... of philosophy as an academic discipline with, crucially, a history; the “conversation” that had always been part of what counted as philosophy now becomes diachronic, and there comes to be a list of canonical names marking the discipline’s practitioners. Not that, even then, broader uses of the term disappear...

...Anders J. Schoubye M ILLIANISM and DESCRIPTIVISM are without question the two most prominent views with respect to the semantics of proper names. However, debates between MILLIANS and DESCRIPTIVISTS have tended to focus on a fairly narrow set of linguistic data and an equally narrow set of problems...

...Delia Graff Fara One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names...

...Samuel Cumming Variabilism is the view that proper names (like pronouns) are semantically represented as variables. Referential names, like referential pronouns, are assigned their referents by a contextual variable assignment (Kaplan 1989). The reference parameter (like the world of evaluation...

...Robin Jeshion Clarence Sloat, Ora Matushansky, and Delia Graff Fara advocate a Syntactic Rationale on behalf of predicativism, the view that names are predicates in all of their occurrences. Each argues that a set of surprising syntactic data compels us to recognize names as a special variety...

... that Russell's solution requires him to adopt certain substantive views about the nature of the referents of what are usually called “logically proper names.” In particular, Russell's solution will work only if the referents of such names are given to one who understands them in a manner that is entirely “aspect...

... to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that the probability...

...Daniel Drucker This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee...

... declarative . While the actions of a perfectly good will would be described by the categorical declarative alone, human action is determined not only by the causality of the will but also by competing causes—namely, those stemming from inclination. There is thus need for a causal test for putative maxims...

... for an action. According to this view, if Jim ought to jam, that is not because there is a special distinctive deliberative ought relation between Jim and jamming; rather, it is because a certain proposition ought to be the case: namely, that Jim jams. This essay defends the naive view, by first arguing...

...Peter A. Graham A principle that many have found attractive is one that goes by the name “'Ought' Implies 'Can'.” According to this principle, one morally ought to do something only if one can do it. This essay has two goals: to show that the principle is false and to undermine the motivations...

... on an extension of a proposal due to Ned Hall and others from the case of chance to that of causation. The remedy suggests a new view of the relation between causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, namely, that they stand to each other much as chance stands to credence, being objective...

... descriptions, proper names, and pronouns are the same—they have the same syntactic as well as semantic structure. They are definite descriptions, with the definite article THE taking two arguments, an index andaNoun Phrase. Elbourne’s proposal targets two dominant views, one in linguistics, the other...

...Frederick Kroon Cornell University 2004 Almog, Joseph, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, eds. 1989 . Themes from Kaplan . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Borg, Emma. 2000 . Complex Demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 97 : 229 -49. Braun, David. 1993 . Empty Names. Noûs...

... for a very particular reason; it does so because a sense presents a reference, by incorporating a mode of presentation. This is how Frege invariably speaks of the matter when- ever he is discussing the senses expressed by proper names, the most renowned passage being found in the opening paragraphs...

... names and general terms. Chapter 1 introduces the distinction between F-type and S-type terms, grounded on the epistemological and semantic differences between the ways in which semantic values are determined and transmitted. This distinction pro- vides the starting point for the account...

... or refrain from bodily motion in accordance with choice. This power is properly called ‘freedom’, and when a person has the power, that power “is that which denominates him free, and is Freedom it self” (ibidthat is, having the power named ‘freedom’ is what makes it appropriate to call someone free...

..., David. 2005 . “Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names.” Noûs 39 : 596 –631. Burgess, John, and Gideon Rosen. 1997 . A Subject with No Object . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davidson, Donald. 1963 . “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” Journal of Philosophy 60 : 685 –700...

... forms. The ultimate outcome of these failures is “a two-tiered account of definition and reference” (16). The first tier consists of names, senses as expressed in ordinary linguistic definition, and referents; the second tier consists of the same names and their philosophically adequate definitions...

..., and an attack on what he regards as a counterrevolution that is attempting to resurrect the view that was dominant prior to the shift in a new and more sophisticated form. The shift was “the Kripkean revolution,” led by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity, assisted by David Kaplan, Hilary Putnam...