Search Results for norm
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The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 272–275.
Published: 01 April 2015
... turned left. Gibbons argues (chapters 2 and 3) that this “ambiguity theory”—which might be bolstered by appealing to sophisticated recent work in the philosophy of normative language 2 —is irrelevant to the solution of his puzzle. The reason is that his puzzle concerns “genuine normative requirements...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2018) 127 (4): 541–545.
Published: 01 October 2018
...Bryce Huebner References Bicchieri C. , and Mercier H. 2014 . “ Norms and Beliefs: How Change Occurs .” Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 63 : 60 – 82 . Hamlin J. K. 2013 . “ Moral Judgment and Action in Preverbal Infants and Toddlers: Evidence for an Innate...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2006) 115 (1): 105–107.
Published: 01 January 2006
...David Merli Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xix + 388 pp. Cornell University 2006 BOOK REVIEWS Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xix + 388 pp. This...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2006) 115 (2): 169–198.
Published: 01 April 2006
... Studies 121 : 263 -75. Korsgaard, Christine. 1996 . The Sources of Normativity . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ____. 2002. “Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity.” The Locke Lectures given at Oxford University, May and June 2002, www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2007) 116 (4): 533–562.
Published: 01 October 2007
...Joshua Gert Cornell University 2007 Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons Joshua Gert Florida State University 1. Normative Reasons, Normative Roles, and Normative Strength The...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2018) 127 (1): 41–71.
Published: 01 January 2018
... interpretation, and first-order normative assumptions. This story is distinguished from extant “reference magnetic” explanations of the phenomenon, and objections and replies are considered. © 2018 by Cornell University 2018 naturalness metaethics metasemantics radical interpretation Some say...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2019) 128 (1): 121–126.
Published: 01 January 2019
...Matthew S. Bedke Eklund Matti , Choosing Normative Concepts . Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2017 . 219 pp . © 2019 by Cornell University 2019 As Eklund might be the first to tell you, this book is not systematic advocacy of a particular position. As I might be the first to...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2017) 126 (2): 281–285.
Published: 01 April 2017
...Samantha Matherne Ginsborg Hannah , The Normativity of Nature: Essays on Kant's “Critique of Judgement.” New York: Oxford University Press , 2015 . iv + 360 pp . © 2017 by Cornell University 2017 1. References to the Critique of the Power of Judgment follow the...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2000) 109 (3): 313–347.
Published: 01 July 2000
...Stephen Darwall Cornell University 2000 The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 3 (July 2000) Normativity and Projection in Hobbes’s Leviathan Stephen Darwall A perennial problem in interpreting Hobbes’s moral and political thought in Leviathan...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2002) 111 (1): 127–129.
Published: 01 January 2002
...Don Loeb ETHICAL NORMS, PARTICULAR CASES. By James D. Wallace. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. xi, 171. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS This book is a must-read for those interested contemporary normative ethical theory...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2012) 121 (4): 611–618.
Published: 01 October 2012
... performed. This thesis assumes that the structure of motivating reasons is sufficiently similar to the structure of normative reasons that the required coincidence in content and strength is a genuine possibility. But because motivating reasons have only one dimension of strength, while normative reasons...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
... arguments against identifying normative with natural statements and facts do not transfer seamlessly to identifying normative with natural properties. Volume 2, by contrast, focuses mostly on metaethics. Here, nothing like a Triple Metaethical Theory is in the offing. Parfit vigorously defends his...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Selim Berker When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... there are two distinct normative senses of 'ought', which actually exhibit different syntactic behavior, and then going on to argue that the deliberative sense of 'ought' relates agents to actions, rather than to propositions. It closes by drawing lessons for a range of issues in moral theory...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 423–446.
Published: 01 July 2011
...David Enoch In Slaves of the Passions Mark Schroeder puts forward Hypotheticalism, his version of a Humean theory of normative reasons that is capable, so he argues, of avoiding many of the difficulties Humeanism is traditionally vulnerable to. This critical notice first outlines the main argument...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
...Daniel Greco Epistemologists and philosophers of mind both ask questions about belief. Epistemologists ask normative questions about belief—which beliefs ought we to have? Philosophers of mind ask metaphysical questions about belief—what are beliefs, and what does it take to have them? While these...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 1–43.
Published: 01 January 2013
... diagnosis of probabilistic analogues of Gettier cases. Just like propositional knowledge, probabilistic knowledge is factive, safe, and sensitive. And it helps us build knowledge-based norms of action without accepting implausible semantic assumptions or endorsing the claim that knowledge is interest...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2018) 127 (2): 197–224.
Published: 01 April 2018
...Michael Bukoski In The Sources of Normativity and elsewhere, Korsgaard defends a Kantian ethical theory by arguing that valuing anything commits one to valuing humanity as the source of all value. I reconstruct Korsgaard's influential argument to show how she can resist many of the objections that...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2015) 124 (2): 169–206.
Published: 01 April 2015
... and discharges some remaining grounds for resistance to these skeptical conclusions, as well as the possibility of defending a weaker version of a normative lottery principle. The conclusion is that we have no reason to believe that where equal claims conflict, we are morally required to hold a...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
... view that this essay goes on to develop and defend, called the group epistemic agent account : groups are epistemic agents in their own right, with justified beliefs that respond to both evidence and normative requirements that arise only at the group level but that are nonetheless importantly...