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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (2): 245–273.
Published: 01 April 2008
.... The Unreliability of Naive Introspection Eric Schwitzgebel University of California, Riverside i. Current conscious experience is generally the last refuge of the skep- tic against uncertainty. Though we might doubt the existence of other minds...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Mark Schroeder According to a naive view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, 'ought' often expresses a relation between agents and actions —the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 353–392.
Published: 01 July 2015
... by analogy to what we naively wish to say about testimony, or which instead attempt to extend to testimony the epistemically preservative role of memory. memory testimony internalism externalism extended mind basing relation rational explanation Is memory merely testimony from one's former...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 471–474.
Published: 01 July 2021
... attention to methodology throughout the book is one of its distinctive virtues.) Borrowing a distinction from Fine, Horsten contrasts naive metaphysics with foundational metaphysics. The goal of naive metaphysics is simply to theorize the metaphysical nature of the world as it directly appears to us. Naive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 523–528.
Published: 01 October 2022
... recommend it to philosophers of mind and perception. Papineau’s central argument is a last view standing argument : wading through the detritus left after his assault on competitor views—naive realism and representationalism—one finds the qualitative view, standing strong. It is “the only option...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 609–614.
Published: 01 October 2021
... of the natural world and our place within it. (Chapters 9–12 discuss the nature of empirical dialectic.) Nor will I focus on the arguments that Gupta levels against competing views of perception. Against naive realism, for example, Gupta argues that the view does not make room for the fact that it is not always...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 327–359.
Published: 01 July 2022
..., if someone hallucinates a yellow pad she undergoes no “phenomenal experience,” but instead merely has the “cognitive effects” (principally “beliefs or judgments”) that would have been produced by a veridical perception of a yellow pad. Naive hallucinators do not just mistakenly think they see things...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 352–356.
Published: 01 July 2019
... is to offer a new reading of the Buddhist idea that a human being is nothing over and above an aggregate of nāma - rūpa (naively translated as mental and physical states or factors). Ganeri renders ‘ nāma - rūpa ’ as ‘minded body’ (18). This is a novel interpretation that provides a sophisticated, nuanced...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2018
... motivated and consistent with a naturalistic picture of perception. (130) There are a few questions one might raise here. What exactly is “the correspondence picture”? Is it the same as the view that experience is “representational”? (So do “naive realists” reject it?) And, supposing “pragmatism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 185–189.
Published: 01 January 2021
...., transparent communication vs. frequentist coverage properties) and the use of further Bayesian mathematical machinery. Naive Bayesian reasoning falls victim to the same criticism. According to some Bayesians, experimenters ought to assign prior probabilities to a fixed set of hypotheses H...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 385–389.
Published: 01 July 2017
..., in the distinctive sense needed for Kalderon's naive realism, where the object itself is part of the experience and so secures its objectivity? I am hard-pressed to think of any text that expresses such an idea or entails it, including ones where it would have been natural. In On Perception 6 (446b17–21...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (3): 299–352.
Published: 01 July 2015
... to a naive but extremely attractive thought, the sentence ‘ p ’ and the sentence ‘ ‘ p ’ is true in English' can be used interchangeably in English when appearing in extensional contexts. 1 Thus, in particular, one ought to accept every instance of the following disquotational schema: T. The sentence ‘ p...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 293–336.
Published: 01 July 2019
... in keeping with a naive or commonsense view of color than other early modern accounts. 14 In addition to articulating an alternative to the early modern consensus, Cavendish provides a vigorous defense of her commonsense view by raising serious worries about the mechanist view of color, and by providing...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (1): 45–92.
Published: 01 January 2013
... could be without it. It is, to say the least, a bit surprising that the dispute in (1) causes any problems. From a naive perspective, the case seems completely inno- cent. Mary rejects Alex’s judgment on the basis of what she knows. She knows that the keys cannot be in the car, and this is why...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (3): 457–459.
Published: 01 July 2001
... of why we are so prone to this (apparently, rather naive) confusion about the workings of language. Whence this “bewitchment of our intelligence” (slog),this “contemptuous attitude towards the particular case” (BB18)? A step toward deeper diagnosis might lie in the way that the object...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (3): 425–427.
Published: 01 July 2003
... disturbance of our naive view of a set as an arbitrary collection. And on the idealization issue, Resnik has argued2 that even an idealizing scientist is committed to the truth of the mathematics they use. Maddy’s new position is put forward in part 3, “Naturalism.” Quine’s natu- ralism consists...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 81–122.
Published: 01 January 2017
... by seeing the attempt to talk about all of the sets (or in this case, all of the non-self-membered sets) as necessarily involving the “introduction,” in some sense, of a set not in our original totality. Of course, the friend of indefinite extensibility need not accept naïve comprehension...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 143–178.
Published: 01 April 2019
... at all: Naive Plenitude. For any material object o and any modal profile M based on all of o 's properties, there is something coincident with o that has M . Naive Plenitude entails that for any property whatsoever, coincidents can vary with respect to its modal status. That is, for any...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (3): 423–425.
Published: 01 July 2000
... was expressing, among other things, his own sense that there was a dimension to Socrates beyond his (indeed beyond human) ken, but one does not fall into naive historicism if one regards that attitude as best explained by his reaction to the individual whom he had known. The enigmatic nature of Socrates invites...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (1): 123–127.
Published: 01 January 2022
... the boundaries of objects. Another is the use of tolerance principles about vague predicates, which lead to the sorites paradox. Another example is provided by the naive disquotational principles governing the truth predicate, which lead to the liar paradox. Thus, even the inconsistency of a heuristic...