Skip Nav Destination
Search Results for names
1-20 of 679 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 59–117.
Published: 01 January 2015
...Delia Graff Fara One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 53–94.
Published: 01 January 2020
...Anders J. Schoubye M ILLIANISM and DESCRIPTIVISM are without question the two most prominent views with respect to the semantics of proper names. However, debates between MILLIANS and DESCRIPTIVISTS have tended to focus on a fairly narrow set of linguistic data and an equally narrow set of problems...
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (1): 103–106.
Published: 01 January 2022
...Richard Bett email@example.com Moore Christopher , Calling Philosophers Names: On the Origin of a Discipline . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press , 2020 xxi + 411 pp. © 2022 by Cornell University 2022 What is philosophy? This has been a contentious question...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 525–554.
Published: 01 October 2008
...Samuel Cumming Variabilism is the view that proper names (like pronouns) are semantically represented as variables. Referential names, like referential pronouns, are assigned their referents by a contextual variable assignment (Kaplan 1989). The reference parameter (like the world of evaluation...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 219–240.
Published: 01 April 2017
...Robin Jeshion Clarence Sloat, Ora Matushansky, and Delia Graff Fara advocate a Syntactic Rationale on behalf of predicativism, the view that names are predicates in all of their occurrences. Each argues that a set of surprising syntactic data compels us to recognize names as a special variety...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
... that Russell's solution requires him to adopt certain substantive views about the nature of the referents of what are usually called “logically proper names.” In particular, Russell's solution will work only if the referents of such names are given to one who understands them in a manner that is entirely “aspect...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 539–571.
Published: 01 October 2012
... to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that the probability...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... for an action. According to this view, if Jim ought to jam, that is not because there is a special distinctive deliberative ought relation between Jim and jamming; rather, it is because a certain proposition ought to be the case: namely, that Jim jams. This essay defends the naive view, by first arguing...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 337–382.
Published: 01 July 2011
...Peter A. Graham A principle that many have found attractive is one that goes by the name “'Ought' Implies 'Can'.” According to this principle, one morally ought to do something only if one can do it. This essay has two goals: to show that the principle is false and to undermine the motivations...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 483–538.
Published: 01 October 2012
... on an extension of a proposal due to Ned Hall and others from the case of chance to that of causation. The remedy suggests a new view of the relation between causal decision theory and evidential decision theory, namely, that they stand to each other much as chance stands to credence, being objective...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (4): 591–642.
Published: 01 October 2020
...Daniel Drucker This article investigates when one can (rationally) have attitudes, and when one cannot. It argues that a comprehensive theory must explain three phenomena. First, being related by descriptions or names to a proposition one has strong reason to believe is true does not guarantee...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 314–316.
Published: 01 April 2008
... descriptions, proper names, and pronouns are the same—they have the same syntactic as well as semantic structure. They are definite descriptions, with the definite article THE taking two arguments, an index andaNoun Phrase. Elbourne’s proposal targets two dominant views, one in linguistics, the other...
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2004
...Frederick Kroon Cornell University 2004 Almog, Joseph, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, eds. 1989 . Themes from Kaplan . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Borg, Emma. 2000 . Complex Demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 97 : 229 -49. Braun, David. 1993 . Empty Names. Noûs...
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 487–516.
Published: 01 October 2006
... for a very particular reason; it does so because a sense presents a reference, by incorporating a mode of presentation. This is how Frege invariably speaks of the matter when- ever he is discussing the senses expressed by proper names, the most renowned passage being found in the opening paragraphs...
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 432–434.
Published: 01 July 2004
... names and general terms. Chapter 1 introduces the distinction between F-type and S-type terms, grounded on the epistemological and semantic differences between the ways in which semantic values are determined and transmitted. This distinction pro- vides the starting point for the account...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (4): 633–645.
Published: 01 October 2007
... or refrain from bodily motion in accordance with choice. This power is properly called ‘freedom’, and when a person has the power, that power “is that which denominates him free, and is Freedom it self” (ibidthat is, having the power named ‘freedom’ is what makes it appropriate to call someone free...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 337–364.
Published: 01 July 2010
... and unproblematic way by the pretending use of names: the fictional entity Jonathan Pine was quite literally and straightforwardly created by John Le Carre’s´ use of ‘Jonathan Pine’ in order to pretend to refer to a real person. (Schiffer 1996, 157) Various considerations weigh heavily...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 536–541.
Published: 01 October 2017
... forms. The ultimate outcome of these failures is “a two-tiered account of definition and reference” (16). The first tier consists of names, senses as expressed in ordinary linguistic definition, and referents; the second tier consists of the same names and their philosophically adequate definitions...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 219–250.
Published: 01 April 2007
... to discuss whether we ought to endorse the schema. The box and the quantifi ers have already been explained. Predicate let- ters are schematic letters for predicates, and individual constants are schematic letters for proper names. Finally, when a formula in which one or more variables have free...
The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 251–266.
Published: 01 April 2007
..., and an attack on what he regards as a counterrevolution that is attempting to resurrect the view that was dominant prior to the shift in a new and more sophisticated form. The shift was “the Kripkean revolution,” led by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity, assisted by David Kaplan, Hilary Putnam...