... the premise that becoming overridden can result in “moral residue” (e.g., in the appropriateness of feeling regret). But then, I note, one could similarly infer not-OIC—via not-(1)—from the premise that becoming infeasible can result in moral residue. So there is an argument against OIC which parallels...

... is nonverbal—though one may want to reapply the method to ‘moral responsibility’ to be sure. Another possible outcome is that there will be no such residual disagreement. For example, the parties might agree on ‘Determinism is compatible with degree D of moral responsi- bility’, ‘Determinism...

... are often morally hamstrung for biological reasons. Those conceived in the summer by an aging father, for example, should expect a lifelong struggle against vice, since southern winds tend to introduce too much feminizing moisture into the residues in a mother's womb and because old men's semen is too cool...

..., though they would have little legal significance. Sixth, by privatizing marriage, the diversity of marriage practices that now exists might become more visible and tolerated, and existing marriage customs would be regarded neutrally by the state, as long as they comply with basic standards of morality...

... for identity—appeals to parsimony, inference to the best explanation, worries about “nomological danglers”—unconvincing. The moral is that we must learn to live with the “mental residue.” If we want to keep mental causation, we should try to minimize its scope and impact as much...

... for identity—appeals to parsimony, inference to the best explanation, worries about “nomological danglers”—unconvincing. The moral is that we must learn to live with the “mental residue.” If we want to keep mental causation, we should try to minimize its scope and impact as much...

... of mental causation vanishes. Kim finds arguments for identity—appeals to parsimony, inference to the best explanation, worries about “nomological danglers”—unconvincing. The moral is that we must learn to live with the “mental residue.” If we want to keep mental causation, we should try...

... for identity—appeals to parsimony, inference to the best explanation, worries about “nomological danglers”—unconvincing. The moral is that we must learn to live with the “mental residue.” If we want to keep mental causation, we should try to minimize its scope and impact as much...

... for identity—appeals to parsimony, inference to the best explanation, worries about “nomological danglers”—unconvincing. The moral is that we must learn to live with the “mental residue.” If we want to keep mental causation, we should try to minimize its scope and impact as much...

... for identity—appeals to parsimony, inference to the best explanation, worries about “nomological danglers”—unconvincing. The moral is that we must learn to live with the “mental residue.” If we want to keep mental causation, we should try to minimize its scope and impact as much...

... about “nomological danglers”—unconvincing. The moral is that we must learn to live with the “mental residue.” If we want to keep mental causation, we should try to minimize its scope and impact as much as possible For one thing, the mental residue encompasses only qualitative...

... for a McDowellean experience to constrain thought and suggests that the assumption that there is might rest on “residually Cartesian intuitions” (98). Drawing on examples such as the legendary example of the chicken sexers—already the topic of an 541...

... with an innate “depravity” or “perversity of the heart.” Such depravity is a feature of the “radical evil in human nature” through which we come to heed the claims of self-love over those of morality.1 Although Kant (R 6:22n, 35, 37) denies that human beings could ever intend evil purely for its own sake, he...

... ascribed by uses of ‘ought’ (and ‘ought*’). Even if it does, Eklund thinks there will be residual problems for the ardent realist. In particular, there will be competing normative concepts with slightly different normative roles, used to correctly ascribe different properties, and there is no clear sense...

... comments about influence, philosophy written recently” (ix). But then what is it that aesthetics needs to be rescued from? Wolterstorff's answer is that one can detect the residual influence of the grand narrative in the uninterrogated preoccupations of philosophers who have only superficially liberated...

... University Press, 1996); Keith Lehrer, “Freedom, Pref- erence and Autonomy,” Journal of Ethics 1 (1997): 3-25; Stuart Hampshire, “Two Kinds of Explanation,” in his Morality and ConJlict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 69-81. 3Such hierarchies of desires have been emphasized by, in particular...

... Defense. I wish to emphasize that it is not enough to point out that if indetermin- ism obtains, there will always be some sort of residual alternative possibility; the alternative possibility must be of the right sort—it must be sufficiently robust to ground attributions of moral responsibility...

... . “Ethical Particularism and Patterns.” In Moral Particularism, ed. B. Hooker and M. Little. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nagel, T. 1974 . “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83 : 435 -50. Levine, J. 1993 . “On Leaving Out What It's Like.” In Consciousness: Psychological...

...Tristram McPherson Mark Eli Kalderon, Moral Fictionalism . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. xii + 193 pp. Cornell University 2008 xxx pr08-004 June 10, 2008 10:56 BOOK REVIEWS Mark Eli Kalderon, Moral Fictionalism...

...Simon Căbulea May Jiwei Ci, The Two Faces of Justice . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. viii + 252 pp. Cornell University 2008 xxx pr08-004 June 10, 2008 10:56 BOOK REVIEWS Mark Eli Kalderon, Moral...