrant attach to theagent of the inference.” (3) “Epistemic norms for inference, and the warrant an agent has in a step in an inference, must be explained in terms of epistemologically relevant capacities, acts, experiences...

... from deontic logic, syntax, semantics, normative eth- ics, and metaethics that bears on these questions and at least attempt to see the forest, over the particular concerns of the linguists, logicians, and moral philosophers who have been interested in some but not all of the relevant issues...