...John MacFarlane Colin McGinn, Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. vi, 114. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS If the complement clause ascribes a first-person content, it expresses...

...Alexander W. Kocurek A counteridentical is a counterfactual with an identity statement in the antecedent. While counteridenticals generally seem nontrivial, most semantic theories for counterfactuals, when combined with the necessity of identity and distinctness, attribute vacuous truth conditions...

...), that there is a broadest necessity. One way to define it is: being identical to ⊤, or λp .( p  = ⊤), where ⊤ stands for a tautology. 8 But higher-order logic is entirely neutral about the behavior of this operator, except that it is governed by a modal logic containing at least the theorems of S4. 9 For instance...

.... The relation of identity holds of necessity between each thing and itself, but this is only one case.6 The relation of being indiscernible from, also holds of necessity between each thing and itself.7 All of these claims are consilient with the Humean claim. One version of the Humean claim also...

... Logics Which Enrich S5.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 : 423 -54. Kripke, Saul. 1971 . “Identity and Necessity.” In Identity and Individuation , ed. M. Munitz, 135 -64. New York: New York University Press. Lewis, David. 1973 . Counterfactuals . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press...

... macroscopic truth concerning natural ‘Horgan (1984) puts forward a version of this thesis under the name “cosmic hermeneutics,” although he qualifies the thesis to allow a role for a posteriori identities involving rigid designators in inferring macroscopic truths from microscopic truths...

..., let’s look more closely at the way modal rationalists explain why necessities like “water = H2O” are a posteriori. They argue that the a posteriority of this identity statement comes from the epistemic (and metaphysical) contingency of the fact that it is H2O that plays the role we use to pick out...

... are either conceptual or logical truths, all such truths them- selves are intelligible. (What about true identity statements—aren’t they brute metaphysical necessities? I don’t think so. While identity is brute in the sense that it’s not the case that something is identical to itself in virtue of some...

..., there might nevertheless be non- trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse- quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces- sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically, arguments for the Necessity...

..., there might nevertheless be non- trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse- quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces- sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically, arguments for the Necessity...

..., there might nevertheless be non- trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse- quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces- sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically, arguments for the Necessity...

..., there might nevertheless be non- trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse- quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces- sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically, arguments for the Necessity...

..., there might nevertheless be non- trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse- quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces- sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically, arguments for the Necessity...

..., there might nevertheless be non- trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse- quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces- sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically, arguments for the Necessity...

..., there might nevertheless be non- trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse- quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces- sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically, arguments for the Necessity...

..., there might nevertheless be non- trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse- quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces- sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically, arguments for the Necessity...

..., there might nevertheless be non- trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse- quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces- sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically, arguments for the Necessity...

..., there might nevertheless be non- trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse- quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces- sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically, arguments for the Necessity...

..., since these will often involve specific assumptions. Those I just gave, for instance, assume the necessity of origins (Kripke 1980: 110–15) and that constitution is not identity (Johnston 1992). 9. This principle survives in some form into the Critical period (PR 28:1036), though...

... that justification. Because we are human and thus characterized by the three features of rational agency, we need some practical identity or other in order “to act and to live” (1996c, 121). Recall: the necessity of action means that we must act; the reflective structure of human consciousness means that we must...