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necessity of identity
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 462–465.
Published: 01 July 2002
...John MacFarlane Colin McGinn, Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. vi, 114. Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS
If the complement clause ascribes a first-person content, it expresses...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 323–369.
Published: 01 July 2018
...Alexander W. Kocurek A counteridentical is a counterfactual with an identity statement in the antecedent. While counteridenticals generally seem nontrivial, most semantic theories for counterfactuals, when combined with the necessity of identity and distinctness, attribute vacuous truth conditions...
Includes: Supplementary data
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 275–287.
Published: 01 April 2008
... Logics Which Enrich S5.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 : 423 -54. Kripke, Saul. 1971 . “Identity and Necessity.” In Identity and Individuation , ed. M. Munitz, 135 -64. New York: New York University Press. Lewis, David. 1973 . Counterfactuals . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 153–181.
Published: 01 April 2009
.... The relation of identity holds of necessity between
each thing and itself, but this is only one case.6 The relation of being
indiscernible from, also holds of necessity between each thing and itself.7
All of these claims are consilient with the Humean claim.
One version of the Humean claim also...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2023
... Considerations on Modal Logic .” Acta Philosophica Fennica 16 : 83 – 94 . Kripke Saul A. 1971 . “ Identity and Necessity .” In Identity and Individuation , edited by Munitz Milton Karl , 135 – 64 . New York : New York University Press . Kripke Saul A. 1980 . Naming...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 597–601.
Published: 01 October 2016
... philosophical work: perception, thought, the operations of the mind, belief and knowledge, causation, necessity, determinism, identity and personal identity, morals, freedom, virtue, justice, beauty, religion, God, design, and miracles. Garrett describes Hume's philosophical project as a general...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 537–589.
Published: 01 October 2020
...), that there is a broadest necessity. One way to define it is: being identical to ⊤, or λp .( p = ⊤), where ⊤ stands for a tautology. 8 But higher-order logic is entirely neutral about the behavior of this operator, except that it is governed by a modal logic containing at least the theorems of S4. 9 For instance...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 295–325.
Published: 01 July 2022
.... This repositioning would not necessarily change the identity of the resulting infant, and so Shae is Mae. 15. The necessity of identity/distinctness may not hold in Lewis’s counterpart theory of modal semantics. This does not mean that the argument must fail in counterpart theory. Instead of the necessity...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 443–450.
Published: 01 July 2004
...: Names, Necessity, and Identity. By Christopher Hughes. New York:
Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2004. Pp. xii, 247.
Mind, Morality, and Explanation: Selected Collaborations. By Frank Jackson, Philip
Pettit, and Michael Smith. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon
Press, 2004...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 315–360.
Published: 01 July 2001
... be a typical macroscopic truth concerning natural
‘Horgan (1984) puts forward a version of this thesis under the name
“cosmic hermeneutics,” although he qualifies the thesis to allow a role for a
posteriori identities involving rigid designators in inferring macroscopic
truths from...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
..., let’s look more closely at the way modal rationalists
explain why necessities like “water = H2O” are a posteriori. They argue
that the a posteriority of this identity statement comes from the epistemic
(and metaphysical) contingency of the fact that it is H2O that plays the
role we use to pick out...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 247–250.
Published: 01 April 2009
... are either conceptual or logical truths, all such truths them-
selves are intelligible. (What about true identity statements—aren’t they brute
metaphysical necessities? I don’t think so. While identity is brute in the sense
that it’s not the case that something is identical to itself in virtue of some...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 266–269.
Published: 01 April 2009
..., there might nevertheless be non-
trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse-
quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces-
sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically,
arguments for the Necessity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 241–244.
Published: 01 April 2009
..., there might nevertheless be non-
trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse-
quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces-
sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically,
arguments for the Necessity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 244–247.
Published: 01 April 2009
..., there might nevertheless be non-
trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse-
quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces-
sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically,
arguments for the Necessity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 250–253.
Published: 01 April 2009
..., there might nevertheless be non-
trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse-
quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces-
sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically,
arguments for the Necessity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 253–255.
Published: 01 April 2009
..., there might nevertheless be non-
trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse-
quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces-
sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically,
arguments for the Necessity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 256–258.
Published: 01 April 2009
..., there might nevertheless be non-
trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse-
quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces-
sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically,
arguments for the Necessity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 259–261.
Published: 01 April 2009
..., there might nevertheless be non-
trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse-
quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces-
sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically,
arguments for the Necessity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 261–266.
Published: 01 April 2009
..., there might nevertheless be non-
trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). Conse-
quently, chapter 6 takes one more step toward ME by arguing against Neces-
sity of Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically,
arguments for the Necessity...
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